Volume 95 — Mississippi Reports

From the circuit court of Alcorn county. Hon. Eugene O. #ykes, Judge. Gray, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Robinson, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgement in defendant’s favor, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. One George Hazard, doing business as the Corinth Brokerage Company, was engaged in buying and selling cotton for future delivery.

From tbe circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. John B. Ricketts, Special Judge. The State, ex rel. R. Y. Fletcher, attorney-general, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the Cotton Oil Company, appellee, was defendant there. The suit was begun, by an information in the nature of a quo warranto. From a judgment sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the information and dismissing the suit the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

Prom the circuit court of, second district, Jones county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. The state of Mississippi, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; one Isaac Laskey, was defendant there, and the Holberg Mercantile Company, appellant, was claimant.

From the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Held: page 401: “In this case, however, we are clearly of opinion that the contract before us imposes no public duty on the part of the water •company to a citizen or inhabitant for the nonperformance of which an action of tort can be maintained, and that the contract does not show, in express terms or by fair intendment, that it was made…

From the circuit court of Lauderdale county. Hon. Robert F. Cochran, Judge. Sturges, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the city of Meridian, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

From tbe circuit court of Forest county. Hon. William H. Cook, Judge. Hudson, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the entire declaration and dismissing the suit the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts as pleaded sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court.

From the circuit court of Warren county. Hon. John N. Bush, Judge. Scott, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

From the circuit court of Lowndes county. ILon. Eobert F, Cooi-iran, Judge. Sicipwith, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff sued for damages to his- horses and wagon suffered on a highway at a railroad crossing.

Prom the circuit court of Leake County. Hon. Jambs R. Byrd, Judge McPhail, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Blaun, appellee, was defendant there. The suit was begun before a justice of the peace, one Moreland, but, it appearing that More-land was akin to one of the parties, the cause was transferred, under Code 1906, § 2724, providing for such case, to the justice court of one Gilberton, another justice of the peace of the County.

From the Chancery court of Kemper county. Hon. James F. McOool, Chancellor. Mrs. Neville, appellee, was complainant in the court below; Kemper County was defendant there. From a decree in complainant’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The appellee moved a dismissal of the appeal. The facts of the case and the grounds of the motion are stated in the opinion of the court.

From the circuit court of Noxubee county. Hon. Robert E. Cochean, Judge. Lilly & Company, a corporation, appellee, was plaintiff 'in the court below; Evans and others, appellants, were defendants there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendants appealed to the supreme court. The facts are clearly inferable from the opinion of the court.

From; the chancery court of Marion county. Hon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Mrs. Woods and others, appellants, were complainants in the court below; Cheeseborough and others, appellees, were defendants there. From a decree in defendant’s favor complainants appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Appellees’ contention is that the bill and amended bills of review are not maintainable.

Prom the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Carnahan, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railway, etc., company, appellant, was defendant there. Prom a judgment in plaintiff’s favor, $955, defendant appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff, desiring to take a street car in the suburbs of Jackson, came to the track at a place where there was no regular stop.

Prom the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Harpy, Judge. White and another, appellants, were tried and convicted before a justice of the peace of malicious mischief, shooting a horse, upon an affidavit charging the horse to have been the property of one James Riley, without naming or describing the animal. They appealed to the circuit court and were there tried de novo and again convicted.

From the circuit court of Sharkey county. Hon. John N. Bush, Judge. Foreman, appellant, was indicted for and convicted of embezzlement and appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The true test to determine whether an amendment is of form, or substance is: Would a different defense be necessary in one case from what would apply to the other ?

From the circuit court of Adams county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Jackson, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the telephone company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor for $100 defendant appealed to' the supreme court. The plaintiff’s wife became ill at night and needed the attention of a physician. Plaintiff endeavored by use of the telephone to call a physician, but after ringing several times got no response.

From the circuit court of Wilkinson county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Dampf, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff, a boy between twelve and thirteen years of age, was playing with several other small children around a turntable of the defendant railroad company.

From tbe circuit court of, second district, Coahoma county. Hon. Samuel C. Cook, Judge. Adams, state revenue agent, appellant, was plaintiff in the •court below; the city of Clarksdale and one Smith, an officer of the municipality, were defendants there. Erom a judgment sustaining a demurrrr to the petition for a writ of mandamus And dismissing the suit plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

From tbe chancery court of Bolivar county. Hon. Peeey Bell, Chancellor. Hiss Greer and others, appellees, were complainants in the court below; Brandau and wife, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree in complainants’ favor the defendants' appealed to the supreme court.

From the chancery court of Jackson county. Eon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Mrs. Martinez and others, appellees, were complainants in the court below; Mrs. Myers and others, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree overruling defendants’ demurrers to the bill of complaint they appelled to the supreme court.

From tbe circuit court of Jackson county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Dick, appellee, was plaintiff in tbe court below; tbe railroad ■company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor tbe defendant appealed to tbe supreme «court.

Brom the circuit court of Simpson county. Hon. [Robert L. Bullard, Judge. The Lumber company, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Barney and another, partners doing business under, the firm name of Barney & Hines, appellants, were defendants there. Barney, one of the defendants, lived in Amite county, -Mississippi, his partner, Hines, lived in Memphis, Tennessee.

From the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Jones, appellant, was indicted and tried for and was convicted of robbery, sentenced to the penitentiary and appealed to the supreme court.

From tbe circuit court of, first district, Tallahatchie county. Hon. Samuel C. Cook, Judge. MoClenden, appellant ,was plaintiff in the court below1; Whit-ten and others, appellees, were defendants there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The suit was against Whitten, former clerk of the chancery court of the county, and the sureties on his official bond. The opinion of the court states the facts.

From the circuit court of Jackson county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Mitchell, appellee, was, jointly with several others, indicted for knowingly receiving deposits in an insolvent bank. A severance having been granted, appellee pleaded specially and the state demurred the plea. From a judgment overruling the demurrer and quashing the indictment, the state appealed to the supreme court.

Prom the circuit court of Yazoo couuty. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Tate, appellant, was indicted and tried for the murder of one Dixon, was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for life, and appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts. It is apparent that this is a very delicately balanced case on. the facts, hence any errors in the trial must have militated most seriously against the rights of appellant.

Erom the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Edwards, appellant, was convicted in the court below of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors and was sentenced to pay a fine and suffer imprisonment for thirty days; and appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of, first district, Bolivar county. Hon. Sydney Smith, Judge. Shelby, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Lee county. Hon. Eugene 0. Sykes, Judge. Ruff, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to*the supreme court.

From the circuit court of, second district, Coahoma, county. Hon. Samuel O. Cook, Judge. The insurance company, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the board of levee commissioners of the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Levee District, appellee, was defendant there.

From tbe circuit court of Pike county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Moyse and others, appellees, were plaintiffs in the court below; the FlowersrCarruth company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor for $150, defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the Chancery court of Covington county. Hon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Bryant, appellee, was complainant in the court below; Graham, appellant was defendant there. From a decree in complainant’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The defendant sold and conveyed to complainant a tract of land,' the deed imperfectly described the premises, the description mistakenly used in the deed covering only a part of' the land actually sold.

From the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Mrs. Troutman, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee^ was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The plaintiff sued defendant for the alleged wrongful death of her husband, Herman Troutman, who came to his death at Long Beach, a station on defendant’s railroad.

From the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Mrs. Smith, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the traction company, operating an electric street railway, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s declaration and dismissing the suit plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

From tbe circuit court of, second district, Tallabatcbie county. Hon. Samuel O. Cook, Judge. Ammons, appellee, was plaintiff in tbe court below; Sullivan, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

From the circuit court of, first district, Tallahatchie county. Hon. Samuel C. Cook, Judge. Adams, appellant, was-plaintiff in the court, below; Helms, county treasurer of Tallahatchie county, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

Prom tbe chancery court of Attala County. Hon. James P. McCool, Chancellor. McPherson, appellant, was complainant in the court below; Davis and others, appellees, were defendants there. Prom a decree in defendant’s favor complainant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court. In the first place, we sgy that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the amended bill.

From the circuit court of TIarrisou county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Saucier, appellant, was indicted for perjury, convicted, sentenced to the penitentiary for three years, and appealed to the supreme court.

