Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

938 P.2d 264

313 UtahAdv.Rep. 21

State v. Jiminez

Utah Supreme Court

Decided March 21, 1997

Utah Supreme Court · decided 1997-03-21

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 2003

3 state decisions

Relies on State v. Johnson · South Salt Lake v. Burton · Swenson Associates Architects, P.C. v. State Ex Rel. Division of Facilities Construction

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1997-03-21

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

HOWE, Justice:

¶1Defendant Jose Jiminez appeals from his conviction of rape of a child, a first degree felony. He was sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term of. five years to life. He timely moved for a new trial on the ground that newly discovered evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict. The trial court held a hearing on the motion but denied it after argument and without taking additional evidence. It entered an unsigned minute entry on November 14, 1994, which gave no specific reasons for the denial. Defendant filed his notice of appeal eleven days later, on November 25. Two months later, on January 25, 1995, the trial court signed a formal written order denying the motion for a new trial, stating that “the evidence presented by defendant does not rise to the level contemplated by rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.”

¶2We must dismiss defendant’s appeal because his notice of appeal was prematurely filed. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) specifies, “A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [a motion for a new trial] shall have no effect.” In Swenson Associates Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1994), the plaintiff filed a timely post-trial motion, which was denied in a signed minute entry. The plaintiff filed his appeal within thirty days of this minute entry but four days before the court issued its written order denying the new trial motion. We ruled that this court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff had filed his notice of appeal before the trial court entered its order. Defendant seeks to distinguish this case from Swenson on the ground that the unsigned minute entry entered by the trial court in the instant ease did not direct either counsel to prepare a formal written order denying the motion, as was the case in Swenson. That distinction is unavailing since the minute entry in this case was unsigned, and we have consistently dismissed appeals from unsigned minute entries. See, e.g., South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986) (citing numerous cases holding same).

¶3In dismissing the appeal, we recognize that our action may deprive this defendant of his constitutional right to an appeal. Therefore, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110. The trial court should then follow the procedure outlined in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). As we wrote in State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), “Once a trial court on habeas review determines that a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately, without adjudication of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel.” The direct appeal is provided by means of the resentencing procedure outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981).

¶4Appeal dismissed.

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Justice HOWE’S opinion.
/938/p2d/264 · .json · Public domain