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← 95 U.S. 68 - Ex parte Easton

Ex parte Easton’s Empirical Analysis

95 U.S. 68 · 1877

Citation profile

225
cited by 225 later decisions
18
cited 18 times by the Supreme Court
15
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

44 federal appellate · 64 district · 29 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 225 later decisions (18 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2018 · most notably Atlantic Transport Company of West Virginia v. Frank Imbrovek (1914), Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law (1972)

44 federal appellate · 64 district · 29 state decisions — followed in 15 states

310187718801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on The Lottawanna · The Propeller Genesee Chief Pierce Kelsey Cheney Hunter Swan Clark Strong v. Fitzhugh Littlejohn Peck · The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchants' Bank of Boston · People's Ferry Co. v. Beers

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 225 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Compensation for wharfage maybe claimed upon an express or an implied contract according to the circumstances. Where a price is agreed upon for the use of a wharf, the contract furnishes the measure of compensation, and when the wharf is used without any such agreement, the contract is implied, and the proprietor is entitled to recover what is just and reasonable for the use of his property and the benefit conferred. Such erections are indispensably necessary for the safety and convenience of commerce and navigation; and those who take berth along-side them to secure those objects derive great benefit from their use. * * * Such contracts, beyond all doubt, are maritime, as they have respect to commerce and navigation, and are for the benefit of the ship or vessel when afloat, * * * for which, if the vessel or- water-craft is a foreign one, or belongs to a port of a state other than the one where the wharf is situated, a maiitime lien arises against the ship or vessel in favor of tlio proprietor of the wharf. * * * Water-craft of all kinds necessarily lie at a wharf when loading and unloading; and Mr. Benedict, says that the pecuniary charge for the use of the dock or wharf is called * wharfage ’ or «dockage,’ and that it is the subject of admiralty jurisdiction; that the master 'and owner of the ship, and the ship herself, may be proceeded against in admiralty to enforce the payment of wharfage when the vessel lies along-side the wharf, or at a distance, and only uses the wh”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Delivery on the wharf, in the case of goods transported by ships, is sufficient under our law, if due notice be given to the consignees and the different consignments be properly separated so as to be open to inspection and conveniently accessible to their respective owners. Where the contract is to carry by water from port to port, an actual delivery of the goods into the possession of the owner or consignee, or at his warehouse, is not required in order to discharge the carrier from his liability. He may deliver them on the wharf; but to constitute a valid delivery there the master should give due and reasonable notice to the consignee, so as to afford him a fair opportunity to remove the goods or put them under proper care and custody. When the goods, after being so discharged and the different consignments properly separated, are not accepted by the consignee or owner of the cargo, the carrier should not leave them exposed on the wharf, but should store them in a place of safety, notifying the consignee or owner that they are so stored, subject to the lien of the ship for the freight and charges, and when he has done so he is no longer liable on his’ contract of affreightment.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Neither canal boats nor barges ordinarily have sails or steam power, but they usually have tow lines; and it clearly cannot make any difference, as to their liability for wharfage, whether they are propelled by steam or sails of their own, or by tugs, or horse or mule power, if it appears that the boat or barge actually occupied a berth at the Wharf or slip at the commencement or close of the trip as a resting place, or for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo, or receiving or fqr landing passengers.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.