¶2In this case seeking judicial review of denial of Social Security benefits, Plaintiff Frances Noe Kettering has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #11] (“Plaintiffs Motion”). Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 12] (“Defendant’s Motion”) and a Brief in Support [Doc. # 13] (“Defendant’s Brief’). The motions now are ripe for decision. Having considered the parties’ briefing, the applicable legal authorities, and all matters of record, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion should be denied, that Plaintiffs Motion should be granted, and that this case should be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
¶3I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Procedural Background
¶5Kettering filed an application for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) alleging disability beginning May 9, 2006. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Kettering requested an administrative hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to review the denial of benefits.
¶6On July 8, 2008, ALJ Gary J. Suttles held a hearing, and subsequently issued a decision on July 24, 2008, finding that Kettering was not disabled.
¶7Upon remand, on December 2, 2009, ALJ Suttles held a supplemental hearing.
¶8Kettering filed this case on March 22, 2012, seeking judicial review of the denial of benefits from May 9, 2006, through July 31, 2008. Contemporaneously with her complaint in this Court, she filed a new application for disability with the SSA. The SSA ruled favorably on the application, finding Kettering disabled as of August 9, 2009.
¶9B. Factual Background
¶10Plaintiff Kettering alleges that her disability began on May 9, 2006. On Decem*523ber 24, 2003, Kettering was injured in a motor vehicle accident, which caused neck and back pain, muscle spasms, and decreased range of motion. In the period before her alleged onset date, she was treated by various physicians, therapists, and chiropractors.
¶11Beginning in September 2005, Kettering was treated by William F. Donovan, M.D., an orthopedist.
¶12Dr. Donovan’s subsequent testing supported his diagnosis. An MRI of Kettering’s cervical spine in October 2005 revealed a central disc herniation at the C34 level. Neurological testing of the lumbar spine in November 2005 revealed right L5-S 1 lumbar radiculopathy.
¶13On January 13, 2006, Dr. Donovan performed a lumbar hemilaminectomy L5-S1 right with posterior disc excision.
¶14On February 20, 2006, about five weeks after her surgery, Kettering returned to work. Dr. Donovan’s x-rays from April 2006 showed good alignment of the vertebrae, no arthritis, and decreased motion.
¶15On July 11, 2006, Dr. Donovan wrote another letter on Kettering’s behalf, stating that after returning to work “patient has developed an increased evidence of instability to the lumbar spine.”
Based on most recent clinical examination, 7/11/06, [Kettering] is not able to work in any capacity. Patient will be *524referred for additional rehabilitation therapy to help strengthen her low back. Patient is unable to sit for more than two hours in an eight hour day because of the lumbar spine instability caused by the accident of 12/24/03 and facilitated by the surgery of 1/13/06. In addition, patient is not capable of doing repetitive bending, lifting, pushing, pulling, and twisting.18
¶16In Dr. Donovan’s records from August and October 2006, he continued to state his opinion that Kettering was totally disabled and unable to work. He noted pain to her lower back and in her right shoulder and neck. His records indicate that Kettering slipped and fell on a wet floor at home in August, causing further injury to her neck and back.
¶17On September 12, 2006, the SSA reviewed Kettering’s records and conducted an assessment of her physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
¶18On October 13, 2006, Kettering had an MRI of her cervical spine. The records state that Kettering had “central disc herniation impinging upon the subarachnoid space” at the C3-4 level. The rest of her cervical spine was within normal limits.
¶19During the period from October 2006 through August 2007, Kettering also was treated by Gregory Shannon, M.D., for persistent abdominal pain apparently unrelated to her neck and back pain.
¶20Throughout 2007, Kettering continued to receive treatment for her neck and back pain. On referral from Dr. Donovan, she was treated briefly at the Texas Pain Institute,
¶21An MRI of Kettering’s cervical spine in March 2007 revealed “mild cervical spondylosis” with cervical muscle spasms and “mild disc degeneration,” but no evidence of disc herniation, central canal, or forami*525nal stenosis.
¶22In April 2007, Kettering’s physical therapist noted progressively worsening neck pain over several years resulting from Kettering’s motor vehicle accident and a series of falls, as well as severe radiculopathy. She further noted limitations in Kettering’s daily activities, including sitting, standing and walking.
