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← 947 F.2d 817 - Cain v. Redman

Cain v. Redman’s Empirical Analysis

947 F.2d 817 · 1991

Citation profile

57
cited by 57 later decisions
1
states following
September 2016
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently September 2016 · most notably United States v. Mandanici (2000), Leavitt v. Arave (2004)

27 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

300199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Gideon v. Wainwright · Teague v. Lane · Murray v. Carrier

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 , 109 S.Ct. at 1070 _ The Supreme Court has provided further guidance in analyzing whether a rule is new under Teague standards by holding that precedents which “inform, or even control or govern” the intervening decision do not keep it from being a new rule if the precedents do not “compel” the decision. Saffle v. Parks, [ 494 U.S. 484 ], 110 S.Ct. [1257] at 1261 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 415 ] (1990). Applying this analysis to petitioner’s case, Sandstrom represents a “new rule” within the meaning of Teague . Clearly, no case prior to Sandstrom invalidated the type of potential burden-shifting jury instruction given in petitioner’s case. Sandstrom broke new ground by definitively holding that such instructions may be unconstitutional. At the time of petitioner’s conviction, no Supreme Court precedent dictated or compelled the result reached by Sandstrom eight years later. In fact, Sandstrom was not controlled or governed by any particular precedent, but was the result of an analysis of cases generally dealing with the presumption of innocence and the allocation of the burden of proof such as In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “rule must do more than improve the accuracy of the trial; it must alter the understanding of the “bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 , 110 S.Ct. at 2831. Against these standards, I conclude that Sandstrom does not represent one of the “watershed” rules envisioned by Teague.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.