Venza v. Venza’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It is admitted by counsel for appellants that the appointment of a receiver is discretionary. It has been so determined by the Supreme Court which said, in Goes v. Perry, 18 Cal.2d 373, 381 , 115 P.2d 441, 445 ; `The rule is well established that the appointment of a receiver rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and that its action in appointing a receiver will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (Numerous citations.)' Also see Armbrust v. Armbrust, 75 Cal. App.2d 272, 275-276 , 171 P.2d 75 . And that such order may be made without notice and without any previous request by either party has also been decided. * * *"”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sullins v. Sullins

2. “"That case was cited with approval in McGarrah v. Bank of Southwestern Georgia, 117 Ga. 556 , 43 S.E. 987, 989 , in which it was said: `We can perceive no reason why the chancellor should not, on his own motion, appoint a receiver whenever a proper case is made, even though neither party to the controversy asks for or desires his appointment. Such seems to be the general practice of courts of chancery both in England and America. (Cases cited.)'"”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sullins v. Sullins