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← 94 U.S. 734 - Jerome v. McCarter

Jerome v. McCarter’s Empirical Analysis

94 U.S. 734 · 1876

Citation profile

149
cited by 149 later decisions
15
cited 15 times by the Supreme Court
21
states following
January 2005
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 11 district · 41 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 149 later decisions (15 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2005 · most notably Heiser v. Woodruff (1946), State of South Dakota v. State of North Carolina (1904)

50 federal appellate · 11 district · 41 state decisions — followed in 21 states

26018761880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Eyster v. Gaff · Marshall v. Knox · Bronson et al. v. La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company et al.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 149 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The position that the pledgees could not sell the pledge aftei- the adjudication in bankruptcy, is quite untenable. It is sustained by nothing in the Bankrupt Act. The bonds were negotiable instruments. They passed by delivery, and even were there no expressed stipulation, in the contracts of pledge, that the pledgee might sell on default of the pledgor, such a right is presumable from the nature of the transaction. Certainly the Bankrupt Act has taken away no right from a pledgee secured to him by his contract.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the lands reverted to the United States, unless the ship canal should be finished within a fixed period, and that period was pássing away when the order was granted to the receiver to raise money for completing the canal by the issue of certificates secured by his mortgage. The canal was unfinished, and there were in the receiver’s hands no funds to finish it. ■ Hence there - was a necessity for making the order which the court made — a necessity attending the administration of the trust the court had undertaken. The. order was necessary alike for the lien creditors and for the mortgagors. Whether the action of the court could make the receiver’s mortgage supeferior in right to the mortgages which existed when it was' made, it is needle'ss to inquire. - None of the creditors secured by those other mortgages objected to the order when it was made, though they were ail then in court. None of .them object to its lien or its priority now.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““It is undoubtedly true there am cases to be found in which it was ruled that prior incumbrancers were necessary parties to a bill for the foreclosure of a junior mortgage, but in most of these cases the circumstances were peculiar. Whore the effort of the junior mortgagee is to obtain a. sale of the entire property or estate, and not merely of the equity of redemption, there is reason for making the prior incum-brancers parties, for they have an immediate interest in the decree.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.