From the chancery court of Washington county. Hon. M. E. Denton, Chancellor. Tillman, appellant, was complainant in the court below, Heard and others, appellees, were defendants there. From a -decree in defendants’ favor, dissolving an injunction, complainant appealed to the supreme court.

Prom the circuit court of Neshoba county. Hon. James P. Byrd, Judge. Peek, the appellee, was indicted for manslaughter, and demurred to the indictment. The demurrer was confessed by the state and the indictment amended;, thereupon appellee moved to quash the indictment, his motion was sustained, and the state appealed to the supreme court.

From the chancery court of Yazoo county. LIon. G. Garland Lyell, Chancellor. Held: there was no estoppel against Bolen because of his warranty deed. Bolen v. Lilly, 85 Miss. ,884, 31 South. 811. Class and wife occupied premises as a home, title being in Class, and conveyed without wife’s signature. Both continued to reside on the land. Class died first, leaving no children.

From the chancery court of Lauderdale county. Hon. James L. McOaskill, Chancellor. Held: under this new provision of our fundamental law, to be entitled to due compensation for, not the taking, only, of his property for public use, but for all damages to his property that may result from works for public use. He is now secured in his property, and his use and enjoyment ■of his propetry.

From tbe circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Waldrop, appellant, was indicted and tried for and convicted •of an assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, sentenced accordingly, and appealed to tbe supreme court.

From the chancery court of Harrison county. Hon. Tiiaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. r Augur, appellant and cross-appellee, was complainant in the court below; the Land Improvement Cbmpany, appellee and cross-appellant, was defendant there. The object of the suit was to' enjoin an advertised sale of lands under a deed of trust executed by complainant to secure a debt due defendant.

From the circuit court of Leflore county. Hon. Sydney Smith, Judge. Stein, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the Hyman Lewis 0o., appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s fayor the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff sued defendant for rent on storehouses for the year-beginning April 14, 1906.

From the circuit court of Lincoln county. I-Ion. Moyse II. Wilkinson, Judge. Weathersby, appellant, was indicted and tried for the murder of one Emanuel Miller, was convicted, the jury failing to fix his punishment at imprisonment for life in the penitentiary, thereby subjecting him under the statute, Code 1906, § 1229, to the death penalty. The defendant’s motion for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence was overruled by the trial court.

From the circuit court of Pike county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Turner, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the Mc-Oomb City Mercantile company was the original defendant there.

From the chancery court of Jackson county. Hon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Mrs. Gardner and others, appellees, were complainants in the court below; Blomquest and others, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree in complainant’s favor defendants appealed to the supreme court. The complainants, appellees, the widow and son and only heirs of Axum Gardner, deceased, began this suit seeking to cancel the title of the defendants, appellants, to the land in question.

From the circuit court of Franklin county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Campbell, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant’s railroad, had to change cars at Harriston.

From the circuit court of Covington county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. Proceedings were begun, under the statutes, Code 1906, §§ 3301, 3312, as amended Laws 1908, chs. 186, 187, p. 196,. by the town of Seminary to enlarge its boundaries so as to embrace the village of Gandsi, the northern boundary of the one-municipality being the southern boundary of the other. The-village and some of its freeholders appealed from the ordinance-of the town to the circuit court.

From the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. G. Garland Ltell, Chancellor. The state of Mississippi, suing on the relation of the attorney-general, appellee, was complainant in the court below; the Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association and the several members thereof, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree in complainant’s favor the defendants appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Prom the chancery court of Tunica county. Hon. Percy Bell, Chancellor. The Insurance company, appellant, was complainant in the court below; Smith, appellee, and another were defendants there. Prom a decree overruling its demurrer to defendant Smith’s cross-bill the complainant appealed to the supreme court. The appellee, Smith, was the owner of a storehouse and stock of goods near the town of Pentecost. The land on which the store was situated was leased by him for a term.

