Volume 95 — Washington Reports

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Walla Walla county, Mills, J., entered April 24, 1915, upon a trial and conviction of the offense of false advertising.</p>

, entered September 14, 1915, confirming an assessment roll for a public improvement, upon appeal from the city council.

, entered April 7, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Snohomish county, Alston, J., entered January 20, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered October 26, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered February 21, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action on contract,- tried to the- court.</p>

, entered February 29, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a promissory note, tried to the court.

<p>Executors and Administrators — Distribution—Decree—Conclusiveness — Fraud. The probate of a will and final distribution of the estate cannot be set aside after the lapse of two years for the fraud of the executrix in suppressing a codicil in favor of the plaintiff; since it is merely an attack upon the final decree of distribution because of the presentation of false evidence touching the merits of the question as to who were the proper distributees.</p> <p>Same. In such a case there can be no recovery of the amount of the codicil on the theory that the defendant held the distributed property as trustee for the plaintiff.</p> <p>Wills — Contest — Limitation. An action for an accounting against the executrix of a will cannot be sustained as a will contest, unless commenced within one year following the probate of the will, under Rem. Code, § 1307, limiting the time for contesting a will.</p> <p>Judoment — Vacation—Limitations. Under Rem. Code, § 466, the proceeding to vacate or modify a judgment must be commenced within one year following the rendition of the judgment.</p>

F. Wright, J., entered May 3,1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to vacate a decree adjudging an escheatment of the property of a deceased person to the state.

<p>Appeal — Review—Findings. Where the proofs are not brought up on appeal, the objection that they do not warrant the findings cannot be considered.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Public Works — Bond of Contractor— Actions — Notice. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1161, providing that notice of furnishing materials and supplies to a contractor or subcontractor on public work must be given within thirty days from and after the completion of the contract and acceptance of the work by the city, in an action upon a bond it is necessary to show that such notice was given, and also, that goods alleged to be supplied to a boarding house keeper were furnished to a subcontractor of the contractor, under Id., § 1159.</p>

, entered November 15, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, dismissing an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.

<p>Executors and Administrators — Family Allowance — Persons Entitled — “Widow”—Surviving Husband. Where there are no children, the surviving husband cannot claim an exemption or allowance, as provided in Rem. Code, §§ 1465 and 1467, for the “widow, minor child or children;” as the word “widow” cannot be held to be “widower.”</p>

<p>Banks and Banking — Insolvency — Trust Fund — Following Trust — Burden of Proof — Evidence—Sufficiency. In an action to recover from the receiver of an insolvent bank money collected by it and held in trust for the plaintiff, it is not enough to prove the trust relation and that the money physically became a part of the bank assets; but the burden is upon plaintiff to clearly and satisfactorily show that his money in its original or substituted form is in the hands of the receiver; and this is not done where it appears that, when it collected the money nine months before insolvency, the bank repudiated the trust and wrongfully credited the money to another, to whom it paid part of it, and presumably used the balance indiscriminately with other assets during that time.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Findings—Exceptions—Question for Jury. In order to secure a review on appeal, exceptions to findings of fact as required by Rem. Code, § 383, may be filed on the 5th day following the signing of the findings.</p> <p>Banks and Banking — Insolvency—Claims—Interest. A general creditor of an insolvent bank on account of money collected and held in trust is entitled to interest on the amount due from the date of demand made therefor.</p> <p>Appeal — Costs on Appeal. Appellant, successful upon the whole controversy in the supreme court as to a preference right, is entitled to costs on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered March 10, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action to construe a will, tried to the court.</p>

, entered June 29, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in a jitney bus.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Kitsap county, French, J., entered April 8, 1916, dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus, after a hearing before the court.</p>

<p>Insurance — Indemnity Insurance — Corporations—Regulation— Judgments — Payment — Day op Execution — Statutes — Repeal. Since the insurance code makes no pretense of repealing existing laws except those “on the subject of the organization of insurance companies and insurance business,” and since repeals by implication are not favored, Rem. Code, § 522 of the practice act providing for a ninety-day stay of execution on judgments for over $1,500, is not repealed by Id., § 6059-196, of the insurance code, providing that judgments against any indemnity or insurance company upon a bond shall be paid within thirty days, upon penalty of forfeiture of its license to do business in this state; which must be taken to mean that such judgments must be paid within thirty days unless execution be stayed by resort to the ’general law in the practice act.</p> <p>Execution — Stay—Judgments. The‘giving of a stay bond, under Rem. Code, § 522, substituting a statutory and binding obligation to pay the judgment in any event at the end of ninety days, is in legal effect a payment pro tempore, within the meaning of Id., § 6059-196, requiring judgments against an indemnity or insurance company to be paid within thirty days, on penalty of forfeiture of their license to do business in this state.</p> <p>Same — Stay—Time op Commencement. Rem. Code, § 522, providing for a stay of execution for ninety days upon the filing of a stay bond, without any limitation as to the time of the filing of the bond, makes the stay operate from the time the bond is filed and not from the date of the judgment.</p> <p>Insurance — Corporations—License to Do Business — Revocation. In view of all the provisions of the Insurance code relating to notice, charges, and hearing before revoking the company’s license to do business, Rem. Code, § 6059-196, providing for the revocation of the license of a company for failure to pay a judgment within thirty days, does not impose the arbitrary duty upon the insurance commissioner to revoke a license, but it is his duty to exercise a sound discretion upon the principles of law and equity, where the company has not been guilty of any breach of faith.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Grays Harbor county, W. H. Tucker, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered July 1, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action by a taxpayer to restrain the payment of city warrants.</p>

