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947 P.2d 535

68 O.B.A.J. 3218

Hung Thanh Le v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma · decided 1997-10-02

Relies on United States v. Cronic · Lockhart v. Fretwell · Ledbetter v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1997-10-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 79 later decisions — most recently July 2025 · most notably Victor Wayne Hooks v. Ron Ward (1999), Miller v. Champion (1998)

14 federal appellate · 53 state decisions

4701997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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LANE, Judge,

¶1concurring in results.

¶2I would analyze the victim impact evidence in light of 21 O.S.Supp.1992 § 701.10 and not rely on 22 O.S.Supp.1993 § 994 used by the majority in footnote 52. See my vote in Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 902 (Okl.Cr. 1997).

¶3I find that the victim impact evidence in this matter is permissible under § 701.10 as evidence about the victim and impact on the family.

LUMPKIN, Judge,

¶4concurring in part/dissenting in part.

¶5I concur in the decision to affirm the Judgments and Sentences for first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault and battery with intent to kill. However, I dissent to the dismissal of the larceny of a motor vehicle and grand larceny convictions. Prosecution and conviction of these last two offenses were not barred by double jeopardy as each was a separate and distinct offense.

¶6Further, Section 11 is not to be used as a shield to allow a defendant the opportunity to commit any number of separate, distinguishable crimes without impunity merely because he may have had a specific ultimate objective in mind. Where a defendant commits offense after offense, he is properly subject to punishment for each offense. I do not find the Legislature has prohibited separate punishments for these offenses under the facts of the case. See Hale v. State, 888 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Okl.Cr.1995) (Lumpkin, J., Concur in Results). Using the Court’s analysis to its illogical conclusion would mean that since Appellant’s objective from the beginning was to steal the money in the safe deposit box, then all crimes committed as a “means to another ultimate objective” could only be punished through the sentencing on that ultimate objective crime. That would mean only the theft of the money from the safe deposit box could be punished in this case. Needless to say, that result would be patently absurd.

¶7Finally, in addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the opinion relies on Strickland v. Washington. That case has since been clarified in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 189 (1993) wherein the Supreme Court stated:

*559[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. See [United States v.] Cronic, 466 U.S. [648], at 658, 104 S.Ct. [2039], at 2046 [80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ].

¶8Therefore, the “ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696,104 S.Ct. at 2069, and not merely the outcome of the proceedings.

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