majority"> MjerrimoN, J.

(after stating the facts). We are of opinion that both the deeds in question contained words of inheritance ■sufficiently expressed, and that they each passed the fee simple. It is very manifest from their purpose, scope and terms, although confusedly expressed, that the parties to them respectively, intended to pass the fee. And if the Court can give then) any reasonable interpretation that will effectuate this purpose, it must do so. In the construction of such instruments, the aim of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the parties. It seeks to do so. And with this view, it will have regard to the whole instrument, and not simply the orderly parts; it may,and ought, if need be, transpose words, clauses and sentences, and sometimes parts of sentences not in juxtaposition. Such transposition, however, must be reasonable, render the whole instrument ■consistent-, and give effect to the obvious intent. Stafford v. Jones, 91 N. C. 189 ; Broome’s Legal Maxims, 445.

The deeds before us are very confused in their provisions. While the general purpose of each is plain, their several parts are ■disjointed, disorderly and obscure. It was conceded on the argument, that they were ill drawn, informal and not punctuated at •all. So that the court is left much at large to decipher the meaning, relation and bearing of their constituent parts.

As to the one first mentioned : The warranty clause is interjected between the operative words of conveyance and the words of inheritance. The latter were intended to apply and refer to, and be read in connection with, the words of conveyance, and *230 fix the quantity of the title conveyed, as well as the clause of warranty — otherwise, they would be meaningless and mere surplusage. Why warrant the title to the heir, if it was intended that only a life estate should pass by the deed ? In such case, the heir could have no estate — there would be no fee to warrant! But treating the words of inheritance as fixing the quantity of the estate conveyed, they would have meaning and operative force, and render the conveying clause of the deed, and the clause of warranty, consistent, and effectuate the intent. Thus-interpreted, the clauses referred to must he taken as if they were-written in the proper connection, thus, “ have bargained and sold unto him, the said Lindsey the following named property, * ****** *^ nrq0 jj¡m said John E. Lindsey, his heirs and assigns forever, the right and title of the aforesaid property I do warrant and forever defend unto him, the said John E. Lindsey his heirs and assigns forever. ”

And for like reason, the second deed mentioned must be taheñ-as if written in the proper connection, thus, “To have and to hold the said lands and premises * * * to him, the said Bennett Barnes, his heirs, &c., * * * * and further I do-warrant and forever defend, the right and title of the aforesaid land and premises, to him the said Bennett Barnes, his heirs ” (fec-it seems to us that, such interpretation is not unreasonable ; it renders material parts of each deed referred to, consistent with, each other, while it gives just effect to the clear intent of the.parties to each.

What we have said, is in effect sustained by numerous similar oases decided by this Court. We cite only that of Stell v. Barham, 87 N. C., 62, in which several others are referred to and commented upon.

The judgment must be affirmed.

No error. Affirmed-

Mr. Justice Ashe dissented from the decision of this case on the ground that it is not supported by the decision in Stell v. Barham, 87 N. C., 62.

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