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← 95 U.S. 161 - Continental Improvement Company v. Stead

Continental Improvement Company v. Stead’s Empirical Analysis

95 U.S. 161 · 1877

Citation profile

254
cited by 254 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
34
states following
December 2013
most recently cited

82 federal appellate · 4 district · 130 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 254 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2013 · most notably Bowman v. Chicago N W Ry Co (1888), Schofield v. Chicago M St P Ry Co (1885)

82 federal appellate · 4 district · 130 state decisions — followed in 34 states

620187718801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Nudd v. Burrows · Mills v. Smith

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 254 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““If a railroad crosses a common road on the same level, those traveling on either have a legal right to pass over the point of crossing, and to require due care on the part of those traveling on the other to avoid a collision. Of course, these mutual rights have respect to other relative rights subsisting between the parties. From the character and momentum of a railroad train, and the requirements of public travel by means thereof, it cannot be expected that it shall stop and give precedence to an approaching wagon to make the crossing first. It is the duty of the wagon to wait for the train. The train has the preference and right of way. But it is hound to give due warning of its approach, so that the wagon may stop and allow it to pass, and to use every exertion to stop if the wagon is inevitably in the way. Such warning must be reasonable and timely. But what is reasonable and timely warning may depend on many circumstances. It cannot be such, if the speed of the train bo so great as to render it unavailing. The explosion of a cannon may be said to be a warning of the coming shot; but the velocity of the latter generally outstrips the warning. The speed of a train at a crossing should not be so great as to render unavailing the warning of its whistle and bell; and this caution is especially applicable when their sound is obstructed by winds and other noises, and when intervening objects prevent those who are approaching the railroad from seeing a coming train. In such eas”
    12 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““plaintiff was going east, away from the village, following another wagon, and in approaching the railroad track could not see a train coming from the north, by reason of the cut and intervening obstructions. There was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, though he looked to the southward (from which direction the next'regular train was to come), did not look northwardly; that his wagon produced much noise as it moved over the frozen ground; that his hearing was somewhat impaired, and that he did not stop before attempting to cross the track; also, evidence tending to show that the engineer in charge of the train used all efforts in his power to stop it after he saw the plaintiff’s wagon on the track. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the customary and proper signals were given by those in charge of the locomotive, and as to the rate of speed the train was running at the time; some witnesses testifying that it was at an unusual and improper rate, and others to the contrary.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Here is no assumption of facts as in the previous instruction; but it states the duty of persons approaching a railroad with wagons and teams in a more absolute and unqualified form than we think admissible. It states such duty with the rigidity of a statute, making no allowance for modifying circumstances or for accidental diversion of the attention, to which the most prudent and careful are sometimes subject, and assuming, in effect, that the duty of avoiding collision lies wholly, or nearly so, on one side.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.