17‐514‐ag
Wood v. Barr
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
____________________
August Term, 2019
(Submitted: October 17, 2019 Decided: November 1, 2019)
Docket No. 17‐514‐ag
____________________
GIOVANNI HOWARD WOOD,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General
Respondent.
____________________
Before: WINTER, POOLER, and PARK, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals,
affirming Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) finding Wood removable for an aggravated
felony. We hold that Wood’s conviction for first‐degree robbery in violation of
Connecticut General Statutes § 53a‐134(a)(4) is a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16(a) and therefore an aggravated felony under
8 U.S.C. §§
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(43)(F). Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.
DENIED.
____________________
GLENN FORMICA, New Haven, CT, for Petitioner
Giovanni Howard Wood.
KILEY KANE, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
Immigration Litigation (Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant
Director, on the brief), for Chad A. Readler, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent
William P. Barr, United States Attorney General.
PER CURIAM:
We hold that first‐degree robbery in violation of Connecticut General
Statutes § 53a‐134(a)(4) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and as a
result, is an aggravated felony for which a petitioner may be removable under
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U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.
BACKGROUND
Giovanni Howard Wood, a native and citizen of Jamaica, came to the
United States in 2004 on a tourist visa. He became a lawful permanent resident in
2006. When seventeen years old, Wood pled guilty to first‐degree robbery in
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violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a‐134(a)(4). He received a sentence
of five years’ imprisonment, suspended after one year, and five years’ probation.
In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security served Wood with a Notice
to Appear and charged him as removable for having been convicted of an
aggravated felony, either a crime of violence, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), or a theft
offense,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Before the IJ, Wood challenged his aggravated
felony charges and asserted that his conviction was not a crime of violence as
defined under
8 U.S.C. § 16(b). He also applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Following a
hearing, the IJ ordered Wood removed to Jamaica. The IJ concluded that Wood’s
conviction was a crime of violence under Section 16(b), but the IJ did not address
whether the conviction was a crime of violence under Section 16(a). The IJ found
Wood’s asylum and withholding of removal claims barred by his aggravated
felony conviction and denied CAT relief.
Wood filed a Notice of Appeal from the IJ’s decision. Wood argued in
relevant part that his conviction was not a crime of violence under Section 16(a),
but he did not address Section 16(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
affirmed. The BIA first noted that the IJ relied on Section 16(b), which Wood did
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not address. The BIA further stated that Wood’s conviction was a crime of
violence under Section 16(a).
Wood timely petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s order, and he
subsequently moved for a stay of removal, which this Court granted. On appeal,
Wood raises two issues. Wood’s first argument, that Section 16(b) is void for
vagueness, has since been addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions
v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), which struck down that provision as
unconstitutionally vague. Wood’s second argument is that his conviction for
Connecticut first‐degree robbery is not a crime of violence under Section 16(a).
DISCUSSION
Whether a specific conviction constitutes an aggravated felony is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d
Cir. 2009).
Under Section 16(a), a “crime of violence” is defined as “an offense that
has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
Wood was convicted for violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a‐
134(a)(4), which states:
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A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the
commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a‐133 or of
immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . (4)
displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or
conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other
firearm . . . .”
Our Circuit has previously held that Connecticut first‐degree robbery is a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in United States
v. Bordeaux, 886 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2018). Like Section 16(a), the ACCA defines
a “violent felony” as a crime having “as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
18 U.S.C.
§924(e)(2)(B)(i). Given the similarities between the statutes, we have said that
“the use of ACCA case law to interpret § 16(a), and vice versa, is widely accepted
by our Court and others.” Banegas Gomez v. Barr,
922 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2019).
We adopt the rationale set forth in Bordeaux and hold that Connecticut
first‐degree robbery is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). We are
unpersuaded by Wood’s argument that his conviction does not necessitate the
use of actual violent force. A crime of violence under Section 16(a) need only
have threatened use of physical force as an element, and as noted in Bordeaux,
Connecticut General Statutes § 53a‐134(a)(4) requires the threatened use of
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physical force because “[e]ven mere ‘display’ of a firearm during a larceny or
immediately thereafter necessarily implies a threat to commit violence.” 886 F.3d
at 194. Similarly, we reject Wood’s argument that the Connecticut first‐degree
robbery statute is overbroad because a conviction may be predicated on another
person’s display of a firearm. We have previously held that a conviction for New
York first‐degree robbery, which may also be predicated on another person’s
display of a firearm, is a violent felony under the ACCA. Stuckey v. United States,
878 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2017). We see no reason to not apply the reasoning of
these ACCA precedents. Accordingly, Wood’s conviction falls within the
definition of a crime of violence under Section 16(a).
CONCLUSION
Wood’s petition for review is thus DENIED.
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