<p>Indians — Patents—Restriction Against Alienation — Statutes. Since an unwarranted provision in an Indian homestead patent restricting the power of alienation will be regarded as surplusage, and since the patent must have read into it the law under which the title was acquired, an Indian homestead patent is subject to the five-year restriction upon the power of alienation provided in the Indian homestead act of March 3, 1875 (18 U. S. Stats., p. 420, § 15), extending the privilege of the general homestead laws to Indians, and not to the twenty-five year limitation provided in the act of July 4, 1884 (23 U. S. Stats., p. 96), where the homestead application recited that it was made under the act of 1875, and the required fees and final proof were offered under that act; notwithstanding the land department first issued a patent under the act of 1884 containing a restriction upon the power of alienation for twenty-five years, but later, in apparent recognition of the error, issued another patent in the usual form under the general homestead laws without any restriction upon the power of alienation.</p> <p>Courts — Federal Question — Controlling Decision of Federal Courts — Statutes—Repeal—Indian Homestead Acts. Whether the act of 1875 (18 IT. S. Stats., p. 420), making the general homestead laws available to Indians who had abandoned their tribal relations subject to a five-year restriction upon the power of alienation, was impliedly repealed or amended by the act of 1884 (23 U. S. Stats., p. 96), authorizing Indians then located upon the public lands to avail themselves of the privileges of the homestead laws subject to a twenty-five year restriction upon the power of alienation, is purely a Federal question; and the supreme court of the United States having decided that it was not, and that the two acts were not repugnant, the decision is conclusive upon the state courts.</p> <p>Gifts — Parol Gift of Land — Evidence—Sufficiency. A present parol gift, by an aged Indian woman, of twenty acres of land, to her relatives, is sufficiently shown where it clearly appears that it was in accordance with the terms of her will made some time before, that the donor told the donees that the land was theirs and they could improve it as they saw fit, subject to her right to live upon it, and that valuable buildings and improvements were thereupon placed upon the land by the donees, including a house in which the donor lived until her death.</p>

, entered March 24, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action upon promissory notes, tried to the court.

<p>Municipal Corporations — Streets — Accidents at Crossings— Automobiles — Negligence—Contributory Negligence — Question fob Juey. The negligence of the driver of an automobile and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, a pedestrian, struck at a street intersection in the nighttime, cannot be decided as a matter of law, merely because the automobile was not exceeding the extreme speed limit of eight miles per hour at street intersections and plaintiff did not look for the approach of an automobile while crossing the street; but the same are questions for the jury, where it appears that the plaintiff was not aware of the approach of the automobile until it struck him, that there was no other traffic on the street at the time, that the headlights were burning brightly and lighting up the street, and there was evidence tending to show that the driver might have seen the plaintiff in time to have avoided the accident if he had looked and if the car had been within the speed limit.'</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered February 11, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action in. tort.</p>

, entered March 9, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.

<p>Infants — Offenses Against — Contributing to Delinquency— Statutes — Construction. Keeping in view the beneficent purpose of the juvenile court law, in a prosecution under Rem. Code, § 1987-17, providing that, in all cases where a child “shall be dependent or delinquent,” any person who shall “cause” or contribute to the dependency or delinquency shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, it is not necessary to allege that the child was dependent or delinquent prior to the commission of defendant’s acts “causing” delinquency, or that the acts charged contributed to a preexisting state or condition of delinquency; especially in view of Id., § 1987-1 defining a dependent child as one who from any cause is in danger of growing up to lead an idle or immoral life.</p> <p>Same — Offenses Against — Contributing to Delinquency — Evidence — Sufficiency. The evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction of causing the dependency of a female child under the age of eighteen years by putting her in danger of leading an immoral life, under Rem. Code, § 1987-17, where it appears that defendants, a married woman 19 years of age and a young man, jointly accused, invited a girl sixteen years of age to a restaurant reputed to be a resort for prostitutes, where they drank beer, and proposed obtaining a room in a hotel in which to spend the night together.</p>

, entered March If, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action on a life insurance policy, tried to the court and a jury.

, entered April 1, 1916, modifying a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.

