95 Md. App. 561 - Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The purpose of [the license suspension statute] is to protect other drivers on the road from those who would drive while intoxicated and to deter those who would otherwise decide to drive drunk. While the statute is also aimed at sanctioning the offending driver, that is not its primary purpose. Moreover, the mere fact that the suspension of driving privileges may carry the “sting of punishment” is immaterial. “[C]ases have acknowledged that ... even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.” ^ ^ Appellant was deprived of a valuable right when the administrative judge issued him a restricted license. He was not, however, subject to criminal punishment for the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 110 Md. App. 717 - Montgomery County v. Krieger

2. “Halper clearly applies to instances where the government attempts to extract from a person who has committed a punishable act, preceded or followed by a criminal prosecution, a monetary penalty “related to the goal of making the Government whole.” The case at bar does not fit the strictures of such a “rare case.” The state did not seek, nor was appellant subject to, an excessive fine at the administrative hearing. Appellant was merely deprived of some driving privileges for a two-month period. [[Image here]] [W]e do not believe that the * * * sanction handed down in this case rose to the level of punishment or had the punitive- elements envisioned by the Supreme Court in Halper .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Parker

3. “In 1989, the General Assembly enacted the administrative per se law recommended by the Task Force, rewriting § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article to allow a person’s driver’s license to be promptly suspended for suspected drunken driving if the person refused a test for blood alcohol concentration. Ch. 284 of the Acts of 1989. The legislative history of Chapter 284 (House Bill 556) indicates that the General Assembly’s desire for swift and certain action against drunk drivers was balanced with concern for the administrative needs of the MVA.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jones