¶1 (after stating the facts). We cannot give our assent to either of these propositions, nor yield to the force of the argument urged in their support.
¶2 The cause was not determined by the defendant’s failure to give the required bond.
¶3 It was retained by the order of continuance, and the bond was-but a prerequisite to the suspension of process for enforcing the judgment, and the issuing of the injunction against the plaintiff. Such is the obvious intent and effect of the interlocutory order.
¶4 The omission to furnish the indemnity, warranted the issue of the writ sued out by the plaintiff, and it has been executed. But the supplementary proceeding of the defendant remained in Court, and was properly taken up and acted on afterwards.
¶5 The appellant’s counsel insists, that the words used in the statute, (The Code, §473), that a defendant “may, at any time before the execution of such judgment, present a petition,” &c., and “ thereupon the Court may, if satisfied of the probable truth of the allegation, suspend the execution of such judgment, and empanel a jury to assess the damages of the plaintiff, and the allowance to the defendant for such improvements,” imply a discretion in the Court, and do not confer a right on the defendant to demand such allowance.
¶6 If that were so, the Court did exercise its discretion, and after overruling the plaintiff’s motion, “within its discretion allowed the defendant to proceed to trial upon his said petition,” as-shown in the record, and, as we have seen, no obstacle in the way of so doing is presented in the requirement of an indemnifying bond.
¶7 But we do nut concur in this construction of the act. The proceeding was instituted in time, and the words, that “the Judge or Court may, if satisfied of the probable truth of the allegation, suspend,” &c., may confine the Court to the order of sus *71 pension or arrest of proceedings, “ but if satisfied,” &c., the Court cannot, when the application is made in apt time and regular course, withhold the institution of the inquiry as to betterments, and deny to the defendant the statutory relief given him.
¶8 The term “may” is often construed as mandatory when the statute is intended to give relief.
¶9 In Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk., 609, it is said that when a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good, the word “may” is the same as the word “shall.”
¶10 In Mason v. Fearson, 8 How., U. S., 248, Mr. Justice Woodbujry, after citing numerous cases, uses this language: “Without going into more details, these cases fully sustain the doctrine, that what a public corporation or office is empowered-to do for others, and it is beneficial to them to have done, the law holds he ought to do.”
¶11 There is no error in the rulings.
¶12 The method of procedure in cases arising under the act, is pointed out in the opinion in'the late case of Barker v. Owen, 93 N. C., 198, and to the end that the cause may proceed according to law, in the Court below, it is remanded.
¶13 The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal. It is so ordered.
¶14 No error. Affirmed.