From the circuit court of Clarke county. Hon. Robert F. Cochran, Judge. Mrs. Hicks, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the lumber company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Lincoln county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. The lumber company, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiffs favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. The suit was for alleged overcharges of freights made by defendant on shipments of lumber received from and transported for the plaintiff. The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>From the chancery court of Jefferson county.</p> <p>Hon. J. T. Drake, Special Chancellor.</p> <p>Mrs. Collins and others, appellees, were complainants in the court below; Davenport and others, appellants, were defendants there. From a final decree granting complainants relief defendants appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>This litigation is over a plantation; and it arises between a testator’s grandchildren who claim to be remaindermen under the terms of the will, on the one hand, and certain sub-vendees of his children themselves who claim that -the effect of the will' was to invest his children and widow with a fee simple title-which they had a right to convey away, and did convey in fee..</p> <p>The contention of the appellants in support of their title-moves along three distinct lines, any one of which, if good, gives the title to them and requires a reversal of the chancellor’s decree and a dismissal of this suit.</p> <p>1. Appellants contend that the limitations of the title to the real estate which are contained in paragraph 3 of the will are not directed at, and do not control, the home place; but that this place, and the title to- itj are controlled solely by the provisions of paragraph 5. In other words, that the home place, expressly dealt with, as it is in paragraph 5, beyond dispute, is one of the exceptions of real estate “otherwise disposed of in this will,” made in so many words in paragraph 3 itself.</p> <p>2. Even if the home place is to be taken as included within the estate dealt with by paragraph 3, then the provisions of paragraph 3 are such as that the rule in Shelley’s case applied, and the heritable estate (in this case, by virtue of the statute, of fee simple instead of fee tail) vested in the first taker; and, therefore, the deed to Davenport passed a fee simple title. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss1. 343; Dibrell v. Carlisle, 48 Miss. 691; Pressgrove v. Comfort, 58 Miss. 644; Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289; Harris v. McGann, 75 Miss. 805, 23 South. 631; Code 1880, § 1201; 25 Am. & Eng. Eney. Law, p. 640; Hudson v. Gray, 58 Miss. 882, 891, 892; Willis v. Foltz, 12 L. B. A. (N. S'.) 283; Strawbridge ¶. Strawbridge, 4 L. B. A. (N. S.) 948; Lofton v. Murchison, 80 Ga. 391; Banking Go. v. Field, 84 Miss. 646, 657, 37 South. 139.</p> <p>3. Again, even if it be considered that the home place falls within the real estate dealt with in paragraph 3, and even if it be considered that the rule in Shelley's case does not apply, yet still the statute of 1822 against perpetuities does not apply, and by virtue of that statute, the first donee took a fee, and the deed to Davenport invested him with a fee. Lofton v. Murchison, 80 Ga. 391; Banking Go. v. Field, 84 Miss. 646, 37 South. 139.</p> <p>It is conceived that the real issues in this case are two: Eirst, What kind of estate in his children and their issue was created by clause 3 of the will of Washington S. Burch ? Second, Was the property mentioned in clause 5 governed by the limitations in clause 3 ?</p> <p>The third paragraph contains the general scheme of the testator in the disposition of the bulk of his property; the time and manner of making the several possible'divisions contemplated by it are provided for in clause 6. It was manifestly the desire and intention of Mr. Burch to* keep his estate in the hands of his wife and three children, Eliza, Isaac and Mary, and the descendants of these children, at least until the death of the wife and the three children. He provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts and gives to each of them one of the sharts so to. he divided off and alotted, “to be theirs and each of theirs during their natural life, and to the children and heirs of their bodies, if any they have at the time of their death.” Thus far the meaning is clear: His wife and children were each of them to have one allotted share for life, with remainder in fee to such issue as each should have living at the time of their re■speetive deaths. Contemplating, however, the possibility that one or more of the life tenants might die without lineal descendants, the testator, in the next paragraph, provided for such a contingency by limiting over the share of any one of them who might so die to his estate in gross, to be re-divided among the same devisees or such of them as might then be living, and to their heirs, share and share alike, they to take a life estate only, •and all the children of “my deceased children (if any) to take only such share as their deceased parent would have taken.” At first glance this might appear somewhat obscure but a little consideration clears it up. The testator is here dealing with a lapsed share and its new division among his wife and surviving child or children.. The expression “they to take a life estate only,” evidently applies to the survivors who could re-divide the lapsed share, the word “they” meaning the surviving life tenants, and the expression “and all the children of my deceased children (if any) to take only such share as their deceased parent would have taken” while awkwardly phrased, perhaps, must mean that after the termination of each life estate the children of each life tenant would take his or her share in fee simple. It can mean nothing else; it cannot refer to the children of any of the four ■original life tenants who had died, because the contingency here provided for could arise only in case of such death without issue; so that the only children who could be embraced in the paragraph under consideration would be the children of the ■survivors of the four life tenants. This construction effectuates the purpose of the testator and is in perfect harmony with the first paragraph of clause 3. He divided his estate into four ■equal parts, giving his wife one and each of his named children one; they were severally to take a life estate in the same. In the event that any one of them died leaving children or lineal descendants, the fee in that share was to vest in such children or descendants, and it was freed from the ulterior limitations of the will. Should any one die without children, or descendants, instantly the whole estate in that original share passed, by limitation, over to tbe survivors, to be held by them, share and share alike, for life, with the fee in each share to go- to their respective children. Should any of the new life tenants die without issue surviving, then, under the first paragraph, as the whole-includes every part,'that new share would again pass to- the survivors, for life with the fee limited as before. As each life tenant died leaving children or descendants that portion of the-estate held by the descendant under the will vested in fee in those children or descendants. In case all four died without leaving lineal descendants all the limitations over after termination of the life estate would fail for want of persons to take and the estate would vest in the heirs general of the testator. Should some of the four life tenants leave children but the last survivor die without any, that portion of the estate held by the-surviving life tenant would go to the testator’s heirs, who-, in such case, would be the descendants of his children who had already died. Thus, in every contingency, the whole estate would go to the lineal descendants of the testator’s children, if there were any living at the time of the death of the last survivor of the four original life tenants, and so the estate would be kept for life in those four, and after their death, would vest in fee simple in testator’s grandchildren, or some remote posterity, as the case might be under the condition of the will. The only contingency possible that would defeat this result, or transmit the estate, or any part of it, to persons other than the testator’s descendants, or heirs in general, was the remote possibility that Mrs. Burch would outlive all her three children, Isaac, Eliza-Jane and Mary, that they would all die without issue, and that, she herself would remarry and have issue by her second husband, who would, upon her death, take the estate. Of course, if Mrs. Burch should marry again and have other children and die-before the decease of all her children by her marriage with Washington S. Burch, then under the limitation in clause 3 of' the will the share allotted to her for life would pass in fee to all her surviving children, both those by the first and those by the second marriage. Under any conceivable circumstances the fee in all of the lands was bound to vest in somebody at the time of' the death of the last survivor of the four original life tenants, who were all in being when Mr. Burch died, and, therefore, the limitations are not in violation of the rule against perpetuities and are valid. This will was probated in 1843 and was subject to the law as it then existed on this- question. Under the Act of 1822, sec. 24, with proviso, a testator could make a conveyance to succession of any number of donees living at the time of his-death, with ulterior limitations. Hutchinson’s Code-, ch. 42, sec. 24.</p> <p>So the conveyance to a succession of four donees, who were all in being at the time of Mr. Burch’s death, did not create a perpetuity. The rule in Shelley's case has no application since the intention of the testator throughout the limitations of clause 3 was perfectly clear that the words “children,” “heirs,” and “heirs of the body,” as used therein, all meant descendants living at the death of the several life tenants, and not an indefinite-succession to the remotest posterity, and were words of purchase and not of limitation. Ca/rroll v. Benich, 7 Smed. & M. 798;. Powell v. Brandon, 2 Cushman, 343; Hampton v. Bather, 1 George, 193; Oarradine v. Oarradine, 4 George,'- 687; Gannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 290.</p> <p>The last case cited supra is especially applicable, as it establishes the rule that any limitations that may be made by a testator are good, provided only that the fee shall vest within twenty-one years and ten months after the death of the last devisee, life tenant. In the case at bar the fee in the entire-property must vest within ten months after the death of the last surviving life tenant, and, consequently,- the limitations of clause 3 of the will were valid, and the wife and children of Mr. Burch took life estates and not a fee.</p> <p>The second question involved is whether the homestead referred to in clause 5 of the will is governed by clause 3. If not appellees must fail in this suit, as in that event, the children of the testator took fees in the land and Davenport acquired a fee ■simple from them by his deed in 1856. Before considering this proposition it may be well to advert to the facts as to- the dealings with this land. Mr. Burch died in 1893; in 1845 his widow, then remarried, conveyed, or attempted to convey, a life •estate in it to the three children, Isaac, Eliza and Mary; in 1847 Mrs. Miller, by petition, sought the aid of the probate court in allotting to her her share in her father’s estate, upon the ground that she was then married and entitled to such allottment, under clause 6 of the will. Cbmmissioners were appointed and they set apart to‘ Mrs. Miller the one thousand acre tract constituting the homestead; Mrs. Dangerfield assented to this proceeding, the report of the commissioners was confirmed and Mrs. Miller went into possession of the land and finally, in 1856, in conjunction with her brother and sister, Isaac and Mary (or Nancy), attempted to convey it in fee to Davenport. Now, if this land was subject to the limitations of clause 3 as well as the provisions of clause 5, when Mrs. Miller went into possession under the allottment of the commissioners after Mrs. Dangerfield had relinquished all her testamentary claims upon it, ■she held it as a life tenant only, with a vested remainder in fee in her children, subject t» be defeated'by the contingency of her death without issue, in which case the ulterior limitations would take effect: when she died in 1907 appellees, her children became tenants in common in fee under their grandfather’s will, •and must prevail in this suit.</p> <p>Was clause 5 practically a part of clause 3 ? We contend for the affirmative of the proposition, for the following reasons:</p> <p>First. The position of clause 5 in the will in case the land affected by it was intended to be governed by the general devising clause- — clause 3. The court will notice that the first eight clauses are devoted to the details of the administration of his estate, the comfort of his wife, her maintenance and the ■education of his children, the preservation of the estate for a limited time, and the final disposition to be made of it. Beginning with the ninth clause the testator turns his attention for the first time to the matter of special devises; by clause nine he makes a special devise to his son Isaac; by clause ten he makes a special devise to his children of the land and personal property of the plantation on which his mother resided. The court will note that in this clause the significant words “as hereinbefore provided, etc.” to be found in clause are omitted. The wife too is not mentioned in the clause, so that it might be fairly contended that as to the land affected by clause 10 the children did take a fee: by clause 11 the testator makes a special devise to' John D. Burch, etc., and in the final clause he names his executors. We thus have three successive devises, forming exceptions to-the general devise in clause 3, and satisfying the parenthetical sentence in that clause, placed where they should be at the end of the will and strongly suggestive, by their position in the will, arrangement and sequence, that these were the properties-in the mind of the testator when he used the words, “except such as is particularly excepted and otherwise disposed of in this-will.” Now, clause 5' immediately precedes the paragraph in which the testator provides for the time and manner in which his general estate shall be divided: the mind of the writer was-upon the question of the method to be adopted in making the divisions, and these divisions were to affect the property of which-he had previously spoken — all the property mentioned by him in previous paragraphs. He had not yet come to special devises: and he did not reach them until he had made complete provision for the carrying out of his general will.</p> <p>Second. The language employed in clause 5 indicates that the testator was not creating any different estate in the homestead than was employed for in clause 3. He does not therein use the-words “it is my will and desire,” which begin all the other paragraphs of the will (except the 6th). He expressed a wish that his wife should remain upon the homestead but he does not give her any life estate in the property; she is given a bare right to .remain in possession as long as she desired to do so- — whereby the testator, as it were, anticipated our statute permitting the widow to prevent partition of the homestead so long as she chooses to possess and use it. B-ut the widow might at any time signify her assent to the division of the homestead as part of the general estate “among the heirs,” in the language of the will. Who were the people meant by the word “heirs” in this connection ? Clearly those who were the beneficiaries under the genral devising clause; the words mean all those who were left shares in the estate by that clause, being the three children and Mrs. Burch herself. The testator assumes here that a division would be made in case of Mrs. Burch’s willingness to have one, but does not point out the persons who were to take under it, ■except by the incidental use of the word “heirs.” Why \ Because he had already in the general devising clause, provided for the persons who were to be the beneficiaries and created their estate, and he evidently considered that his intention was sufficiently clear to use of a word that, while not strictly appropriate, from its technical meaning, was general and will embrace all the objects of his bounty previously classified. While it is true that the word “as” “will be taken in its technical sense unless there is any will, a clear demonstration that the testator used it in a •different sense” (Irving v. Newlin, 63 Miss. 196), yet the ■connection in which the word occurs here does clearly demonstrate that it was not used in its technical sense but that it referred to a class of persons who had already been indicated in, the will, in other words to devisees. The testator, indeed, is not in this clause making any devise at all; he is merely pointing •out the conditions under which a previous devise should become •operative as to this land. Harhleroad v. Bass, 84 Miss. 483, 36 iSouth. 537.</p> <p>Again, the use of the words in clause 5, “when the same shall be divided as hereinbefore provided in regard to other property —equally among my children,” seems conclusive that it was intended that the nature of the title to this land should be governed by clause 3. The reference to clause 3 and the use of the little word “as” undoubtedly linked tbe two clauses together as governed by one and the same purpose. The land was to be divided how ? As provided in clause .3; it was to be held after division by the very title created by clause 3. If the construction should be adopted that these words meant merely that the land was to be equally divided and then held in fee, and did not convey the idea that when divided it was to be held under the title of the life tenants, with remainders over, etc., violence would be done to the plain significance of the terms used, and the manifest general intention of the testator thwarted, that purpose being that the children should take only for life and that the ultimate fee should vest in grandchildren or more remote descendants. The concluding words of the clause, “equally among my children,” are additional to and explanatory of those immediately preceding, but they add nothing to and subtract nothing from their force. The word “as” means “the same,” “in all respects alike,” and a construction that would make it mean "something like,” “in some respects similiar,” would be an emasculation of its true and full sense, and would, moreover, do violence to the elemental rule of construction that words are to be taken in their ordinary sense unless the context shows that they were used with some other sense. Paxton v. Oliver, 70 Miss. 570, 12 South. 799.</p> <p>The objection that might be made to the construction contended for, that the words “equally among my children” take this land out of the scope of clause 3 because Mrs. Burch was one of the four life tenants contemplated in that clause, while only three are contemplated by clause 5, is of no force, because, as above pointed out, a division of the land into four parts might be made whenever Mrs. Burch assented to it, and, in case she did not assent and remained on the land until her death, then the land was to pass to the very persons to whom, under clause 3, it would have gone had it been allotted to Mrs. Burch as her share, i. e., to the children of herself and testator. At her death, of course, no fourth share was needed to carry out- the purpose of the testator and this land would then pass under the limitations of clause 3. Mrs. Burch has no life estate given her by clause 5. She has the right to possess, with the veto power enabling her to postpone division of the land until her death, if she saw fit, and that was all. When she should die, then the division into shares with life estate tenures and limitations over already carefully provided for was to be made, she herself being eliminated by death.</p> <p>Third. The codicil to the will clearly supports the views here advanced. In it we have a life estate given to the widow, with remainder over in fee simple to his children. How different is the language used from that heretofore under consideration! The testator here evinces a perfect knowledge of the legal effect of the words he is using*, and, by employing them, calls.attention to the fact that, as to this particular tract, he is giving his widow a life estate with fee to his children, instead of cross-remainder does. No such words were employed in the will proper, because, in it, he was not giving his children a fee simple, as he was doing in the codicil, and he made-use of different terms to convey a different estate. This clear perception on the part of the testator of the value and meaning of legal terms whether of his general knowledge or gained by consultation with a lawyer is very' persuasive that our position is the sound one. The codicil also makes more manifest what, indeed, was plain enough before, that Mrs. Burch was never intended by her husband to take a life estate simply by force of the fifth clause. Mr. Burch knéw how to create a life estate by apt words and he did it in clause 3 of his will and in the codicil but never in clause 5. The actions of the parties and the court, in what might be called a cotemporaneous construction of the Burch will support the claim of appellees. The record shows that Mrs. Dangerfield assented to the division of this land under the order of the probate court; that Mrs. Miller filed her petition to have her share in her father’s estate allotted to her under his will; that commissioners were appointed and set off this land to her as her share in the general estate, brought in as the land was by the consent of the widow; that this occurred in 1841; nine years later, in 1856, Mrs. Miller, in derogation of the rights of her children, sold the land to Davenport by a deed in fee. The other children of Washington S. Burch joined her in this conveyance, but their previous conduct in permitting this land to be allotted to Mrs. Miller by order of the probate court shows clearly enough that they knew that they were attempting to convey title that they did not possess; for if they had believed that Mrs. Dangerfield’s quitclaim to them in 1845, coupled with clause 5 of their father’s will really vested them a fee simple as cotenants with Mrs. Miller then they would never have permitted the whole land to be given to Mrs. Miller by the probate court in the division of the Burch estate, for the same reason that as to this particular land they would have thought they had a fee, but as to the balance of the estate not specifically devised, they would have only had life estates, and they would not have permitted Mrs. Miller to get the whole of that part of the estate in which they all had equal shares in fee. Again, if they had really taken a fee and Mrs. Miller in the partition had been given this land, then there would have been no necessity for their joining her in the deed to Davenport, as she would have the entire estate in herself. In 1841 all parties, and the court, dealt with the land as part of the general estate of Mr.. Burch. The truth is, doubtless, that in 1856, the Burches thought they would chance it on the ambiguity on clause 5, and that the purchaser Davenport would chance it too, so he was willing to take a doubtful title. As a matter of fact he did not make such a bad bargain after all, as he and his vendees have enjoyed the possession of the land since 1856, a period of over fifty years. Mr. Davenport, however, and all. those claiming under him were bound and held to notice of what sort of title he got by reason of the probate and record of Mr. Burch’s will and could take only such title as passed thereunder. Millsaps v. Shoiwell, 76 Miss. 923, 25 South. 359.</p> <p>Upon the whole case we confidently urge — 1</p> <p>First. That the homestead was subject to the title limitations of the general devising clause of the will.</p> <p>Second. That under that clause'the children of Mr. Burch took life estates in equal' shares, with remainders to their children or descendants living at their death, subject to be defeated by the contingency of the death of life tenants without issue surviving, with cross-remainders conditioned upon such contingency. That there were valid limitations under the law as it then stood.</p> <p>Third. That when Mrs. Miller received and took possession of the one thousand acre tract constituting the homestead, under allotment by the commissioner, she took a life estate only in it, with remainder to her children living at her death, defeasible in case she left none that, at her death in 1907, a fee simple title vested in .appellees as her living children, and the ulterior limitation was defeated; and that appellees were entitled to recover. This was the opinion of the court below, and should be affirmed we think.</p>

