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94 Ariz. 131

382 P.2d 239

Docket No. 7268.

Rueda v. Galvez

Edward RUEDA and Rosario Rueda, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Maria GALVEZ, wife of F. Galvez, Appellee.

Arizona Supreme Court

Decided May 29, 1963.

Arizona Supreme Court · decided 1963-05-29

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““After a motion to set aside entry of default had been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, and to enter judgment upon the default. Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b), 16 A.R.S. An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable.” Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132, 133 , 382 P.2d 239, 240 (1963).”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 3 Ariz. App. 294 - Searles v. Haldiman, 6 Ariz. App. 506 - Walter v. Northern Arizona Title Co.

““B. From a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court * * *. ****** D. From any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken. ****** G. From an interlocutory judgment which determines the rights of the parties and directs an accounting or other proceeding to determine the amount of the recovery. ******”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Musa v. C. K. Adrian, M. D., 3 Ariz. App. 433 - Bolon v. Pennington

Relies on Stevens v. Mehagian's Home Furnishings, Inc. · Fudim v. Kane · Unger v. Los Angeles Transit Lines

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1963-05-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently December 2010 · most notably Arizona Podiatry Ass'n v. Director of Insurance (1966), Musa v. C. K. Adrian, M. D. (1981)

46 state decisions

180196319701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*132 Jose del Castillo, Tucson, for appellants.

¶2Healy, Laubscher & Dickerson, Tucson, for appellee.

¶3JENNINGS, Justice.

¶4The appellee Maria Galvez brought an action against appellants Edward and Rosario Rueda, seeking possession of certain real property and other affirmative relief. Appellants failed to answer within the time required by law and their default was subsequently entered by the clerk of the superior court. Three days thereafter appellants moved to set aside the default. This motion was denied and appellants appealed from the order denying their motion. No judgment was entered upon the default.

¶5Although the parties have not questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this appeal, we must nevertheless pass upon the Court's power to accept it. Stevens v. Mehagian's Home Furnishings, Inc., 90 Ariz. 42, 365 P.2d 208 (1961). With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the power of this Court to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals "from a final judgment." Review of orders is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) to appeals from "any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken."

¶6After a motion to set aside entry of default has been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, *133 and to enter judgment upon the default. Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b), 16 A.R.S. An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable. Unger v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App.2d 706, 339 P.2d 586 (1959); Garcia v. Thompson, 137 Colo. 231, 323 P.2d 280 (1958); Hope v. Hudgins, 98 Ga. App. 856, 107 S.E.2d 252 (1959) (dictum); Fudim v. Kane, 47 R.I. 357, 133 A. 351 (1926).

¶7The appeal is dismissed.

¶8STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.

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