94 Ill. 2d 176 - Balciunas v. Duff’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

99 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 101 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[O]nce the court has exercised its discretion, that ruling should not be reversed by another member of the court simply because there is disagreement on the manner in which that discretion was exercised. Rather, a successor judge, before whom the case has been assigned, should revise or modify previous discovery rulings only if there is a change of circumstances or additional facts which warrant such action.” ( 94 Ill. 2d 176, 188 , 446 N.E.2d 242 .)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2018 IL App (1st) 180467 - Russo v. Corey Steel Co. · 152 Ill. App. 3d 648 - In Re Marriage of Falstad

2. ““In a variety of contexts, this court has stated that an interlocutory order may be reviewed, modified or vacated at any time before final judgment, and it is of no consequence that the original order was entered by another circuit judge. (E.g., Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113, 121 ; Leopold v. Levin (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 434, 446 ; Roach v. Village of Winnetka (1937), 366 Ill. 578, 581 ; Shaw v. Dorris (1919), 290 Ill. 196, 204 ; Fort Dearborn Lodge No. 214 v. Klein (1885), 115 Ill. 177, 181 ; cf. Barliant v. Follett Corp. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 226, 231 .) While those cases did not involve pretrial discovery rulings, we think that this court’s decision in Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113 , is virtually dispositive. In that case, one of the defendants had moved for judgment, claiming that a previous judgment dismissing plaintiff’s suit against Yellow Cab Company was res judicata. That motion was denied by the motion judge, and the action was assigned to another judge for a pretrial conference. Defendant renewed his motion before the second judge, who, agreeing with defendant’s contention, dismissed plaintiff’s action against that defendant. On appeal, this court considered the propriety of the second judge’s action. First, the court noted that the original order denying the motion was in the nature of an interlocutory order, and that the circuit court has inherent power to amend and revise such an order prior to final judgment. The court further stated:”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 104 Ill. 2d 54 - Brown v. Scotillo

3. “"As we have noted, in previous cases this court has indicated that prior interlocutory rulings should be modified or vacated by a successor judge only after careful consideration. [Citations.] In the context of discovery, where abuse is said to be widespread and delay phenomenal [citations], we think it is particularly appropriate for a judge before whom a motion for reconsideration is pending to exercise considerable restraint in reversing or modifying previous rulings. This is especially true if there is evidence of 'judge shopping' or it is apparent that a party is seeking, for delay or abusive purposes, a reconsideration of prior rulings." Id. at 187-88 , 68 Ill.Dec. 508 , 446 N.E.2d 242 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2018 IL App (1st) 180467 - Russo v. Corey Steel Co.