From the circuit court of Lee county. Hon. Eugene O. Sykes, Judge. Payne, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Parker, trustee, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment-predicated of a peremptory instruction in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. Parker, the appellant, was trustee in a deed of trust executed by one James Little for the benefit of Thompson & Son, the deed of trust conveying two mules and a mare.

From tbe circuit court of Yazoo county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Thomas, appellant, was tried and convicted in the municipal court of Yazoo City for selling intoxicating liquors in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting such sales, and appealed to the circuit court. He was again tried and convicted in the circuit court and appealed to the supreme court. The opinion sufficiently states the facts.

Hrom the circuit court of Quitman county. Hon. Samuel 0. Cook, Judge. Whitten, appellant, was indicted and tried for and convicted of murder, and appealed to the supreme court. Appellant and deceased visited a gambling house on the night of the homicide. The killing occurred on the second floor of the building, and there was but one eyewitness, a woman, who escaped, and could not be found to be used as a witness.

From the judgment of Hon. G. Garland Lyell, Chancellor, rendered in habeas corpus proceedings, heard and determined at Jackson, Mississippi. Mrs. O’Neal, appellee, was the petitioner, and O’Neal, her divorced husband, appellant, was defendant in the proceeding before tbe chancellor. From a decree in petitioner’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the chancery court of Adams county.. Hon. James Stowers Hicks, Chancellor. Nutt, appellant, was adjudged in contempt of the chancery court and the decree mentioned in the opinion was entered against him, from which he appealed to the supreme court. Since the appeal was dismissed no> other statement of the facts, in view of the opinion of the court, is deemed necessary.

