Rupp v. Markgraf’s Empirical Analysis
95 F.3d 936 · 1996
Citation profile
17 federal appellate · 9 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 58 later decisions — most recently April 2019 · most notably Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc. (1996), Finley Kumble Wagner Heine Underberg Manley Myerson Casey Christy v. Alexander & Alexander of New York Inc
17 federal appellate · 9 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on United States v. Nordic Village, Inc. · Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank · Nordberg v. Arab Banking Corp. · Danning v. Miller · C-L Cartage Co Inc Ray v. City Bank and Trust Company
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“the right to put those funds to one's own purpose.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Determining the initial transferee of a transaction is necessarily a temporal inquiry; there must be a transfer before there can be a transferee. The extent to which a principal has de facto control over the debtor before the funds are transferred from the debtor, and the extent to which the principal uses this control for his or her own benefit in causing the debtor to make a transfer, are not relevant considerations in determining the initial transferee under § 550.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[I]f the distinction between an initial and a subsequent transferee turns on whether the party benefitting from the transfer “forced” the debtor to make the transfer, then the scope of liability under section 550 is unduly narrowed. Section 550(a)(1) subjects to strict liability not only the initial transferee, but also “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.” 11 U.S.C. § 550 (a)(1). The party who forces a debtor to make a transfer is almost always “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” and thus is generally always subject to strict liability. Yet Congress intended to make initial transferees also strictly ha-ble.... “The implication is that the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made is different from a transferee, immediate or otherwise.” Bullion Reserve, 922 F.2d at 548 . Consideration of whether the beneficiary of the transfer “forced” the debtor to make the transfer would collapse the two prongs of strict liability into a single party.... There is nothing in the statute or otherwise to justify this result.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.