<p>Bankruptcy — Preferences—Transfers—Depletion of Property. "Where an insolvent corporation induced a third person not interested in the company to come to its aid, and as a matter of accommodation give a mortgage upon real estate to a creditor of the insolvent in partial payment of the creditor’s claim, the transaction does not amount to a transfer in violation of the bankruptcy law as a preference, since it did not deplete the assets of the bankrupt, the property not being its property.</p>

<p>Counties — Nature and Government. Counties are created by the state under its sovereign right without the consent of the inhabitants’ and legislative authority over them as administrative branches of governmental affairs is unlimited except as provided in the constitution.</p> <p>Taxation — Legislative Powers — Discretion—Review. The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty, and it is within the discretion of the legislature to compel a county to levy taxes in aid of state governmental purposes in support of the public defense, within constitutional limitations, and questions of state policy and necessity therefor are legislative questions over which the court has no control.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — States — Powees — Public Defense. The furnishing of a mobilization camp for the Federal soldiery in aid of the public defense, while a Federal purpose, is likewise a state duty to which the state may be called upon to contribute.</p> <p>Taxation — For Public Defense — Uniformity—Statutes. Under article 10 of the constitution requiring the legislature to provide for the organization and disciplining of the militia in such manner as it may deem expedient, the legislature may distribute the burden upon its political subdivisions as it sees fit.</p> <p>Same — Uniformity—Purposes—Public Defense — Constitutional Law. Chapter 3, Laws 1917, p. 2, compelling Pierce county to levy a tax for the purpose of acquiring a Federal mobilization training camp and supply station for the Federal army and other military organizations under the Federal government, is within the exercise of the sovereign power of taxation that may be imposed upon one county as an arm of the state government, exclusive of the balance of the state; and therefore does not violate Constitution, article 7, section 2, requiring uniformity of taxation; article 11, section 9, prohibiting the release or discharge of any county from its proportionate share of taxes for state purposes; article 2, section 28, subdivision 6, prohibiting the legislature from enacting special laws granting corporate powers or privileges; article 13, section 1, providing that state institutions shall be fostered and supported by the state; or article 11, section 12, prohibiting the legislature from imposing taxes on a county for county purposes.</p> <p>Same. The taxation of the property of one county for the purpose of aiding the Federal government in the public defense does not fall within any constitutional prohibition, irrespective of any question of public duty to the state, where the local benefit therefrom to the county is not questioned but has been accepted by'the legislature, by the board of county commissioners, and by the people of the county voting at an election held for the purpose of authorizing the levy.</p>

<p>Application for a writ of mandate, filed in the supreme court February 7, 1917.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered October 13, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

, entered July 14, 1916, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, suspending the defendant from the practice of law.

<p>Insane Peesons — Tebmination of Guabdian — Death of Ward. A guardianship of an insane ward is terminated hy the death of his ward and the appointment of an administrator, under Rem. Code, § 1672, and the estate passes to the control of the administrator.</p> <p>Same — Tebmination of Guabdian — Death of Ward — Claims—Liability of Guabdian. On the death of a ward and the appointment of an administrator, the allowance of $150 to the guardian for an attorney’s fee without providing for its payment before passing the estate, is not a personal charge against the guardian, hut a claim against the estate in the hands of the administrator; and the same is true of a pending suit against the guardian on a claim hy a creditor of the ward.</p>

<p>Certiorari to review an order of the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., entered December 22, 1916, dissolving a temporary injunction and denying a supersedeas pending appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal — Decision—Review After Remand — Jurisdiction. Where, Upon exceptions and appeal from a judgment going beyond the directions of a remittitur, no objection is made to the method employed to review the form and substance of the judgment, the supreme court will treat the appeal as a proceeding in the same case and as sufficient to reinvest the court with jurisdiction.</p> <p>Statutes — Curative Acts — Validity of Municipal Bonds — Power of Legislature. A curative act designed to correct objections to procedure and validate municipal bonds is a declaration of legislative policy within its jurisdiction, where the act was passed during the pendency of the action to test the validity of the bonds.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Public Works — Sale of Bonds — Interest — Discount. A bond issue to pay for a water works system cannot be sold at a discount of five per cent, ostensibly to cover all commissions, attorney’s fees and expenses, but which was in fact a bonus for the benefit of the buyer increasing the rate of interest which the bonds were to bear.</p>

, entered December 30, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a promissory note, tried to the court.

<p>Witnesses — Competency—Age op Witness. Under Rem. Code, § 1213, providing that children under ten years of age are competent to testify if they appear capable of receiving just impressions and relating them truly, the capacity of a witness of the age of eight years is a question for the trial court, and no abuse of discretion is shown in receiving her evidence where she evidenced her intelligence and competency by an understanding of the oath and that it was wrong to tell lies.</p> <p>Same. Such a child is not shown to be incompetent by the fact that her story was improbable and that she was more or less embarrassed and confused in detailing it.</p> <p>Rape — Evidence—Sufficiency. A prosecution for the rape of a child eight years of age is sustained, notwithstanding her story is. inherently improbable and uncorroborated, where she told a straightforward story substantially proving every allegation, and the accused lived with the child’s mother under suspicious circumstances.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Exceptions — Review. In a criminal case, error cannot be assigned upon instructions to which no exceptions were taken, especially where it does not appear that the accused was thereby deprived of a fair trial.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal. An accused in a criminal case is not entitled to a new trial for infringement of the constitutional right to have competent counsel except in case of neglect or gross ignorance.</p> <p>Parker, J., dissents.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Trial—Appointment oe Counsel — Competency. Attorneys regularly admitted to practice law and appointed to defend a criminal case are presumed to have sufficient skill and learning, which presumption controls, in the absence of anything in the record to the contrary.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Confessions. Evidence of the confession of guilt is admissible where it was not made under the influence of fear produced by threats; and where the confession is not admitted but is denied, it is inconsistent to claim on appeal that it was involuntary.</p>

