94 Md. App. 461 - Lampton v. LaHood’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 4 district · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[I]t is now well established that ‘an estoppel may arise even where there is no intent to mislead, if the actions of one party cause a prejudicial change in the conduct of the other.’ Indeed, all that is needed to create an equitable estoppel is (1) voluntary conduct or representation, (2) reliance, and (3) detriment.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grimberg v. Marth · Chevy Chase Bank v. Chaires

2. “The sole authority cited by Lampton in support of her argument is Lowery v. Hairston, supra [ 73 Md.App. 189 , 533 A.2d 922 (1987) ]. There, plaintiffs filed an action against the personal representative of an estate seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase option. The circuit court dismissed the action, finding that the option constituted a “claim” under § 8-103(a) and that the plaintiffs had failed to file the claim in a timely fashion. We reversed, holding that three letters from the plaintiffs to the personal representative, which were sent and received by him prior to the statutory deadline for claims, and in which were stated the names and addresses of the claimants, the terms of the option, and their intent and ability to exercise it, constituted substantial and timely compliance with the statute. This holding is, as we noted then, entirely consistent with the “use of the word ‘may’ throughout § 8-104,” indicating that the forms of presentment are “permissive and not mandatory in nature.” 73 Md.App. at 197 n. 2, 533 A.2d 922 . The view that substantial, rather than strict compliance, is all that is necessary, has also been adopted by other courts interpreting similar statutes. See e.g., Peterson v. Marston, 362 N.W.2d 309 (Minn.1985); Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App.1989); Strong Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.App.1983). See also Matter of Estate of Phillips, 532 A.2d 654 (D.C.App.1987). To permit substantial ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Estate of Barry · Cunninghame v. Cunninghame

3. “(a) Presentation of claims.—Claims against an estate of a decedent may be presented as provided in this section. (b) Delivery to the personal representa tive.—The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative a verified written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed. If the claim is not yet due, the date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent, the nature of the contingency shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be described. The failure of the claimant to comply with the provisions of this section or with the reasonable requests of the personal representative for additional information may be a basis for disallowance of a claim in the discretion of the court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chamberlin v. Carter