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949 F.2d 736

Docket Nos. 90-3226, 90-3536.

Doe v. Doe

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Dec. 13, 1991.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1991-12-13

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently November 2021

1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

3 counsel of record

Relies on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. · Doe v. Doe

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1991-12-13

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¶1Rhonda M. Benedetto, Lanny R. Zatzkis, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

¶2Francis A. Olivier, III, John L. Olivier, Sunset, La., for Davis.

¶3*737Malcolm W. Monroe, Joseph L. Spilman, III, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, La., for Hill.

¶4ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING

¶5Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

¶6PER CURIAM:

¶7We deny the petition for rehearing, except as follows. The Louisiana Press Association, as amicus curiae, has argued that the Louisiana common law definition of actual malice is narrower than the federal definition established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). It thus challenged that part of our opinion in which we defined actual malice as having knowledge that the statements were false or having a reckless disregard for their truth value.

¶8Because we have determined that the fair reporting privilege is a state law privilege and because this case involves a private individual, the Louisiana definition of actual malice controls. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Neither of the parties to the case raised this issue and it was not argued before us. We therefore leave it to the district court to define, under Louisiana law, the term “actual malice” as it applies in this case.

¶9In all other respects, the Petition for Rehearing is

¶10DENIED.

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