¶23In May 2007, Kettering returned to Dr. White and reported weakness, numbness, and tingling in her right arm, and the return of “occipitalgic-type headaches.” Dr. White ordered an electrodiagnostic evaluation and another course of cervical physical therapy and traction. Because Kettering’s pain was interfering with her sleep, Dr. White added a prescription to help her sleep.
¶24Over the next few weeks, Kettering completed ten sessions of physical therapy. Her therapist reported to Dr. White that Kettering had achieved short-term relief, but that her overall condition “remain[ed] irritable and easily provoked by prolonged sitting, driving, or [upper extremity] movement.” Kettering had remaining weakness in her neck, shoulders, and right arm and wrist. She continued to report constant pain.
¶25On May 30, 2007, Kettering saw A.Y. Shukla, M.D., a neurologist to whom Dr. White had referred her.
¶26In June 2007, Dr. White noted at a follow up examination that the physical therapist and the neurologist had arrived at the same conclusion, i.e., chronic C5-7 radiculopathy.
¶27*526Kettering also received psychiatric treatment throughout 2007 and 2008. Beginning in January 2007, she was treated by Jaime Gane, M.D., for depression and other mental conditions.
¶28In January, at her initial appointment with Dr. Gane, Kettering reported a history of moderate depression, with irritability, mood swings, and periods of mania.
¶29However, in November 2007, after her surgery, Kettering presented with symptoms of depression, and reported that her credit was very bad because of manic spending behavior in the past.
¶30On March 25, 2008, Kettering attempted suicide by overdose of her medication. She was transported by ambulance to Oak-bend Medical Center,
¶31Beginning in June 2008, the records reflect that Kettering received additional treatment for her neck and back pain at Orthopaedic Associates in Katy, Texas.
¶32Several days later, Kettering saw Dr. Kushwaha and reported neck and arm pain, numbness and tingling, frequent headaches, and disturbed sleep due to pain. She also reported constant lower back pain that traveled down her right leg with numbness and tingling, and an increase in pain with prolonged sitting or standing. Dr. Kushwaha noted that past treatments including physical therapy, epidural steroid injections, and the 2006 laminectomy had failed to provide long term relief. His physical examination noted Kettering’s decreased range of motion, pain in the neck and back, and some muscle spasm. Dr. Kushwaha ordered further MRIs.
¶33The remainder of Kettering’s medical records are after August 1, 2008, the date as of which the ALJ granted disability benefits. However, because Kettering challenges the ALJ’s choice of August 1, 2008 as her onset date, these later records are informative for sake of comparison.
¶34In August 2008, Dr. Kushwaha performed a disk replacement at L5-S1. Postoperatively, Kettering had significant left leg pain that progressively worsened.
¶35On August 10, 2009, Arthur Hadley, M.D., performed a consultative examination on behalf of the SSA. Dr. Hadley reported that Kettering complained of numbness in her pelvis and left thigh, and right buttock pain radiating down her leg.
¶36Shortly thereafter, in September 2009, Kettering was treated by Marvin Chang, M.D., at Texas Pain Consultants, for chronic pain.
¶37This consultative exam by Dr. Hadley and the treatment by Dr. Chang both occurred after August 9, 2009, which the Appeals Council ruling had set as the end of Kettering’s eligibility period. However, upon Kettering’s subsequent application for benefits in 2012, Kettering was found disabled as of August 9, 2009.
¶38II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
¶39Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial.
¶40III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶41Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits is limited to two inquiries: first, whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and, second, whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence.
¶42When applying the substantial evidence standard on review, the court scrutinizes the record to determine whether such evidence is present.
¶43IV. ANALYSIS
¶44A. Statutory Basis for Benefits
¶45Social Security disability insurance benefits are authorized by Title II of the Social Security Act. The disability insurance program provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence.
¶46B. Determination of Disability
¶47When determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must engage in a five-step sequential inquiry, as follows: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the regulations; (4) whether the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any other work.
¶48In this case, the ALJ determined at Step One that Kettering had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of May 9, 2006. At Step Two, he found that Kettering had three severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, asthma, and depression. At Step Three, he found that Kettering’s impairments, considered singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations.
¶49Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ considered Kettering’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). He determined that she had become disabled on August 1, 2008, and thus found different RFCs for the periods before and after that date. The ALJ concluded that, prior to August 1, 2008, Kettering had the RFC to perform sedentary work with some limitations.