From: the circuit court of Marshall county. Hon. L. G. Fant, Special Judge. Cooper, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Fivers, appellee, was original defendant there. The defendant inter-pleaded the state, and the district attorney in behalf of the state defended the suit. From a judgment denying the plaintiff all relief he appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Alcorn county. Hon. Eugene O. Sykes, Judge. Dalton, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Bynum, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. One Helms, charged by affidavit with crime committed in 'Mississippi, absconded to the state of Kansas.

From the circuit court of Lauderdale county. ITon. John L. Buckley, Judge. Davis, appellant, was plaintiff in tbe court below; Woods, appellee, was defendant there. Held: the plaintiff approached the polls and asked for a ticket, that he might vote; that the defendant, in reply to such request, said to the plaintiff, “You cannot vote, because you are a convict.

Erom the chancery court of Simpson county. Hon. James L. McCaskill, Chancellor. Magee, appellee and cross-appellant, was complainant and cross-defendant in the court below; McLeod and wife, appellants and crose-appellees, and one Womack, an appellee and cross-appellant, were defendants and cross-complainants there.

From the chancery court of Marion county. Eon. It. D. Cooper, Special Chancellor. Foxworth and others, appellees, were complainants in the-court below; Mrs. Stewart and others, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree in complainants’ favor defendants, appealed to the supreme court. The suit was for the sale of land for division of the proceeds'among the descendants of one Jesse Lee, deceased, alleged to be-unusually numerous'.

From the chancery court of Forrest county. LIon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Mrs Lehman and others, composing the partnership of A1 ’ Lehman & Company, appellants, creditors of the estate, contested the claims of Powe and E. B. George, appellees, probated against the insolvent estate of T. J. George deceased. The proceeding was based on Code 1906, § 2108, authorizing any one interested, including any creditor, to contest any claim probated against the estate of a decedent.

From the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. BEon. G. Garland Lybll, Chancellor. Beresford and others, appellants, were complainants in the court below; Marble and others, appellees, were defendants there. From a decree sustaining the demurrer of the defendants to the bill of complaint and dismissing the suit the complainants appealed to' the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Lawrence county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. Maxwell, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the Mississippi Valley Company and the Brookhaven & Pearl River Railroad Company, appellees, were defendants there. The suit was an action of ejectment. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Lincoln county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Miss Jackson, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the telegraph company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court.

Prom the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Shumaker, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Hines ■and another, appellants, were defendants there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendants appealed to the supreme ■court. When the case reached the supreme court the appellee moved the court to strike from the record the stenographer’s report (notes transcribed) of the evidence.

From the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Scarborough, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the Naval Stores Company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

Prom the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. The Leland Lumber Company, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Moorer, appellant, was defendant there. Prom a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Harrisou county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Held: and it does not show that it was a political party primary of any kind.

From the circuit court of Tate county. How. William A. Roane, Judge. Fowler, appellant, and his son Richard Fowler and son-in-law John Burnett, were jointly indicted in the circuit court ■of Panola county for the murder of Lawrence Turner. On motion the yenue was changed to Tate county; appellant was -separately tried and convicted of murder, sentenced to the penitentiary for life, and appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts.

From the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge.

From the circiiit court of Lauderdale county. ITon. Robert F. Cochran, Judge. Mrs. Smith and others, appellees, were plaintiffs in the court below; the Mississippi Cotton Oil Company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

From the circuit court of Tunica county. Hon. Samuel 0. Cook, Judge. Davis, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment for $25 in plaintiff’s favor he appealed to the supreme court, contending that his recovery was too small. Appellant took passage on a passenger train of the appellee, and requested to be put off at a flag station called Etters.

Drom the circuit court of Amite county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Gordon, appellant, was indicted and tried for the murder of one Code Williams, was convicted of manslaughter and appealed to the supreme court. The testimony was conflicting.

<p>Eeom the circuit court of Harrison county.</p> <p>Hon. William If. Hardy, Judge.</p> <p>Hatton, appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted under an indictment charging him with having seduced his niece, Rosella Hatton, a female child under the age of eighteen years and of previous chaste character, and appealed to the supreme court. The testimony showed that the girl was under eighteen years of age and of previous chaste character; that defendant, a man of about fifty years of age, had sexual intercourse with her repeatedly during a period of nearly two years; that she finally became pregnant and was delivered of a child. Before her pregnancy became apparent she made no complaint. Her testimony alone told of the .occasion when she first permitted defendant to enjoy her person, and was to the effect that defendant told her he loved her, asked her to have sexual intercourse with him, assured her that no other person in the world but them would ever know anything about it, and said it was not wrong; while so stating he put his hands upon her, laid her across a bed and did what he wanted to do; she asked him not to do it and did not want him to do it, but made no resistance and let him do it because he wanted to; he made her no presents and gave her no promises until after she had let him do what he wanted to do.</p> <p>The case was once before in the supreme court and the decision then made is reported. Hatton v. State, 92 Miss. 651, 46 South. 708.</p> <p>Aside from the fact that the testimony of the girl has been overcome by competent testimony, if her testimony be true, we fail to see how under the judicial definition of the word it could make out a case of seduction as.is contemplated in law, for the reason that she testifies that there were no presents, promises or inducements offered her on the first act of sexual intercourse.</p> <p>Illicit sexual connection may be had between a man and a woman without seduction. Carnal intercourse may have been occasioned, as much by the woman’s desires as by the man’s.</p> <p>Simply having sexual intercourse with a woman does not constitute seduction; the defendant must use insinuating arts to overcome the opposition of the seduced, and must by wiles, and persuasion, without force, debauch her. People v. (Burner, 39 N.' T. 326.</p> <p>Seduction is the offense of a man who abuses the simplicity and confidence of a woman to obtain by false promise what she ought not to do. Brown v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa, 220.</p> <p>Every illicit connection is not a seduction. It cannot be said that a female is drawn aside from the path of virtue, unless she is honestly pursuing that path and is polluted. If a minor is corrupt and polluted with lewd thoughts so she is ready to submit to improper embraces, as opportunity presents, from her own lustful propensities and without arts of blandishments by him with whom she has had’ sexual intercourse, she cannot be said to have been seduced by him with whom she has had improper sexual relations. State v. Wheeler, 18 S. W. 658.</p> <p>Appellant had so conducted himself towards the child as to win her implicit confidence, and he ought not to be permitted to escape the law because the state is unable to show just exactly what artifice and persuasion was employed to accomplish his purpose.</p> <p>In the case of People v. Gibbs, 10 Mich. 425, the court approved of the instruction to the effect that it was for the jury to say whether arts were practiced and whether the prosecutrix was lured from the paths of virtue and her reluctance to sexual intercourse was overcome by these means; that the means used are not material if the art and persuasion are what caused her to submit; that the arts or inducement need not have been concurrent with the act of sexual intercourse, but if, by insiduous persuasion, intention of artifice from time to time appellant built up such respect of affection for himself as to finally and eventually overcome her virtue, it would not be material if all of these efforts may not have been concurrent with the first act of sexual intercourse, and that in pa'ssing upon the question of whether the means employed were such as to •be likely to induce a woman of previous chaste character to yield to the successful embraces of another, the jury have a right to take into account the relations existing between the parties, the respective age of the parties and the age of the girl at the time. From the reports of the case it appears that the facts there were no stronger than in this case, and in affirming the conviction the court said: “In all such cases, the age, the experience, artfulness and blandishment of the defendant; and the youthfulness, innocence, guileless, and confiding nature of the injured party will always be found to enter largely into consideration of the facts of the parties involved in the investigation.</p> <p>Without attempting to review the many decisions wherein evidence 'has been held sufficient to justify a conviction we content ourselves with the citations of a few of the many cases wherein it has been so adjudged. Stale v. MulTholland, 115, Iowa, 170; Stale v. Ilatherton, 60 Iowa, 175; State v. McIntyre, 89 Iowa, 139; State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa, 269; Philli'p v. State, 108 Ind. 406; State v. Knutson, 91 Iowa, 550.</p>

Prom tlie chancery court of Grenada county. Hon. Isaac T. Blount, Chancellor. Lake, appellant, was complainant in the court below; Perry, appellee, was defendant there. Held: That in exercising the special statutory powers conferred in derogation of the common law, and proceeding under the statute, a court, though of record, is to be considered as of limited jurisdiction, and is not to be presumed to have jurisdiction other than is shown to exist.

