¶1(after stating the facts). The refusal of the court to grant appellant’s prayer number 4 was reversible error. The prayer was warranted by the testimony both on the part of appellant and appellees. The appellant, a wholesale dealer, sold to appellees the goods at a fixed price named at the time. Appellees obtained, 'the moment the goods were delivered to them, absolute control over them. They resold them at their own price. The title was retained in appellant only for the purpose of security, but for no other purpose. So far as the appellant was concerned, she had done all she could do to pass the title when the goods were shipped to appellees. Nothing remained for her to do. The goods were on delivery under the complete dominion of the appellees to do with them as they chose, and to resell upon their own terms. The facts in this case do not make it a “bailment for mutual benefits.” Cases of that character have no application here. Here, although the witnesses speak of the contract as a consignment, yet the facts detailed by them tend to show that, when the goods consigned to appellees were received by them, they became the principal debtors to appellant. The title passed immediately to them on the payment of the purchase price. They were not merely intermediaries to pass the title from appellant to some third parties as the ultimate purchasers. At least, appellant was entitled to an instruction on the specific facts as set forth in the above testimony, telling them if they found the facts to be as recited in prayer number four presented by appellant that the loss must fall on appellees. We think that, according to the weight of authority and the best considered cases, where the title is retained solely for security and passes immediately to the vendee upon the payment of the purchase -money, he in the meantime having the absolute control and dominion over the property, the rule is that the loss falls upon the vendee, and the vendor may recover the purchase price undiminished by such loss. Lavalley v. Ravenna, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97; Osborn v. South Shore Lumber Company, 91 Wis. 526, 65 N. W. 184; Marion Mfg. Co. v. Buchanan, 99 S. W. 984; Phillips v. Hollenberg, 82 Ark. 9, and authorities there cited.
¶2The testimony tending to prove what appellant did in certain bankruptcy proceedings against certain third parties had no connection with this suit, and was therefore incompetent. It is unnecessary to decide whether under the whole case as developed it was also prejudicial.
¶3For the error indicated the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.