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94 N.C. App. 386

380 S.E.2d 382

State v. Cooke

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1989-06-20

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[w]hile this evidence tends to show that [the] defendant was justifiably in fear for his safety when he drove away from his pedestrian pursuers, it does not tend to show that he was still justifiably fearful thirty minutes later after his pursuers had been left many miles behind. The coercion defense cannot be invoked by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm; and nothing in the record suggests that [the] defendant would have exposed himself to harm of any kind if he had stopped driving the car long before the officer saw him.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 15 Kan. App. 2d 326 - State v. Riedl, 242 N.C. App. 384 - State v. Badson

“nothing in the record suggests that defendant would have exposed himself to harm of any kind if he had stopped driving the car long before the officer saw him.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 242 N.C. App. 384 - State v. Badson

Relies on State v. Brower · State v. Green · 27 N.C. App. 354 - State v. Kearns

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1989-06-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently March 2018

8 state decisions

401989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PHILLIPS, Judge.

¶1 In appealing his conviction of driving while impaired in violation of G.S. 20-138.1 defendant contends that the court erred in not charging the jury on the defense of coercion and duress and as to the credibility of the breathalyzer operator. Neither contention has merit and we find no error.

¶2 The trial court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of coercion, compulsion or duress as there was no evidence that defendant faced threatening conduct of any kind at the time the officer saw him driving while intoxicated. State v. Brower and Johnson, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E. 2d 551 (1976), reconsideration denied, 293 N.C. 259, 243 S.E. 2d 143 (1978). The evidence that defendant relies upon was to the effect that he drove the vehicle away from a drunken party in the country because several irate people were chasing him on foot, and that he had been driving on different public highways for about thirty minutes when the officer stopped him. While this evidence tends to show that defendant was justifiably in fear for his safety when he drove away from his pedestrian pursuers, it does not tend to show that he was still justifiably fearful thirty minutes later after his pursuers had been left many miles behind. The coercion defense cannot be invoked “by one who had a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm,” State v. Kearns, 27 N.C. App. 354, 357, 219 S.E. 2d 228, 231 (1975), disc. rev. denied, 289 N.C. 300, 222 S.E. 2d 700 (1976); and nothing in the record suggests that defendant would have exposed himself to harm of any kind if he had stopped driving the car long before the officer saw him.

¶3 And the court’s instructions concerning the breathalyzer exactly conformed with the Pattern Jury Instructions, N.C.P.I. — Crim. *388 270.20, and adequately conveyed the substance of defendant’s request. State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 S.E. 2d 625 (1982).

¶4 No error.

Judges Parker and Cozort concur.
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