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94 Ala. 163

Alba v. Strong

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided November 15, 1891

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1891-11-15

Heard before the Hon. Vm. H. Tayloe. The bill in this case was filed on the 13th September, 1890, by Peter F. Alba against Joseph C. Strong, to enforce the specific performance of an alleged agreement for the sale of a tract of land by the -defendant to the complainant. The defendant was the trustee in a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors executed by the Danner Land and Lumber Company, which had become insolvent.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"The following propositions must be regarded as settled by the former decisions of this court beyond controversy: First , that to authorize the specific enforcement of an agreement to sell land, all the terms of the agreement must have been agreed on, leaving nothing for negotiation. Second , that all the terms of the agreement viz., the names of the parties, the subject-matter of the contract, the consideration and the promise, must be in writing . . . Third , that it is not essential that the paper evidence of the agreement be in any particular form, provided it contain the substance, as stated above. Fourth , that the written evidence of the terms of the agreement need not all be expressed in one paper. . . ."”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Tensaw Land & Timber Co. v. Covington, 355 So. 2d 698 - Montgomery v. Peddy

Relies on Jenkins v. Harrison · Phillips v. Adams · Carter v. Shorter

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1891-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently January 1978

19 state decisions

50189119001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

STONE, C. J.

¶1— The following propositions must be regarded as settled by the former decisions of this court beyond controversy : First, that to authorize the specific enforcement of an agreement to sell land, all the terms of the agreement must have been agreed on, leaving nothing for negotiation. Second, that all the terms of the agreement viz., the names of the parties, the subject-matter of the contract, the consideration and the promise, must be in writing, signed by the party sought to be charged, or by his agent thereunto authorized in writing. — Code of 1886, § 1732. Third, that it is not essential that the paper evidence of the agreement be in any particular form, provided it contain the substance, as stated above. Fourth, that the written evidence of the terms of the agreement need not all be expressed in one paper. If expressed in two or more papers, it will be sufficient, if collectively they contain enough, and refer to each other, and show the connection with sufficient clearness, without the aid of oral testimony. If, however, oral testimony is required to connect the papers, or to supply any essential term of the contract, then there is a failure to make a case for specific performance. Waterman on Specific Performance, § 231; Fry Spec. Per. § 72; Carter v. Shorter, 57 Ala. 253; Phillips v. Adams, 70 Ala. 373 ; Horton v. Wollner, 71 Ala. 452; Norman v. Molett, 8 Ala. 546.

¶2Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345, is not opposed to these *166views. On the contrary, it re-affirms them. In that case, the original memorandum was conceded to be insufficient, but a formal deed was signed, which, though not delivered, was sufficient of itself to take the case- without the influence of the statute of frauds. Speaking of that deed and another, simultaneously sigred, this court said: “Of themselves, the deeds import a bargain and sale of the fee-simple estate in lands, which are particularly described; and the bargainor and bargainee are clearly stated.” If the original, imperfect memorandum had been entirely omitted, the non-delivered deed contained all the terms of the contract, was signed by the party sought to be charged, and was sufficient.

¶3In the case in hand, the writing neither expresses the quantity of the land, nor any description by which it can be determined what land was intended to be bought or sold. This, according to the averments of the bill, rests entirely in parol. The chancellor did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the bill.

¶4Affirmed.

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