majority"> MebJRIMON, . J.,

(after stating the facts). It is very obvious that the indictment charges no offence created by any statute of this State in respect to forgery, and we-are of opinion that it can not be sustained at common law.

The order, request, or “railroad pass,” as it is called, is very indefinite and uncertain in every aspect of it. It does not purport, upon its face, to be given by a person who had any authority *838 to grant it, or to create any possible obligation on his part, to make it good or effective in any contingency, nor does it create, or express any purpose to create, any — the slightest — obligation upon the “conductor,” whoever he was, or whatever his business, to accept it, and comply with, the request contained in it, or to create any liability in any way, upon any person. Nor does it appear to whom it was given, or that it was given for any consideration of value. So far as appears from the order itself, or any averment in the indictment, it had no binding effect, and could not operate so as to injure or defraud any person. It was a simple, naked request, in favor of any person who might hold it.

To constitute the offence of forgery at common law, the paper writing, or instrument forged, must be executed with a fraudulent intent, and be such as may prejudice, or as would, or might, if genuine, operate to create a liability of another person. The false instrument must be such as does, or may, tend to prejudice the right of another, and such tendency must be apparent to the Court, either from the face of the writing itself, or from it, accompanied by the averment of extraneous facts, that show the tendency to injure. If the forged writing itself shows such tendency, then it will be sufficient to set it forth in the indictment, alleging the false and fraudulent intent; but where such tendency does not so appear, the extraneous facts, necessary to make it apparent, must be averred. This is essential, so as to enable the Court to see in the record, that the indictment charges a complete offence. State v. Greenlee, 1 Dev., 523; State v. Thorn, 66 N. C., 644; State v. Lamb, 65 N. C., 419; People v. Sholl, 9 Cowen, 778; People v. Harrison, 8 Barb., 560.

As we have seen, the alleged forged writing in this case, did not, of itself and upon its face, tend to prejudice any person. It may be, however, that the person whose name is subscribed to it, was the agent of a railroad company, and had authority to issue such a “ pass” for a consideration — that the paper was given to some particular person — that the conductor was agent of the *839 railroad company, and authorized and required to receive and act upon such a paper — it may be that there were facts and circumstances that would have shown that the paper did constitute the offence of forgery. If so, such material facts should have been properly averred, in connection with the writing, in the indictment. It is not sufficient to simply designate the paper as a “railroad pass” — it must appear and purport in some way, and with reasonable certainty, to be such pass, to constitute forgery. A railroad ticket, or pass, may be the subject of the offence at common law. Commonwealth v. Ray, 3 Gray (Mass.), 441; Regina v. Boult, 3 Car. & Kir., 604, (61 Eng. C. L., 603). The Court properly arrested the judgment.

Let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court, to the end that further proceedings may be had according to law. It is so ordered.

.No error. Affirmed.

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