95 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 180 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 204 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of murder may be sentenced to death if: 3. The defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to Subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate premeditated acts.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9—1(b)(3)) (hereinafter, the multiple-murder, aggravating-factor provision).)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 115 Ill. 2d 72 - People v. Guest · 127 Ill. 2d 12 - People v. Jimerson

2. “" 'Earlier cases in this court would appear to preclude a judge from taking judicial notice of the orders or decrees entered in other cases in the court in which he presides. [Citations.] It has been repeatedly held that proof of prior convictions should be by means of certified copies of the record and identification of the defendant in the prior case as the same person. [Citations.] To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of those records and proof of identity, they are incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads. Nor do such procedures provide any necessary or useful safeguards to the defendants in cases such as this where the fact that the prior conviction had occurred has never been denied.’ ” (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31 , 447 N.E.2d at 367 , quoting People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164 , 357 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 .)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Gregory · 409 Ill. App. 3d 869 - People v. Coleman

3. ““[The language was designed] to insure that a defendant would not suffer the death penalty where a multiple murder is an accidental consequence of a single act. In other words, the physical act leading to a multiple murder must be accompanied by a culpable mental state as to each murder. A defendant may not receive the death penalty for related, multiple murders where more than one person was accidentally killed. Thus, the intent of the amendment was to address the problem of multiple murders committed at the same time. In the instant case, defendant did not receive the death penalty because of his participation in a multiple-murder situation. He was convicted of three separate and unrelated murders. In the Cash murder case, he was convicted after the jury had been instructed solely on an intent-to-kill theory. In the Oertel case, the jury was instructed to find defendant guilty if he (or a person for whom he was responsible) intended to kill or do great bodily harm, or knew his act would cause death or great bodily harm. In the case at bar, the jury was instructed as to each murder theory, and it is therefore unclear upon which theory they found defendant guilty. We hold in this case that where, as here, defendant is convicted of two or more murders resulting from intentional or knowing acts, the death penalty may properly be imposed.” (Emphasis in original.) (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 35-36 .)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 127 Ill. 2d 12 - People v. Jimerson