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← 939 F.2d 153 - Colvin v. Sullivan

Colvin v. Sullivan’s Empirical Analysis

939 F.2d 153 · 1991

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
June 2021
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 2 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently June 2021

3 federal appellate · 2 district ·

501991200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1320B (§ 1132 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 671 (§ 471 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 674 (§ 474 of the Social Security Act of 1935)

Relies on Sullivan v. Finkelstein · Brown v. United States Department of Interior

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Maryland has asserted that denying retroactive approval of its CAP will result in its receiving less than full reimbursement for the expenses it incurred that could have been eligible for Title IV-E reimbursement. Approval of a plan and compliance with the plan approved are two different things ... a state that administered a program substantively complying with Title TV-E but did not submit a plan would be entitled to no funds at all.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “45 C.F.R. § 95.515 reasonably presumes that a new CAP, as opposed to a claim submitted under an existing CAP, ordinarily should go into effect after the date when “a material defect is discovered” in the existing plan. 45 C.F.R. § 95.509 (a). This regulation gives states an incentive to carefully examine their CAPs at all times, to discover any defects that might exist as early as possible. Maryland could not prove that the RMS method was materially defective until it began measuring its employees’ time by the SSTS method, on October 1, 1985. Increasing disbursements from the date that Maryland began measuring by the SSTS method, and no earlier, is entirely appropriate. The Secretary did not abuse his discretion in making this determination. Maryland’s CAPs under both the RMS and the SSTS methods required it to verify all claims with data for the proper time period. See Department Appeals Board Decision at 4. The projected data for the time period prior to October 1, 1985 was not verified or verifiable. Therefore, it was not in compliance with any CAP approved by HHS. If Maryland were to submit projected data for a future time period, HHS. could disapprove that claim as well. Congress gave HHS the authority to require that all claims meet reasonable verification standards. It did not require HHS to waive such rules simply because the state failed to develop corroborating data and can no longer do that.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.