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← 95 U.S. 80 - Packet Company v. Keokuk

Packet Company v. Keokuk’s Empirical Analysis

95 U.S. 80 · 1877

Citation profile

226
cited by 226 later decisions
41
cited 41 times by the Supreme Court
27
states following
March 2023
most recently cited

17 federal appellate · 18 district · 64 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 226 later decisions (41 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2023 · most notably Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917), Simpson v. Shepard (1913)

17 federal appellate · 18 district · 64 state decisions — followed in 27 states

8001877188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gibbons v. Ogden · Aaron Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia to the Use of the Society for the Relief of Distressed Pilots Their Widows and Children Same · Barney v. Keokuk · George Smith v. William Turner Health-Commissioner of the Port of New York James Norris · Railroad Company v. Schurmeir

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 226 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““* * * To determine whether the charge prescribed by the ordinance in question is a duty of tonnage, within the meaning of the Constitution, it is necessary to observe carefully its object and essence. If the charge is clearly a duty, a tax or burden, which in its essence is a contribution claimed for the privilege of entering the port of Keokuk, or remaining in it, or departing from it, imposed as it is, by authority of the State and measured by the capacity of the vessel, it is, doubtless, embraced by the constitutional prohibition of such a duty. But a charge for services rendered or for conveniences provided is in no sense a tax or a duty. It is not a hindrance or impediment to free navigation. The prohibition to the State against the imposition of a duty of tonnage was designed to guard against local hindrances to trade and carriage by vessels, not to relieve them from liability to claims for assistance rendered and facilities furnished for trade and commerce.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “To determine whether the charge prescribed by the ordinance in question is a duty of tonnage, within the meaning of the Constitution, it is necessary to observe carefully its object and essence. . . . (A) charge for services rendered or for conveniences provided is in no sense a tax or a duty. . . . It is a tax or a duty that is prohibited: something imposed by virtue of sovereignty, not claimed in right of proprietorship. Wharfage is of the latter character. Providing a wharf to which vessels may make fast, or at which they may conveniently load or unload, is rendering them a service. . . . (A)nd, when compensation is demanded for the use of the wharf, the demand is an assertion, not of sovereignty, but of a right of property.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(i)t is the thing, and not the name, which is to be considered.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.