Young v. Herring’s Empirical Analysis
938 F.2d 543 · 1991
Citation profile
39 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably Verdin v. O'Leary (1992), Amos v. Scott (1995)
39 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Faretta v. California · Franks v. Delaware · Coleman v. Thompson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A defendant’s constitutional right to be present derives, in essence, from the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484. An ex parte communication with the jury, however, also may violate the defendant’s right to due pro cess “in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” Id. Such a communication amounts to a due process violation, however, only to “the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence, and to that extent only.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 332-33 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). When not secured by a specific constitutional provision, the defendant has a constitutional right to be present only when his presence “bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106 , 54 S.Ct. at 332 . Because the ex parte instruction in the instant case does not implicate a specific constitutional provision, Young must demonstrate that, based on all the circumstances, the instruction prevented him from receiving a fair and just hearing. See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116-17 , 54 S.Ct. at 336 (the due process clause requires us to examine the particular conditions and results to determine whether the hearing was unfair).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“'A predicate to the application of the Harris presumption ... is that the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law.’ ” (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 )), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 1485 , 117 L.Ed.2d 627 (1992). 114 . Ruiz, 504 F.3d at 527 . 115 . See, e.g., Maldonado v. Thaler, No. 10-70003, 2010 WL 3155236 , at - (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Rocha v. Thaler · Hogue v. Johnson“A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing ... if his claims are merely 'conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics' or 'contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.