From tbe circuit court of Copiah county. Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge. Baker, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Peets & Norman Company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court. It was fatal error to refuse instructions 1, 2 and. 3 asked b'y the appellant and refused by tbe court below.

From the chancery court of Warren county. Hon. J. S. Hicks, Chancellor. Dabney, appellant, was complainant in the court below. Child, appellee, was defendant there. Erom a decree in defendant’s favor the comlainant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Prom the circuit court of Wayne county.</p> <p>Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge.</p> <p>McPhearson, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the Hiwannee Lumber Company, a corporation, and others, appellants, were defendants there. Prom a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendants appealed to the supreme court.</p> <p>McPhearson sued the Hiwannee Lumber Company and others, his declaration containing two counts, one under Code 1906, § 4976, for the statutory penalty of $15 per tree for the alleged cutting by defendants of timber trees on plaintiff’s land, while the second count demanded a recovery of the actual value of the trees so cut. The plaintiff offered as evidence of his title to the land only a receipt and a certificate issued to him, upon his application to homestead the land under the Hnited States homestead laws. The same were objected to by defendants because they were not patents or certificates of entry. The testimony showed that McPhearson had never been in possession of the land at the time of the alleged trespasses, the timber being cut in the early springtime of 1907 and plaintiff did not move on the land until June, 1907. The circuit court admitted the receipt and certificate in evidence; they were in these words: — •</p> <p>“Excess Receipt No. 46,823. Receiver’s Duplicate Receipt No. 41,702. Application No. 41,702. Homestead. Department of the Interior, United States Land Office, Jackson, Mississippi, December 20th, 1906. Received of Lorenzo D. MePhearson the sum of fourteen dollars no cents, being the amount ■of fee and compensation of register and receiver for the entry of S. E. % of N. W. %, S. W. % of N. E. y¿, and N, % of the •S.. W. % of section 13, in township 10, north, of range 7 West, ■St. Stephens meridian, under section 2290, Revised Statutes of the United States. $14.00. 160.16. Thomas V. McAllister, Receiver.”</p> <p>“Department of the Interior, United States Land Office. I hereby certify that the records of this office show that S. E. •of N. W. %, S. W. y¿ of N. E. and N. % of S. W. %, 'Sec. 13, Tp. 10 N., R. 7 W. of St. Stephens meridian, is covered by homestead entry No-. 41,702, made December 20th, 1906, by Lorenzo D. McPhearson, and I further certify that said entry is intact. Witness my signature this 31st day of December, 1908. Thomas V. McAllister, Receiver U. S. Land ■Office, Jackson, Mississippi.”</p> <p>Plaintiff had taken all steps possible under the law in order to homestead the land for which he had made application, and sufficient time had not elapsed for a certificate of entry or patent to issue to him.</p> <p>' Code 1906, § 1969, is as follows: “All certificates issued in pursuance of any act of congress by any board of commissioners, register of any land office, or any other person authorized to issue such certificate, founded on any warrant, order of survey, ■.entry, grant, confirmation, donation, pre-emption, or purchase from the United States of any land in this state, shall vest the full legal title to such land in the person to whom such certificate is granted, his heirs or assigns, so far as to enable the holder thereof to maintain an action thereon, and the same shall be received in evidence as such, saving the paramount rights of .other persons.”</p> <p>The plaintiff had no legal title to the land from which the timber- was cut; nor had be ever been, up to the time of the cutting of the timber, in possession of the land. In order to maintain an action of trespass for cutting timber a plaintiff must show title to the timber, or that he was in the exclusive possession of the land from which it was cut and exerting a claim of title thereto. Dejameit v. Haynes, 28 Miss. 600; Ware v. Collins, 35 Miss. 223 ; Calkins v. Miller, 16 Miss. 651; Damll v. Dodds, 78 Miss. 912.</p> <p>The certificate or receipt which was issued by the receiver of the United States land office is not evidence of title. It is nothing more than a receipt for money. It is certainly a novel proposition that a person may acquire a title, legal or equitable, to the land of the United States merely by paying a small fee required to be paid at the very incipiency of the effort to acquire title to the land, and this also even before the applicant has ever moved on it and resided any part of the five years required by section 2291 of the United States Statutes, and before making any final proof, as required by said section, and before he himself has any right to eut the timber on the land except for improvements; and that he may thereby acquire such title, too, as will enable him to recover $15 for each tree cut by any one else thereafter on the land. The mere statement of such a proposition carries with it its own refutation.</p> <p>Counsel for appellee rely on Code 1906, § 1959, in support of their contention that the receipt is such title as will enable plaintiff to recover. A sufficient reply to this is that the receipt of the receiver, issued to the plaintiff and introduced as evidence, is not a certificate and does not purport to be. It is nothing more than a receipt for the fee required to be paid as compensation to the register and receiver by all persons who enter land under the homestead laws.</p> <p>Section 2291 of the United States Statutes, the one immediately following the Federal Statute last cited, provides that “no certificate, however small, shall be given or patent issued therefor” (that is, to persons homesteading lands) “until the expiration of five years from the date of such entry.” The fact that by the above express provision of the United States Statutes no certificate shall issue until the applicant shall have resided on the land for five years is proof that the receipt issued to the applicant at the time he enters the land, and before he is even required to move on it, is not a certificate as provided for in Code 1906, § 1959.</p> <p>In Orrell v. Bay, etc., Go., 83 Miss. 800, 36 South. 561, the court decided that a settler on mailing application for a homestead and filing the required affidavit and paying a certain small sum, proportionate to the amount of the land applied for, acquires certain rights in the land and the timber growing thereon. He acquires a privilege of pre-emption, and is clothed with the right and power to protect his entry from intrusion or trespass. He acquires also the right to- the absolute and undisturbed possession and control of the land embraced in his entry. Mott. v. Hopper, 116 La. 629, 40 South. 921.</p> <p>McPherson’s entry -vested in him the immediate right of exclusive possession and use of the land embraced in his entry coupled with the right to receive a perfect legal title on complying with certain conditions prescribed by law, and created in fact an inchoate title, which when perfected relates back to date of entry. If a homesteader could not protect his homestead before receiving-patent to his land, he would be at the mercy of every trespasser, and the beneficial purpose of the national homestead-law.would be defeated. Johnson v. Hrnis, 91 Miss. 708, 45 South. 979.</p> <p>Code 1906, § 1959, gives to the person to whom, any certificate of entry or purchase has been issued by the United States government of any land in this state, a full legal title to such land insofar as to enable the holder to maintain an action for the cutting of timber, thereon. It is the policy of the federal government to secure for the homesteader the exclusive benefit of his homestead rights. The homestead laws allow the homesteader six months from the date of his entry in which to move on the land homesteaded. McPherson, the homesteader, was on this land a short time before he made his entry, which was on Dec. 20, 1906. He was again on the land in March, 1907, and he was also on the land several times between March and June, 1907, and on or before the said last date he built his house on said land and moved his family, and he and they wero living on the land within six months from the date of this entry. Considering the whole record in this case this court must affirm the judgment of the court below.</p> <p>Appellee rests his title on a receipt and certificate issued to him by the proper officer of the United States Land Office at Jackson, Mississippi, and these instruments were, at the time of trial and now are uncancelled and in full force and effect. Under Code 1906, § 1959, the appellee was thereby vested with title to the land sufficiently to support his suit for the cutting and removing of timber from the land.</p> <p>The Eevised Statutes of the United States, § 2290, give the receiver of the land office authority to- issue a certificate to one in possession of public land claiming it as a homestead. And by Code 1906, § 1959, appellee had the right as plaintiff to prosecute the suit, irrespective of whether or not he was, at the time of suit, in exclusive possession of the land from which the timber was taken. Dickinson v. Brown, 9 Smed. & M. 130; Lindsey v. Brown, 27 Miss. 502; Martin v. Nash, 31 Miss. 324; Huntington v. Orantland, 33 Miss. 453.</p> <p>In the case of Johnson v. Davis, 91 Miss. 708, 45 South. 979, it is distinctly held that a United States land office certificate showing the entry or purchase of government lands is competent evidence of title in the person to whom it was issued, by Code 1906, § 1959, and will support a suit by the legal holder thereof to recover the statutory penalty for illegally boxing of pine trees for turpentine.</p>

From the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. IIon. G. Garland Ltell, Chancellor. Madame Turner, appellee, was complainant in the court bellow ; the town of Clinton and the Alabama & Vicksburg Eailwa'y Company, appellants, were defendants there. From a decree overruling their demurrer to the bill of complaint, the defendants appealed to the supreme court. 'The material facts, as shown by the bill, are stated in the opinion of the court.

