95 So. 3d 751 - Jones v. Graphia’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he distinguishing characteristic of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. By virtue of survivorship, the property descends outside of probate from the deceased joint tenant to the surviving joint tenant. The requirements for the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in land are governed by statute. Ownership of the whole and then taking the whole by survivorship are the outstanding features of owning property as joint tenants. The decedent’s share does not have to pass to the survivor because the survivor already owns the whole. The usefulness of the joint tenancy as one property-law expert explained is that it serves as a “poor man’s probate.” With the above said about joint tenancy and its feature of survivorship, one point becomes clear about this case: [Carolyn] Jones owned the whole along with [Anthony] Graphia while they were joint owners. However, when Graphia filed to partite the property, as joint tenants are allowed to do, then Jones’s interest was subject to division by the chancellor. Pri- or to the chancery proceeding, Jones enjoyed the ownership of the whole. Jones lost this enjoyment when Graphia, her joint tenant, filed for partition. Had Graphia died, Jones, as the only other joint owner, would have owned 'the whole by herself. But since there was no death, the joint tenants had to give testimony during the partition Rearing concerning their contributions to buying the house.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Joshua Seymour v. Richard G. Turner

2. “An appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused [her] discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. John Anthony Mansour v. Gene G. Stock

3. “instead of partitioning the property, the chancellor essentially performed an equitable distribution of the house, justifying his decision to award one joint tenant all the proceeds of a partition sale based primarily on the 'putative-spouse doctrine.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Gallagher v. Townsend