94 Md. App. 21 - Corbin v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Wjhere several persons are acting together aggressively toward another, and, because of their acts or the acts of either of them, it reasonably appears to him that his life is in danger, or he is in danger of great bodily harm, he may slay any of such persons or all of them, if it reasonably appears to him to be necessary so to do to protect himself from death or great bodily harm. And when a person is called upon to act under such circumstances, he is not bound to decide as to which one of the persons made the actual hostile demonstrations and refrain from injuring the others.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rajnic v. State · Jones v. Maryland

2. “Some evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no more than what it says — “some,” as that word is understood in common, everyday usage. It need not rise to the level of “beyond reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.” The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden. Then the baton is passed to the State. It must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did not kill in self-defense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 121 Md. App. 320 - Redcross v. State

3. ““Defense counsel argued at the close of all evidence that the requested instructions should be given. She excepted to the court’s refusal to give the instructions at that time and, again, the next day just before the jury was instructed. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that a third exception, after the jury was instructed, ‘would obviously [have been] a futile or useless act.’ [Sims, 319 Md. at 549 , 573 A.2d at 1321 ].””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 177 Md. App. 504 - Haney v. Gregory