Hrom tbe circuit court of Covington county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. Harvey, appellant, was indicted and tried for and convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, and appealed to the supreme court. Tbe facts of which the opinions of the judges are predicated are sufficiently stated in them respectively.

Erom the circuit court of Tishomingo county. Hon. Eugene O. Sykes, Judge. Eaves and others, appellants, co-partners under the name Eaves & Company, .were plaintiffs in the court below; Harris & Sons Company, a corporation, was defendant there. Erom a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The appellants, Eaves & Company, were cotton merchants at Tupelo, Miss.

<p>From the circuit court of Lowndes county.</p> <p>Hon. John L. Buckley, Judge.</p> <p>Grace, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railway company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>The sufficiency of the declaration must be determined by the Alabama statute, inasmuch as plaintiff’s injury was received in Alabama.</p> <p>The very question now before this court was before the supreme court of Alabama in the case of Seaboard Mfg. Go. v. 'Woodson, 10 South. 87.</p> <p>"What was said by the supreme court in that case in construing the statute would seem to be conclusive against the sufficiency of the declaration. The proof required to support the allegations of the declaration does not necessarily involve any showing that the alleged defect arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the defendant or of some person in its service and entrusted by it with the duty of seeing that the engine was in proper condition.</p> <p>In the case of United States Bolling Stoch Co. v. Weir, 11 South. 438, the foregoing case was referred to with approval.</p> <p>In the case of Walton v. Lindsey, etc., Co., 39 South. 671, in condemning a certain count of the declaration in that case, the supreme court said: “Furthermore there is no averment or anything equivalent to an averment that a defect arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the defendant, or of some person in the service of the defendant and entrusted by it with the duty of seeing that the ways and works and machinery were in proper order or condition.”</p> <p>The correct manner of pleading the statute is illustrated in Birmingham Bolling Mill Co. v. Boclchold, 42 South. 96, and in West Pratt. Coal Co. v. Andrews, 43 South. 350, it will be seen that the declaration in each of those cases, after averring that the injury resulted from defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, .etc., concluded by alleging that the defect “had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of defendant or of some person in the employ of defendant intrusted by defendant with the duty of seeing that said ways, works, machinery or .plant were in proper condition.” Not only is the declaration defective by not making averments required by the statute, but there was no effort made by the proof to bring the case within the Alabama statute. Of course, however, the plaintiff was restricted to such a case as was made by his declaration, and this case being wholly defective he was not entitled to recover. The court therefore erred in granting the instruction requested by the appellee and erred in refusing the eighth instruction asked for appellant, by which the court was asked to peremptorily instruct the jury to find for the appellant.</p> <p>Appellant claimed that appellee’s pleadings and proof do not conform to “section No. 3910, of the Alabama statute” — the injury having occurred in that state. Our reply is that, the code in which that section occurs was not adopted until May 1, 1908, and the injury occurred February 22, 1908. The said section is not similar to the section of the previous code, 1896, which was in force when this injury occurred, hence controlling. And the decisions cited by defendant all go further back still— to the code that preceded that, that of 1886. Everything including and after the word “providing” is new, but the most important thing is an omission, to wit: the Code of 1896, contained the following words: “he was aware that,” and they come just after the word “unless,” being the sixth word of the sixth line of the section 3910, as quoted in this brief and made the law to be to wit: “The master or employer, is not liable under this section if the servant or employe knew of the defect or negligence causing the injury and failed in reasonable time to give information thereof to the master or employer, or to some person superior to himself engaged in the service or employment of the master or employer, unless he was aware that the master or employer or such superior already knew of such defect or negligence; nor is the master or employer liable under subdivision 1, unless the defect therein mentioned arose or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the master or employer or some person in the service of the master or employer and entrusted by him with the duty to see that the ways, works, machinery and plant were in proper condition.” Code of Alabama, 1896, § 1V4-9.</p> <p>We here see a “distinction with a difference” and a material one at that.</p> <p>Let us see what the law says in reference to these “motions to exclude testimony,” the technical name being “ peremptory instructions.”</p> <p>The supreme court of Mississippi has given this class of instructions a quietus, in Bell v. Southern, etc., B. Go., 8V Miss. 234, 30 South. 821.</p> <p>The supreme court of Alabama has in numerous instances done likewise. Chambliss v. Mary Lee Coal & B. Co., 104 Ala. 655; Louisville, etc., B. Co. v. York, 30 South. 676.</p> <p>We submit three propositions and prove each, both by the law of Mississippi and Alabama, either of which will destroy his contention.</p> <p>First, appellant has waived its right to attack the declaration; second, it has mistaken its remedy; third, it has mistaken its time, both in this and the trial court.</p> <p>“Joinder of issue, upon an issue of fact waives exception to the sufficiency of the pleading.” Southern, etc., Co. v. Hunnicutt, 54 Miss. 578.</p> <p>“Undisposed of pleadings waived by trial on merits under general issue” (as in this case). Georgia, etc., Co. v. Jones, 49 Miss. 81.</p> <p>“Whatever might be the proper judgment upon a demurrer to a declaration for want of technical form, it is manifest that after plea, issue in bar and demurrer to evidence (which is the nature and intent of this motion) it is too late to raise the exceptions.” (Plea of general issue was interposed in this case and trial had thereon). Jordan v. Foxiuorih, 48 Miss. 607. Let us now turn our attention to the state of Alabama and see what its supreme court has made deliverence of on said subject.</p> <p>“Though in actions to recover for personal injuries contributory negligence should be pleaded specially, yet where the parties proceed to a trial of such action on the issue of contributory negligence without such pleading it will be deemed to have been waived.” In this case the claim is that the word “negligence” was omitted in the declaration, but the “defective machinery,” etc., was fully set out and trial had on that issue, and a jury so found. Bichmond, etc., B. Co. v: Fanner, 97 Ala. 141; Kansas City, etc., B. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; Andrews v. Birmingham, etc., B. Co., 99 Ala. 438.</p> <p>Where issue is joined without objection on insufficient pleas if the defendant proves either of .them he is entitled to judgment in his favor. Jones v. Collins, 80 Ala. 108.</p> <p>“Where issue is joined on a plea (the general issue in this case) the defendant has a right to trial thereon without reference to its sufficiency. 14 South. 831.</p> <p>Where issue is taken upon insufficient pleas, evidence must be taken on it and submitted to the jury.” McKinnon v. Lessly, 89 Ala. 625.</p>

Prom the chancery court of, first district, Coahoma county. 'Hon. Percy Bell, Chancellor. Corley, appellant, was petitioner, plaintiff or complainant in the court below; the Board of Levee Commissioners, appellee, was defendant there. Prom an inadequate decree in appellant’s favor he appealed to the supreme court.

Erom the circuit court of Lawrence county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. Miss Lee, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Sills and others, appellees, were defendants there. Erom a judgment in defendants’ favor, sustaining a demurrer to the declaration and- dismissing the suit, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit, court of Jackson county. Hon. William H. Hardy, Judge. Stewart, appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted for receiving as an officer of a bank a deposit into the bank, knowing or having good reason to believe the bank insolvent, without informing the depositor of its condition; a crime under Code 1906, § 1169. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of five years, and appealed to the supreme court.

<p>Deeds. Timber reserved. Limited time to cut and remove. Gross-ties manuactured but not removed.</p> <p>Where a deed to land reserved in the grantor the right and title to all timber thereon which he might remove within a designated time, but conveyed all timber thereon not removed in that time:—</p> <p>(a) The grantee was the owner of all timber standing, growing and being on the land at the expiration of the timé, including timber cut and lying in its natural state; but</p> <p>(Z>) He was not the owner of railroad cross-ties, manufactured by the grantor within the time, the greater part of their value being the result of skill and labor expended in their manufacture, although made from timber on the land and left thereon after the expiration of the time.</p>

Application to the judges of the supreme court for the grant of an appeal from the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. G-. Garland Lyell, Chancellor. The State Fire Insurance Company, applicant, was defendant to an equity suit brought against it in the chancery court by Morrison, complainant.