¶50At Step Four the ALJ determined that Kettering was able to perform her past relevant work as an audit clerk before August 1, 2008, but was not able to perform the work from August 1, 2008, and forward. At Step Five, considering her age, education, work skills, experience, and RFC, he determined that no jobs existed in the national economy that Kettering could perform after August 1, 2008. He therefore concluded that Kettering was disabled from August 1, 2008 forward. Due to the possibility of medical improvement, he recommended a continuing disability review 24 months later.
¶51C. Plaintiff’s Argument for Reversal
¶52The ALJ held that Kettering “was not disabled prior to August 1, 2008, but became disabled on that date.”
¶53The Fifth Circuit has held that the Commissioner must consult a medical advisor when inferring the onset date in certain cases:
[I]n cases involving slowly progressive impairments, when the medical evidence regarding the onset date of a disability is ambiguous and the Secretary must infer the onset date, [Social Security Ruling] 83-20 requires that that inference be based on an informed judgment. The Secretary cannot make such an inference without the assistance of a medical advisor.84
¶54SSR 83-20 “places the burden of consulting a medical advisor on the Secretary, not the claimant.”
¶55In support of his selection of August 1, 2008, as the date of onset for Kettering’s disability, the ALJ cites only to medical records from September 2008 showing that Dr. Kushwaha performed a surgical removal of an artificial disk and, subsequently, a spinal fusion. The ALJ stated, “Due to the claimant’s 2 surgeries and subsequent need to heal, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant was unable to perform even a limited range of sedentary exertion [as of August 1, 2008].”
¶56Plaintiff cites to evidence supporting her claim of disability starting May 9, 2006, due to back impairments, pain, and major depression.
¶57As in Spellman, Kettering’s impairments—both physical and mental—were “slowly progressing.” Although her motor vehicle accident occurred on December 24, 2003, she returned to work after the accident, and continued to work for more than two years while seeking treatment for her condition. She alleges disability as of May 9, 2006, which is the date she stopped working—a date Spellman characterized as “often very significant.”
¶58Based on a careful review of the record, the Court concludes that, as in Spellman, the medical evidence regarding onset of Kettering’s disability was ambiguous.
¶59Defendant argues that, even though the ALJ failed to consult a medical advisor, no remand is required because the error was harmless.
¶60This accordingly must be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings. On remand, the Commissioner is instructed to consult a medical advisor in determining the proper onset date.
¶61V. CONCLUSION
¶62For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
¶63ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 12] is DENIED. It is further
¶64ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #11] is GRANTED. It is further
¶65ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
¶66. R. 45-84 (hearing transcript); R. 149-62 (decision denying benefits).
¶67. R. 199-202.
¶68. R. 85-145.
¶69. R. 23-44.
¶70. R. 1-10. The ALJ's opinion in December 2009 had recommended continuing disability review in 24 months, i.e., December 2011. R. 39.
¶71. Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Motion.
¶72. R. 314-34, 484-511, 528-615.
¶73. R. 472-614, 744-46.
¶74. R. 486-89.
¶75. R. 488.
¶76. R. 367, 485, 529.
¶77. R. 353-76.
¶78. R. 377-86, 430-45.
¶79. R. 437, 440-42.
¶80. R. 438.
¶81. R. 436.
¶82. R. 434.
¶83. R. 434. See R. 388-39 (records from physical therapy from same period).
¶84. R. 431-33.
¶85. R. 408-15.
¶86. R. 414. Somewhat inconsistently, the consulting doctor stated that Kettering's statements of limitations were supported by the evidence, but were not expected to meet the duration requirement for disability benefits. R. 413.
¶87. R. 528.
¶88. R. 420-29, 648-76. After performing an esophagogastroduodenoscopy, Dr. Shannon diagnosed Kettering with mild esophagistis, a hiatus hernia, and other conditions. R. 649.
¶89. R. 478-80.
¶90. R. 473-77, 512-27, 746-50.
¶91.R. 473-77.
¶92. R. 518-19.
¶93. R. 520-23.
¶94. R. 477, 537.
¶95. R. 725-43.
¶96. R. 727.
¶97. R. 733.
¶98. R. 747.
¶99. R. 743.
¶100. R. 615-21.
¶101. R. 749.
¶102. R. 750.
¶103.R. 622-633.
