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← 95 U.S. 191 - Fabbri v. Murphy

Fabbri v. Murphy’s Empirical Analysis

95 U.S. 191 · 1877

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
8
cited 8 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
December 1986
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions (8 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1986 · most notably Rj Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Durham County North Carolina Rj Reynolds Tobacco Company (1986), United States v. G. Falk & Brother (1907)

5 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

140187718801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Thomas Wood Junior v. United States · Distilled Spirits · Aldridge v. Williams · Kimball v. The Collector

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The question then arises whether the sixty-sixth section oí the act of 1799 (chapter 22), has been repealed, or whether it remains in full force. That it has not been expressly or by direct terms repealed is admitted, and the question resolves itself into the more narrow inquiry whether it has been repealed by necessary implication. We say by necessary implication; for it is not sufficient to establish that subsequent laws coyer some, or even all of the cases provided for by it, for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary. But there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy. And it may be added that, in the interpretation of all laws for the collection of revenue, whose provisions are often very complicated and numerous to guard against frauds by importers, it would be a strong grouud to assert that the main provisions of any such laws, sedulously introduced to meet the case of a palpable fraud, should be deemed repealed merely because, in subsequent laws, other powers and authorities are given to the customhouse officers, and other inodes of proceeding are allowed to be bad by them before the goods have passed from their custody, in order to ascertain whether there has been any fraud attempted upon the government. The more natural, if-not the necessary, inference in all such cases is that the legislature int”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““That, the first clause of this section, which deals with imports whereon, the duties have not been paid, applies only to such merchandise remaining in the public stores or bonded warehouses on the day the act takes effect as may then lawfully be entered for consumption, is indicated by the words ‘upon entry thereof for consumption,’ used therein. These words plainly show that the benefits of the provision were meant for merchandise in bond, which, at the time mentioned, the importer is entitled thus to enter, and for none other. * * * Thus, by the then and still existing law, goods in bond can be entered for consumption and withdrawn at any time during the period of three years from the date of original importation. Upon the expiration of this.period, however, the privilege so to enter such goods ceases, and (by section 2971, Rev. St.); they are to be ‘regarded as abandoned to the government, and sold under such regulations as the secretary of the treasury may prescribe,’ etc. It follows that merchandise whereon the duties have not been paid, which had been in the public stores or bonded warehouses more than three years on the day the act of 1883 took effect, does not come within the operation of section 10 of that act. * * * Under section 2977, Rev. St., merchandise upon which duties have been paid may thereafter remain in bonded warehouse in custody of the customs officers at the expense and risk of the owners. But the period during which it may thus remain subject to with”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Any merchandise deposited in bond in any public or private bonded warehouse may be withdrawn for consumption'within .one year from the date of original importation on payment of the duties and charges to which it may be subject by law at the -time of such withdrawal ; and after, the expiration of one -year from the date of original importation, and until-the expiration of three years from such date, any merchandise in bond may be withdrawn for consumption on payment of the duties assessed on the original entry and charges, and an additional duty of ten per centum of the amount of such-duties and charges.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.