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← 938 F.2d 522 - Randall v. Whelan

Randall v. Whelan’s Empirical Analysis

938 F.2d 522 · 1991

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
April 2011
most recently cited

21 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2011 · most notably Reno v. Koray (1995), Dawson v. Scott (1995)

21 federal appellate ·

210199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2113 · 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (Bail Reform Act of 1984) · 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Bail Reform Act of 1984) · 18 U.S.C. § 3585 · 18 U.S.C. § 751

Relies on United States v. Woods · United States v. Insley · Ramsey v. Brennan · United States v. Smith

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]hat single factor encompasses a wide variety of restrictions.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “official detention” under § 3585. 7 . Even if Brown were correct, however, it would not apply in this case because the liberty restrictions in Brown were greater than those placed upon Moreland in RSCTC. In Brown, the curfew lasted from 7:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and during that time the prisoners were allowed no outside contact. In contrast, Moreland's curfew lasted from midnight to 8:00 a.m. with limited phone privileges. While Moreland was subject to some of the restrictions present in Brown-no drugs, no alcohol, drug testing, and limited travel — Moreland still had much more liberty in RSCTC than he would have had in jail. 8 . The fact that a detained defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General and a released defendant is not is particularly important. “There exists a strong presumption that ‘custody’ refers to the legal authority of the custodian.... The physical conditions to which federal inmates are subjected vary widely.... The only common link among all those settings is that the inmates are always subject to the authority of the Attorney General.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.... If any such person shall be committed to a jail or other such place of detention to await transportation to the place at which his sentence is to be served, his sentence shall commence to run from the date on which he is received at such jail or other place of detention. No sentence shall prescribe any other method of computing the term.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.