¶104.At around the same time, on December 22, 2006, a consultant with the SSA completed a Psychiatric Review Technique. See R. 458-71. The consultant concluded that Kettering’s depression was a medically determinable impairment but did not satisfy the diagnostic criteria.
¶105.R. 623-33.
¶106. R. 696.
¶107. R. 695.
¶108. R. 694.
¶109. R. 693.
¶110. R. 692.
¶111. R. 912-76.
¶112. R. 751-52, 761-836, 837-911.
¶113. R. 977-94.
¶114. R. 754-60.
¶115. R. 757.
¶116. R. 757-58.
¶117. R. 756.
¶118. R. 1037.
¶119. R. 1033-34.
¶120. R. 1097-1111.
¶121. R. 1098.
¶122. R. 1101.
¶123. R. 1116-25.
¶124. R. 1119, 1124-25.
¶125. R. 1116.
¶126. R. 1116.
¶127. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir.2002).
¶128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).
¶129. DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
¶130. See Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447 (5th Cir.2007); Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.2005); Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir.2002).
¶131. Audler, 501 F.3d at 447 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
¶132. Id.; Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir.2000).
¶133. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir.2001); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994).
¶134. Perez, 415 F.3d at 462 (citing Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir.1991)).
¶135. Id. at 461 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420); Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir.2002).
¶136. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001).
¶137. Audler, 501 F.3d at 447; Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272.
¶138. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272.
¶139. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) & (d).
¶140. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
¶141. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Newton, 209 F.3d at 453. The Commissioner’s analysis at Steps Four and Five is based on the assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity ("RFC”), or the work a claimant still can do despite his or her physical and mental limitations. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461-62. The Commissioner assesses the RFC before proceeding from Step Three to Step Four. Id.
¶142. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Myers, 238 F.3d at 619.
¶143. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.
¶144. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461; Newton, 209 F.3d at 453.
¶145. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)).
¶146. R. 26.
¶147. R. 37.
¶148. R. 23.
¶149. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis added) (citing Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-20, 1983 WL 31249 (1983)).
¶151. Id. at 361 (citing SSR 83-20; Ivy v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 1045, 1048 (5th Cir.1990)).
¶153. R. 37.
¶154. R. 27, 37. In the section of his opinion discussing the period before August 1, 2008, the ALJ held that the opinions of Dr, Donovan, who had treated Kettering since September 2005, were entitled to "little weight” because they were "unsupported by objective clinical findings and [were] inconsistent with the evidence considered as a whole.” R. 35. In support, the ALJ cited to several items from the record. First, the ALJ cited to records of Dr. Rechter, who saw Kettering one time, on June 24, 2008, before referring Kettering to Dr. Kushwaha. R. 759 (stating that Kettering's inability to work was "questionable” and referring her to Dr. Kushwaha). As noted above, Dr. Kushwaha subsequently treated Kettering, performing a disk replacement and a posterior spinal fusion. R. 1033-37. In addition, when holding that Dr. Donovan’s opinions were entitled to little weight, the ALJ relied on records from Dr. Hadley and Dr. Chang. The ALJ's reliance on these medical findings is curious, given that the findings were from August and September 2009, more than a year after August 1, 2008, the date the ALJ selected as the onset of Kettering's disability. These records are not relevant to whether Kettering was disabled during the period from May 9, 2006, through July 31, 2008. %
¶155. Plaintiffs Motion, at 6-18.
¶156. Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 393 (5th Cir. 2000).
¶157. Spellman, 1 F.3d at 361.
¶158. R. 35 (citing records from Dr. Rechter). The ALJ also relied upon Kettering’s statements in her application and hearing testimony regarding her daily activities, which he concluded were greater than her alleged functional limitations. R. 33.
¶159. Cf. Luckey v. Astrue, 458 Fed.Appx. 322, 326 (5th Cir.2011) (“Luckey’s disability onset date was not ambiguous, such that the ALJ needed to consult a medical examiner”); Orphey v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 1063, at *3 (5th Cir.2001) ("Unlike the situation in Spellman ... the contemporaneous medical evidence in this case is not ambiguous, and there was no medical evidence prior to the expiration of Orphey's insured status indicating that Orphey was suffering from a mental illness.”).
¶160. Defendant's Brief, at 8-9 (arguing that medical evidence from June and July 2008 supported the ALJ’s inferred onset date).
¶161. Spellman, 1 F.3d at 361 (citing SSR 83-20).