Railroad Company v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

96 federal appellate · 6 district · 141 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 301 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person, under the existing circumstances, would not have done. The essence of the fault may lie in. omission or commission.””

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Washington Mills v. Cox · Boston, C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. v. Seaboard Transp. Co.

2. ““One who by his negligence has brought an injury upon himself can not recover damages for it. Such is the rule of the civil and of the common law. A plaintiff in such case is entitled to no relief. But where the defendant has been guilty of negligence also, in the same connection, the result depends upon the facts. The question in such case is (1) whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant, or (2) whether the plaintiff himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his own negligence or want of ordinary care and caution that but for such negligence or want of care and caution on his part the misfortune would not have happened. “In the former case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. In the latter he is not.” (Page 442.)”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lauterer v. Manhattan Ry. Co. · Buckley v. Chadwick

3. ““The plaintiff had been warned against riding on the pilot, and forbidden to do so. It was next Lo the cowcatcher and obviously a place of peril, especially in case of collision. There was room for him in the box car. He should have taken his place there. He could have gone into the box car in as little, if not less, time than it took to climb to the pilot. The knowledge, assent, or direction of the company’s agents as to what he did is immaterial. If told to get on anywhere, that the train was late, and that he must hurry, this was no justification for taking such a risk. As weil might he have obeyed a suggestion to ride on the cowcatcher, or put himself on the track before the advancing wheels of the locomotive. The company, though bound to a high degree of care, did not insure his safety. He was not an infant, nor non compos. The liability of the company was conditioned upon the exercise of reasonable and proper care and caution on his part. Without the latter, the former could not arise. He and another who rode beside him were the only persons hurt upon the train. All those in the box car, where he should have been, were uninjured. He would have eseax>ed, also, if he had been there. His injury was due to his own recklessness and folly. He was himself the author of his misfortune. This is shown with as near an approach to demonstration as anything short of mathematics will permit.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Demko v. Carbon Hill Coal Co. · Winters v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.