From the chancery court of Harrison county. Hon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor. Moores, appellant, was complainant in the court below; Thomas, appellee, was defendant there. From a final decree in defendant’s favor the complainant appealed to the supreme court. The object of the suit was to confirm a tax title. Complainant purchased the land from the state, and the state acquired the same at a regular state and county tax sale in 1893 for the taxes of 1892.

Erom the chancery court of Simpson county. Hon. James L. McCaskill, Chancellor. Carter and wife, appellants, were complainants in the court below; the Eastman-Gardner Company, appellee, was defendant there. From a decree in defendant’s favor the complainants appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. For a case in point as to what constitutes fraud in law, see White v. Trotterj 14 Smed. & M. 42, 43.

From tbe circuit court of Calhoun county. Hon. Joseph T. Dunn, Judge. The State of Mississippi, suing on the relation of the attorney general, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railway company, appellant, was defendant there. The suit was a mandamus proceeding. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Erom the circuit court of Jefferson Davis county. Hon. Bobert L. Bullard, Judge. Olive Brown, appellant, a negro girl about seventeen years of age, was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced under an indictment charging her with infanticide; and appealed to the supreme court. Being fax advanced in pregnancy, appellant was traveling with her father on a railroad passenger train. Her father observed that she seemed to be unwell.

From the circuit court of Forrest county. Hon. William H. Cook, Judge. Williams, appellant, was indicted and tried for and convicted of murder and appealed to the supreme court. A statement of the facts, in view of the opinion of the court, is deemed.unnecessary. The evidence upon which the conviction was had was purely circumstantial.

From the circuit court of Forrest county. IIon. William H. Cook, Judge. Mrs. Magee, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. The suit was for damages because of the alleged wrongful killing by defendant of plaintiff’s husband. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Adams county. I-Ion. Moyse II. Wilkinson, Judge. The railway company, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Clarke, tax collector, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The defendant, tax collector, demanded $100' of plaintiff as a privilege tax for conducting a wharfboat business and threatened to enforce payment.

From the circuit court of Forrest county. Eon. William E. Cook, Judge. The Sumrall Lumber Company, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Perry and another, appellants, were defendants there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendants appealed to the supreme court. The action was in assumpsit for the value of lumber sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. The sale was made by the plaintiff, a corporation, acting by and through its agent, one Smith.

From the chancery court of Lawrence county. Hon. G. Garland Ltell, Chancellor. Steadman and others, appellants, were complainants in the court below; Butler and others were defendants there. From a. decree dissolving an injunction on defendants’ motion the complainants appealed to the supreme court. Appellees obtained a judgment against appellants in the circuit court, and were proceeding to collect the same by execution. Appellants enjoined the enforcement of the judgment.

From the circuit court of Yazoo county. Hon. Wiles: H. Potter, Judge. Booze, appellant, was convicted in the municipal court of Yazoo City for violating an ordinance of the municipality; he appealed to the circuit court and was there tried do novo and again convicted; he appealed to the supreme court and the conviction was reversed.

From the circuit court of Warren county. Hon. John N. Bush, Judge. The city of Vicksburg, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Pearl River county. Hon. William H. Cook, Judge. Mrs. Keeton and others, appellees, were plaintiffs in the court ' below; the insurance company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment by default in plaintiffs’ favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The declaration, taking all its averments as true, is not sufficient to sustain a judgment by default.

Erom: tbe chancery court of Smith county. Hon. Samuel Whitman, Chancellor. Barnes, appellee, was complainant in the court below; the Eastman-Gardner Company, appellant, was defendant there.

From the circuit court of Harrison county. Hon. William: H. Hardy, Judge. The Gulfport, etc., Co1., appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the town of Bond, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment in defendant’s favor, predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts are sufficiently apparent from the opinion of the court.

Prom the circuit court of Lincoln, county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Mills and another, appellees, were plaintiffs in the court below ; Gibson, appellant, doing business under the name Gibson Paving Company, was defendant there. Prom a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Forrest county. Hon.- William H. Cook, Judge. Mrs. Berry, and others, appellants, were plaintiffs in the court below; the Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company, the Home Telegraph Company, the Hattiesburg Traction Company •and the City of Hattiesburg, appellees, were defendants there.

From the circuit court of Clay county. Hon. J. T. Dunn, Judge. Juanita Free and others, appellees, were plaintiffs in the court below; the railway company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiffs sued to recover damages for the death of their father, Monroe Free, colored.

From the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. Hon. G. Garland Lyell, Chancellor. Hindman, receiver of the Central Bank of Mississippi, appellee and cross-appellant, was complainant in the court below; the Bank of Gloster, appellant, and the Pensacola Bank & Trust Company, cross-appellee, and others were defendants there.

Prom tbe circuit court of, first district, Panola county. PIon. William A. Roane, Judge. Dunnigan, appellee, was plaintiff in tbe court below; the-railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. Prom a judgment in plaintiff’s favor tbe defendant appealed to the supreme court.

From the circuit court of Wilkinson county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Bolling, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the Red Snapper Sauce Company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. In November, 1907, the defendant contracted with plaintiff to parchase produce to be grown on the latter’s farm during that year. The contract was in writing and signed by both parties.

From the circuit court of Clarke county. Hon. John L. Buckley, Judge. Hunter, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the insurance company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. The opinion states the facts.

From the chancery court of Lauderdale county. LIon. James L. McOaskill, Chancellor. Greenwald, appellee, was complainant in the court below; Mrs. Baum, appellant, was defendant there. From a decree Appointing a guardian of her estate the defendant appealed to the supreme court and the complainant and one McBaven pros■ecuted a cross-appeal.

Prom the circuit court of Lincoln county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. Potera, appellant, by next friend, was plaintiff in the court below; the city of Brookhaven, appellee, was defendant there. Prom a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court and the specially concurring opinion.

From the circuit court of Lowndes county. IIon. John L. Buckley, Judge. Smith, appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted of murder, sentenced to the penitentiary for life and appealed to the supreme court. The judges were not unanimous in their conclusions touching the facts.

Erom the circuit court of Jefferson Davis county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. The Corinth Engine & Boiler Works, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellee, was defendant there. The suit was an action of replevin. It was submitted to the judge, a jury being waived. From a judgment in defendant’s favor plaintiff appeared to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Prom the circuit court of Wilkinson county. Hon. Moyse H. Wilkinson, Judge. McGraw, administrator, apx>ellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Arc mercantile company, ax>pellee, was defendant there. From a judgment, predicated of a peremptory instruction, in defendant’s favor the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

From the chancery court of Sharkey county. I-Ion. James Stowers Hicks, Chancellor. McKinney and others, appellants, were complainants in the court below; Adams, appellee, was defendant there. Held: and this although the record is silent as to the residence of the minor. This can only be done by showing that under no circumstances could the court have exercised jurisdiction. Farrar v. Ciarle, 29 Miss. 195, overruled.”

From the circuit court of Jefferson Davis county. Hon. Robert L. Bullard, Judge. Mrs. Turnage, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor defendant appealed to the supreme court. Plaintiff sued for injuries received by her while attempting to board the passenger train of defendant.

From the circuit court of Warren county. Hon. John N. Bush, Judge. Austin, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; the Vicksburg Traction Company, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment predicated of a peremptory instruction, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts. The court below erred in peremptorily instructing the jury to find in favor of the appellee.

From the circuit court of Warren county. Hon. John N. Bush, Judge. Mrs. Quaokenboss, administratrix, and others, appellants, were plaintiffs in the court below; the Insurance Company of North America, of Philadelphia, appellee, was defendant there. From a judgment, predicated of a peremptory instruction, in defendant’s favor the plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court states the facts.

From the circuit court of Holmes county. Hon. Sydney Smtth, Judge. Turner, appellant, was indicted and tried for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, was convicted and sentenced to a fine and imprisonment in the county jail, and appealed to the supreme court.