State v. Moen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Although the sheriff has some initial responsibility for determining whether an accused should be handcuffed during a jury trial, the trial judge must, in fulfilling his duty to preside over the trial, decide the question for himself. People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270 , 159 N.Y.S.2d 473 , 140 N.E.2d 353 (1957); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118 , 165 P.2d 389 (1946), rehearing denied, 63 Nev. 118 , 167 P.2d 476 (1946). In exercising his discretion, the judge need not rely only upon evidence formally offered and admitted at trial. His knowledge may properly stem from official records or what law enforcement officers have told him. State v. McKay, supra. In addition, the trial court may take judicial notice of facts generally known within the limits of its jurisdiction. State v. McKay, supra; Makley v. State, 49 Ohio App. 359 , 197 N.E. 339 (1934). However, the information relied upon should be shown on the record before trial and out of the presence of the jury, and the defendant should be afforded reasonable opportunity to meet that information.” 94 Idaho at 479-80 , 491 P.2d at 860-61 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bowers v. State · State v. Williams

2. ““The appellants’ first contention is that they were denied a fair and impartial trial because they were forced to wear handcuffs at trial. . . . The law applicable to the issue raised by the appellants is concisely summarized in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 977 (1961): ‘During the trial accused should, as a general rule, be free from shackles, except in so far as the trial court, in its sound discretion, deems them necessary to prevent the escape of accused or his forcible release, to restrain him from doing violence to others, or from injuring himself, or to prevent such misconduct as would obstruct the work of the court; and such exceptions apply particularly while accused is being brought into or taken from court. If accused is shackled without such necessity, it is reversible error, unless it is clear that no prejudice in the minds of the jury was caused thereby.’ “Furthermore, when reasonable precautions are taken to retain custody of the accused, the fact that they indicate to the jury that the defendant is a prisoner and perhaps a dangerous character does not deprive him of a fair trial. (Citations omitted). “Although the sheriff has some initial responsibility for determining whether an accused should be handcuffed during a jury trial, the trial judge must, in fulfilling his duty to preside over the trial, decide the question for himself. (Citations omitted). In exercising his discretion, the judge need not rely only upon evidence formally offered and admitted at trial. H”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Crawford