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← 937 SW2D 456 - Janecka v. State

Janecka v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

86
cited by 86 later decisions
3
states following
July 2018
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 81 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 86 later decisions — most recently July 2018 · most notably Threadgill v. State (2004), State v. Schackart (1997)

4 federal appellate · 81 state decisions

460199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Franks v. Delaware · Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia · Marks v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance for abuse of discretion.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “It is true the Supreme Court has held that retroactive application of an unforeseeable judicial construction of a statute, or a sudden, unanticipated change in a court-made rule, may violate due process in much the same way that retroactive application of new or modified penal provisions violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. But the gravamen of this dm process guarantee is “fair warning" to the defendant that his conduct was criminal at the time he engaged in it. Insofar as the Supreme Court has yet said, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak to the fairness, vel non, of retroactively lifting a burden of production of evidence from the shoulders of the State. And all the Palafox rule did, after all, was to impose a burden to produce evidence to refute any exculpatory matter that is contained in a confession admitted, and hence “vouched for,” by the State. There is no indication the Supreme Court would regard the abandonment of this increased burden of production in any way to implicate considerations of “fair warning” about whether specific conduct is criminal.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]n order to establish that he is harmed by the denial of intelligent use of a peremptory challenge as to a single veniremember, a defendant must, in effect, blindly exercise a peremptory against the veniremember to prevent him from sitting on the jury. Only if this prophylactic use of the peremptory challenge subsequently results in the deprivation of a peremptory challenge he would have used later on can we say the error in denying him the intelligent use of the peremptory challenge was harmful.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.