<p>Master, and Servant — Federal Employers’ Liability — Limitations — What Law Governs. Under U. S. Rev. Stats., § 721, providing that matters respecting procedure shall he governed hy the laws of the jurisdiction in which the action is brought, and section 6 of the employers’ liability act (35 Stat. 66; 4 Comp. St., § 8662), barring all actions under the act not commenced within two years after the cause of action arose, whether an action in the state courts was commenced by the service of a summons and complaint without filing the complaint must be determined by the laws of this state.</p> <p>Limitation oe Actions — Commencement oe Actions — Filing Complaint — Statutes. Under Rem. Code, § 167, providing in effect that “an action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed,” an action is not commenced so as to toll the statute of limitations until the complaint is filed, notwithstanding that, for some purposes, it is deemed commenced at the time of the service of the summons and complaint.</p>

<p>Judgment — Conclusiveness—Res Adjudicata. A judgment in an action brought by a partner for an accounting, in which a counterclaim was pleaded, is not res adjudicata or a bar to a judgment on the same counterclaim in a prior action already pending between the same parties, where the pendency of such prior action might have been pleaded in abatement and it was shown that the counterclaim was not adjudicated in the last action which first went to judgment.</p> <p>■ Partnership — Actions Between Partners — Damages — Future Profits — Evidence—Sufficiency. In the absence of any evidence of profits in the past, the evidence is too speculative and uncertain to warrant recovery of damages for loss of future profits from a partnership agreement for the manufacture of cigarettes, where defendants merely testified that the stock on hand was worth $7,500, that $1,000 worth of stock would bring a profit of $700, that the cigarettes cost from $4.26 to $4.50 per thousand, and they sold at $12, $15, and $25 per thousand; the estimate of $700 profits being merely an opinion subject to contingencies.</p> <p>Same — Partners—-Accounting—Expenditures. In an action for an accounting between partners, one partner may recover on counterclaim for actual disbursements made for the firm which were never repaid to him.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—-Findings. A verdict upon conflicting evidence, properly submitted, is conclusive on appeal.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Prohibition—Searches—Druggists. The fact that druggists may lawfully keep and sell intoxicating liquors does not exempt them from the operation of Rem. Code, § 6262-11, providing for the issuance of search warrants for the seizure of intoxicating liquors unlawfully manufactured or sold.</p> <p>Same — Search Warrants — Complaint—Probable Causé — Statutes. A complaint for a search warrant for intoxicating liquors need not state the “probable cause” for its issuance, under Rem. Code, § 6262-11, providing that a search warrant shall issue for the seizure of intoxicating liquors, upon the sworn complaint of any citizen, “if it shall be made to appear . . . that there is probable cause to believe” that intoxicating liquor is being unlawfully manufactured or sold; but the judicial officer is to determine the existence of probable cause.</p> <p>Same — Search Warrants — Proceedings—Justices oe the Peace —Jurisdiction. The people, by the initiative state-wide prohibition law (Rem. Code, § 6262-11) conferred jurisdiction upon justices of the peace in cases of proceedings for search warrants for the seizure of intoxicating liquors, irrespective of the amount or value of the liquors, and the vesting of such jurisdiction does not conflict with the constitutional provision limiting the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to cases involving $100.</p>

, entered February 11, 1916, dismissing as to certain defendants an action by a receiver to establish liability for unpaid stock subscriptions, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal — Review—Findings. Findings upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal where the court cannot say that they are against the weight of the evidence. ‘</p> <p>Waters and Water Courses — Diversion—Irrigation—Riparian Rights. Flood waters, of annual occurrence with practical regularity, used for years on riparian lands, cannot be diverted by an upper proprietor for use in irrigating nonriparian lands to the substantial damage of the riparian owners.</p> <p>Same — Diversion—Remedies—Injunction. Injunction lies to restrain the diversion of waters from nonriparian lands, and lower riparian owners will not be relegated to their remedy at law merely because the dain for the diversion was nearly completed, where the dam was on defendant’s land and no injury would accrue until the waters were diverted.</p> <p>Parties — Intervention-—Time eor Filing. Where after trial, the findings and judgment were signed and placed in escrow under stipulation, a petition for intervention made three years thereafter is properly denied, under Rem. Code, § 202, providing that any person may before trial intervene in an action, and § 203 providing that no intervention shall be cause for delay in the trial.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Trial—Objection to Evidence. Error cannot be assigned upon overruling a general objection to the admission of a letter tending to show that the accused was suspected of crime, where it was admissible as matter of impeachment of a witness, and no motion was made to limit the effect of the testimony to the matter of impeachment.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Hearsay—Letters oe Third Person. Although a letter written by a third person telling the accused that it was safe for him to return to the state would generally be inadmissible as hearsay, it is admissible as substantive evidence where accused acted upon the advice and made it a guide for his conduct.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered March 20, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for damages.</p>

