Insurance Company v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““That war suspends all commercial intercourse between the citizens of two belligerent countries or states, except so far as may be allowed by the sovereign authority, has been so often asserted and explained in this court within the last 15 years, that any further discussion of, that proposition' would be out of place. As a consequence of this fundamental proposition, it must follow that no active business can be maintained, either personally or by correspondence, or through an agent, by the citizens of one belligerent with the citizens of the other. The only exception to the rule recognized in the books, if we lay out of view contracts for ransom and other matters of absolute necessity, is that of allowing the payment of debts to an agent of an alien enemy, where such agent resides in the same state with the debtor. Bnt this indulgence is subject to restrictions. In the first place, it must not be done with the view of transmitting the funds to the principal during ihe continuance of the war, though, if so transmitted without the debtor’s connivance, he will not bo responsible for it.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Williams v. Paine · Mayer v. Garvan

2. ““We do not mean to say, that if the defendant had continued its authority to the agent to act in the receipt of premiums during the war, and he had done so, a payment or tender to him in lawful money of the United States would not have been valid; nor that a stipulation to continue such authority in case of war, made before its occurrence, would not have been a valid stipulation : nor that a policy of life insurance on whieh no premiums were to be paid, though suspended during the war, might not have revived after its close. We place our decision simply on the ground that the agency of Garland was terminated by the breaking out of the war, and that, although by the consent of the parties it might have been continued for the purpose of receiving payments of premiums during the war, there is no proof that such assent was given, either, by the defendant or by Garland; but that, on the contrary, the proof is positive and uncontradieted, that Garland declined to act as agent.” • 0”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Robertson v. Miller