Holman v. Page’s Empirical Analysis
95 F.3d 481 · 1996
Citation profile
40 federal appellate · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 77 later decisions — most recently September 2013 · most notably Northrop v. Trippett (2001), Spreitzer v. Peters (1997)
40 federal appellate · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Graham v. Connor · United States v. Leon · Furman v. Georgia · United States v. Cronic
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“It is inconsistent with the function of the exclusionary rule to permit a criminal defendant on federal habeas review to claim prejudice because but for his counsel’s incompetence on the suppression issue he would have gotten away with the crime. Such a claim may be factually true — but that alone does not entitle a convict to a new trial because that alone does not constitute “prejudice” within the meaning of Strickland. Strickland prejudice relates to the fairness of the proceedings and to the confidence one may place in the outcome, i.e., to the correctness of the verdict. The Supreme Court has made clear that it is not unfair to a defendant for a jury to consider reliable but improperly gathered evidence of guilt. Fairness to the accused has nothing to do with the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is why Fourth Amendment claims cannot be raised on habeas review.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Discretion, even if it ends in grossly unequal treatment according to culpability, does not entitle a guilty defendant to avoid a sentence appropriate to his own crime.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Judicial discretion naturally leads to discrepancies in sentencing.... But even wide sentencing discretion in the abstract is not a violation of due process or equal protection. As we held in [United States v.] Marshall, [ 908 F.2d 1312, 1321 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991)], the issue is the appropriateness of the sentence given the defendant’s crime: “Discretion, even if it ends in grossly unequal treatment according to culpability, does not entitle a guilty defendant to avoid a sentence appropriate to his own crime.” Id.; see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 , 90 S.Ct. 2018 , 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (“Sentencing judges are vested with wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropriate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear. The Constitution permits qualitative differences in meting out punishment and there is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense receive identical sentences.”) (emphasis added).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.