, entered August 19, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover over from a contractor the amount paid in satisfaction of a judgment for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian through a defective street, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered December 31, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of being an habitual criminal.</p>

<p>Public Lands' — Sale op Tide Lands — Fish—Oyster Cultivation —Right to Purchase — Discretion oe State Board — Statutes. It is not discretionary with the board of state land commissioners as to when it will entertain applications for the purchase of tide lands for oyster culture, or as to when it will dispose of such lands for that purpose, but any qualified person complying with the act has the right to purchase such lands for oyster culture, under the act entitled an act providing for the sale and purchase of tide lands of the third class for the purpose of oyster planting, “and to encourage and facilitate such industry;” in view of Rem. Code, § 6799, of the act, providing that it shall be lawful for any person entitled to purchase such lands to make a survey, subject to the discretionary control of the state board; § 6800 providing the price at which they may purchase; § 6801 providing for the filing of an application, contest and hearing; § 6803 providing for the purchase of lands not included in natural oyster beds, pursuant to the provisions of the act, in subordination to any preemption right conferred upon prior occupants and upland owners; and § 6804, confining the right to citizens, and providing that the land shall be subject to resale if used for purposes other than the purposes specified in the act.</p>

<p>Limitation op Actions — Removal op Bar — Acknowledgment— Payment — Accepting Credit After Statute Has Run — Statutes. A payment upon a debt after the statute of limitations has run removes the bar of the statute, and there is in effect a cash payment, where, after the statute had run, credit was given upon the debt to the amount of an independent debt not barred by the statute, due to' defendant from plaintiff, after which defendant agreed to pay the debt to plaintiff; in view of Rem. Code, § 176, providing that no acknowledgment or new promise, shall take the case out of the operation of the statute, unless it is in writing and signed but that this shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest; and § 177 providing that, when any payment of principal or interest shall have been made upon any existing contract, if such payment be made after the same shall have become due, the limitation shall commence to run from the time the last payment is made.</p> <p>Sam:e — Statutes—Effect—“Existing” Contract. The statute of limitations does not affect the existence of the contract and a payment upon a contract after the statute has run is a payment upon an “existing” contract.</p>

, entered June 14, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, setting aside a will on the ground of mental incapacity of the testatrix, after a contest tried to the court.

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Jurey, J., entered July 14, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Prater, J., entered February 4, 1916, upon findings in favor of certain assignees to the property of an estate, upon final distribution thereof, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered July 8, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action upon a life insurance policy, after a trial before the court and a jury.</p>

<p>Assignments — Foe Collection — Costs—Liability. Where an assignment of a claim was for the purposes of collection only, and any returns from suit brought were to be paid, less commissions, to the assignor, the assignee’s ownership is special and costs of suit brought to collect the claim are chargeable to the assignor.</p>

, entered July 15, 1915, in favor of the plaintiffs by direction of the court, in an action for conversion, after a trial to the court and a jury.

<p>Cakriers — Regulation oe Rates — Orders—Presumptions. Where an order of the public service commission was not superseded and became effective in twenty days, it will be presumed that it was complied with and therefore it cannot be objected to as too indefinite to be enforced.</p> <p>Same — Discrimination. A joint freight rate upon parallel roads is not shown to be discriminatory as resulting in a loss of all business by one of the roads, where the general freight agent of that road testified that the tariff could be so framed that it would not result in the loss of through shipments but would be available only to certain points.</p> <p>Same — Regulation oe Rates — Public Necessity. Public necessity for a joint freight rate does not depend upon the number of persons asking for the change, and may be based upon the application of but one person.</p> <p>Same — Regulation oe Rates — Milling Privileges — Jurisdiction oe Commission. The granting of milling privileges in transit must be without wrongful prejudice to the rights of other shippers, and its control is within the jurisdiction of the public service commission, under Rem. Code, § 8626-53, granting powers similar to those of the interstate commerce commission.</p> <p>Same — Regulation oe Rates — Service — Adequacy. A finding that a town was not properly served by a railroad, is warranted, where it appears that the road did not enter the town and the haul from its depot costs sixty cents per ton more than would be involved by another service which could be given by another road.</p> <p>Same — Regulation oe Rates — Discrimination—Due Process. A through joint rate, with milling privileges in transit at the town of P., a point on parallel roads, the same as other towns enjoyed beyond the termination of one of the lines, is not a taking of property without due process of law, because of the fact that it would deprive one of the roads of the business of mills located nearer the depots of the other road.</p> <p>Same — Regulation oe Rates — Reasonableness—Discrimination. It is not unreasonable or an abuse of the police power to order a through joint rate with milling privileges in transit, affecting traffic upon one hundred miles of parallel railroads, although it was asked for by only one shipper for the purpose of saving thirty cents dray-age per ton on traffic, where such shipper was not in as good a condition as before completion of the competing line of railroad, and the town did not enjoy the same privileges as enjoyed by other towns beyond the terminus of one of the roads.</p>

, entered March 21, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, after a trial on the merits.

, entered June 28, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendant, refusing to remove a cloud upon title, and foreclosing a mortgage upon defendant’s cross-complaint, after a trial on the merits to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Walla Walla county, Mills, J., entered January 15, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for the alienation of affections.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered March 9, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for false imprisonment.</p>

, entered May 13, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to determine the extent and validity of claims filed against a contractor’s bond, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered April 22, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in garnishment proceedings, tried to the court.</p>

, entered July 28, 1916, in favor of the defendants, decreeing the final distribution of the estate of a decedent, after a hearing before the court.

F. Wright, J., entered February 17, 1917, denying relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, after a hearing before the court.

Application filed in the supreme court January 26, 1917, for a writ of prohibition to the superior court for Spokane county, C. C. Upton, judge pro tempore, to prohibit the entry of a judgment.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered March 11, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, as against certain defendants, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in a train wreck.

, entered January 19, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action on a policy of burglary insurance, tried to the court.

, entered April 15, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective sidewalk.

, entered March 6, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action to foreclose laborer’s liens, tried to the court.

<p>Judgment — Jurisdiction—Death of Plaintiff. A judgment in an action commenced by an attorney in fact after the death of the plaintiff is void for want of jurisdiction of the plaintiff, and may be attacked collaterally.</p>

<p>Corporations — Dissolution—-Actions — Receivership — Jurisdiction. After a foreign corporation has been dissolved in its home state and a receiver appointed who succeeds to its property, it ceases to exist and cannot he made defendant in an action in this state for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of its property in this state; since a proceeding for the appointment of a receiver is only quasi in rem, and requires service upon the owner of the property, the foreign receiver who succeeded to the title.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Skagit county, Brawley, J., entered July 8, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of violating the state-wide prohibition law.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered June 29, 1916, upon the pleadings in favor of the defendant, in an action on contract, tried to the court.

<p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Receivers—Delinquent Taxes. Where the mortgaged property is inadequate to discharge the debt and no deficiency judgment can be taken, and taxes drawing 15 per cent interest are allowed to become delinquent, a receiver is properly appointed to collect the rents and apply the same to the payment of the delinquent taxes, under the authority of Rem. Code, § 741, authorizing a receiver in case the property is in danger of being lost or materially injured.</p>

<p>Contracts — Construction — Intent of Parties — “Renewal” of Mortgage. An agreement that $1,000 of the purchase price of property he placed in escrow and used to pay commissions and expenses in securing an “extension” and a “renewal” of a past due $40,000 mortgage, which both parties to the contract had to obtain or lose their interest in the property, should be construed to cover costs and expenses incurred by the purchaser in taking up the mortgage and replacing it by a new loan, after all efforts to obtain a “renewal” of the original mortgage had failed; since the word “renewal” is not a word of art or of technical significance, but should cover the temporary purchase of the original mortgage for the purpose of saving the property as within the intent of the parties.</p>

<p>Counties — Actions — Maintenance of Perry — Liability. A county is liable for injuries sustained through the operation of a county ferry, under Rem. Code, § 951, providing that an action may be maintained against a county for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such county, and it is immaterial that Rem. Code, § 5013, authorizing counties to operate ferries was passed subsequently, since the former was a general act.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error — Evidence. Error cannot be predicated upon the admission of irrelevant and immaterial evidence that was entirely harmless and of no consequence.</p> <p>Same — Review—Harmless Error — Evidence — Change of Conditions After Accident. In an action for damages for negligence in operating a county ferry without fastening it to the shore while loading, it is not prejudicial error to admit evidence that, after the accident, chains were furnished by the county for that purpose, where it appears that ropes were furnished at the time of the accident and were not used, and where the court instructed the jury that evidence of the means provided after the accident to make the boat more safe was not evidence of neglect at the time of or prior thereto.</p> <p>Evidence — Opinions—Nonexperts. In an action for damages for negligence in operating a county ferry, nonexperts who had used the boat upon different occasions are competent to give their opinions upon the result of their experiences with the particular boat in question.</p>

<p>Appeal — Supersedeas — By Appellate Court — Temporary Restraining Order. Upon appeal from a judgment of dismissal and a dissolution of a temporary restraining order, in an action to enjoin tide county commissioners and other officials from selling negotiable bonds of the county, the supreme court will issue an order of supersedeas-continuing the restraining order in force pending the appeal, where the new board of county commissioners has filed its consent thereto, and grave and irreparable injury might result from the issuance of negotiable bonds that might fall into the hands of innocent holders; in view of Const., art. 4, § 4, providing that the supreme court shall have power to issue all writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether a temporary restraining order may be superseded under Rem. Code, § 1723.</p>

<p>Application filed in the supreme court March 5, 1917, for a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court for Clarke county, Back, J., to vacate orders changing the venue of certain cases. Denied.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered June 14, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for malpractice.</p>

, entered April 10, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, after a trial on the merits.

, entered August 11, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for a writ of mandamus, after a trial on the merits to the court.

<p>Statutes — Construction. . Notwithstanding the public utilities act must receive a strict construction, the legislative intention, when apparent, must prevail.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Public Improvements — Indebtedness— Authority — Submission to Vote. The city charter of the city of Seattle, art. 4, § 18, providing that the city council shall have power to provide for the acquisition of water works, authorizes the council to provide therefor by ordinance, within the meaning of subd. 2 of Rem. Code, § 8005, authorizing a city to acquire a public utility or make any betterments thereto without submitting the same to a vote of the people, where, in the city charter, adopted by a vote of the people, an article or provision had been adopted authorizing the city council to provide by ordinance for acquiring a utility.</p> <p>Same. It is not essential that the charter provision contain the words “by which no general indebtedness is to be incurred by such city or town” as found in the statute, where, as a matter of fact, no general indebtedness is to be incurred in acquiring the utility.</p> <p>Same — Public Improvements — Bonds — Conditions — Statutes. Where the city charter relating to municipal water bonds contains no limitations as to the maturity of bonds payable solely from the earnings of public utilities, the city council has power to fix the date of their maturity, under Rem. Code, § 8008, providing that such bonds shall he payable at such times and places as the council shall determine.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Legislative Powers — Public Policy. The question of public policy in the matter of the issuing of municipal bonds for acquiring public utilities is a legislative question pure and simple.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Jurey, J., entered December 28, 1916, dismissing an action for an injunction, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

, entered April 4, 1916, discharging the defendant, upon granting a motion in arrest of judgment, after a trial and conviction of second degree assault.

, entered May 6, 1916, upon findings favorable to the plaintiff, in an action in tort, tried on the merits to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered April 26, 1916, granting a divorce, after a trial to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Snohomish county, Bell, J., entered October 21, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>

<p>Frauds, Statute of — Orad Agreement for Land — Trusts. An oral promise to convey land to another upon payment of the purchase price is not enforcible as an express trust because not in writing; nor as a resulting trust where there was no part payment by the cestui que trust or other equitable circumstances and the transaction was simply optional.</p> <p>Husband and Wife — Community Property — Payment After Marriage. Where the husband took title to land after marriage under a preexisting oral promise or option, and the same was paid for by the community, it is community property.</p> <p>Same — Community Property — Rights of Heirs — Expenses for Support. Expenses incurred in supporting the family cannot be charged against the interest of a son in his deceased’s mother’s half of the community property even to the extent of his own support, where the burden of such support was voluntarily assumed by the surviving husband.</p> <p>Same — Community Property — Rights of Heirs — Improvements. The interest of a son in his mother’s half of the community land cannot be charged with improvements placed thereon by the surviving husband, either at common law, or under the betterment statute, Rem. Code, § 797, allowing recovery for improvements made by one “bolding in good faitb under color or claim of title adversely to tbe claim of tbe owner.”</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Claims — Limitations — Issuance oe Letters. Under Rem. Code, § 1368, providing that no real estate of a deceased person shall be liable for bis debts, unless letters be granted witbin six years from tbe date of tbe death, tbe claim for advances made by a second wife to liquidate debts owing at tbe time of tbe first wife’s death cannot be asserted against tbe deceased wife’s community interest, twenty years after tbe death of tbe first wife, no letters having been issued upon her estate.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered February 26, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action upon an insurance policy, tried on the merits. Reversed.</p>

, entered March 31, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort, after a trial on the merits. Reversed.

<p>Municipal Corporations — Improvements— Assessments — Objections — Waiver—Collateral Attack. An assessment for a local improvement cannot be collaterally attacked for informalities or defects in the proceedings by owners who failed to object at the time the assessment roll was made up and confirmed and who paid their assessment; and it is not a jurisdictional objection that the city, before assessing property owners, should have credited ¡¡¡7,500 recovered in condemnation cases for the purpose of making the improvement, and which sum the city wrongfully diverted to other purposes; as the same goes to the amount of the assessment and the objections should have been made before the city council.</p> <p>Same — Improvements — Assessments — Validity. The fact that the raising of the level of streets is made necessary solely by a government project raising the level of a lake, does not show that it is not a local improvement or affect the jurisdiction of the city to make the improvement and assess benefits against abutting property.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered June 6, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action in tort.</p>

<p>Carriers — Setting Down Passengers — Negligence—Instructions. In an action for personal injuries received by a passenger in alighting from a street car, an instruction that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish that he was thrown from the car substantially in the manner charged in the complaint, that is, by reason of the negligence of the conductor in starting the car while plaintiff was in the act of alighting, carries the implication that he could not recover if plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an attempt on his part to jump from the car while it was in motion, and is as favorable to the defendant as it had any right, to expect, especially where there was no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to alight while the car was in motion.</p> <p>Same — Setting Down Passengers — Contributory Negligence — Instructions. In an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in alighting from a street car, a requested instruction that the defendant would not be liable if the plaintiff attempted to alight from the car while it was in motion, is properly refused, as it is not necessarily contributory negligence to alight from a moving street car.</p> <p>Appeal — Review — Instructions — Requests. Error cannot be predicated upon the refusal of a requested instruction unless the instruction as requested is substantially correct, and an instruction in part correct and partly incorrect may be refused as a whole.</p> <p>Same. It is not error to refuse to give instructions in the exact language requested, where they are amply covered in the instructions given.</p> <p>Same — Preservation of Grounds — Specific Objections — Harmless Error. Prejudicial error cannot be predicated upon an improper question and answer to the effect that the plaintiff did not have the money for a necessary surgical operation, where it was objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and the court was asked to disregard it, whereupon the court promptly sustained the objection, and no more specific direction to ignore the answer was requested; since the error is one that could have been cured by the proper direction.</p>

<p>Landlord and Tenant — Unlawful Detainer — Notice to Quit —Service—Sufficiency. Under Rem. Code, § 814, providing that . notice to quit in unlawful detainer may be served upon a corporation, in case no person in charge of its business can be found upon the premises, by affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and mailing a copy addressed to the corporation at the place where the premises are situated, service in such a case may be made by affixing. a copy to the door of the premises and mailing a copy, properly addressed, etc.</p>

<p>Lis Pendens — Effect — Mortgages — Foreclosure — Homestead Right During Redemption. The filing of a Ms pendens in an action to foreclose a mortgage bars a declaration of homestead by a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagors; since the right to claim a homestead under Rem. Code, § 602, is a right “reserved” to the “judgment debtor” during the period of redemption, and cannot be transferred to one who had neither possession nor right of homestead at the time the Ms pendens was filed.</p>

<p>Compromise and Settlement — Accepting Payment in Full — Evidence — Sueeiciency. There is a compromise and settlement of a balance due for logs sold by a logger, precluding him from making claim that the company did not properly scale the logs, where it appears that he went to the office of the company for the purpose of receiving his pay, accepted a check for the balance due as shown by the hooks of the company, knowing that its scale was different from his own scale, and, making no objection thereto, receipted the statement and cashed the check given; under the rule that intent to close the account governs, in the absence of mutual mistake or fraud.</p> <p>Appeal — Review — Findings. Findings on conflicting evidence will not he disturbed on appeal where the trial court was in a better situation to determine the matter.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Prohibition Law — Unlawful Prescriptions — Evidence—Sufficiency. In a prosecution for unlawfully issuing a prescription for whiskey, whether the accused had reason to believe that the applicant was sick, is a question for the jury, where it appears that the office of the accused adjoined a drug store that filled many prescriptions on the day in question, some of them' written by him, that any one could obtain a prescription by signing a statement declaring that he was sick and in need of medicine, which was done, and that, at the time in question and at other times, many were standing in line waiting for prescriptions, and no physical examination was made.</p> <p>Same — Prohibitive Ordinance — Municipal Corporations — Powers. A city ordinance providing that prescriptions for intoxicating liquors shall not be issued by physicians unless there is good reason to believe that the applicant is actually sick and that the liquor is required as medicine, is not invalid as a prohibitive ordinance, but is authorized by Rem. Code, § 7507, enumerating the powers of a city of the first class, and authorizing such cities to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors.</p> <p>Statutes — Partial Invalidity. The invalidity of some of the sections of an ordinance regulating the sale of liquor does not affect a prosecution for the violation of other sections that are valid.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors — Prohibition—State Law — Exclusiveness —Powers oe City. The state wide prohibition law does not deprive a city of the power to legislate upon the same subject, so long as the city ordinance does not conflict with the state law, there being nothing in the act to show such intention.</p> <p>Same — Prohibition—Prescriptions—Good Faith. Upon a prosecution for issuing a prescription for whiskey without reason to believe that the applicant was actually sick or that the liquor was required as medicine, evidence is admissible of the issuance by the accused of other prescriptions to various persons within a specified time, as bearing upon the issue of good faith.</p> <p>Trial — Objections to Evidence. Objection to oral evidence as to the contents of the record book kept in a drug store, that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, is not sufficient to raise the point that it was not the best evidence, or that it was secondary evidence and no proper foundation had been laid.</p> <p>Evidence — Best and Secondary — Admissibility. Secondary evidence is admissible of the contents of the records of the prescriptions kept by a drug store, where after every reasonable effort made, the records could not be produced.</p>

<p>Divorce — Nonsupport — Evidence — Sufficiency. A wife is entitled to a divorce for nonsupport where it appears that the husband left her, enlisting in the army, and failed to provide anything, for her support, leaving her and her baby to rely upon charity.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered April 8, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for breach of contract, after a trial on the merits.</p>

<p>Master and Servant — Wages—Actions—Evidence — Admissibility. In an action on express contract for the balance due for work and labor, in which the contract was admitted but the amount to be paid was disputed, evidence of the reasonable value of the services is admissible as circumstantial evidence as to which contention of the parties was correct.</p> <p>Estoppel — Pleading—Proof. Under a plea of payment in full, the acceptance of partial payments without protest will not be declared to work an estoppel, as a matter of law, where the facts are disputed, no estoppel having been pleaded.</p> <p>Master and Servant — Wages — Payment — Evidence — Sufficiency. Upon an issue as to whether defendant had paid plaintiff in full for work and labor, evidence that the defendant had stated what the wages were and that he was holding back part of them, makes the issue a question for the jury, especially where the plaintiff, a Swiss farm hand, was somewhat given to going on periodical sprees.</p> <p>Trial — Verdict—Misconduct of Jury. A verdict for less than the amount claimed by plaintiff cannot be objected to by defendant, where the answer made issues which permitted the jury to reject part of the plaintiff’s claims.</p>

<p>Limitation op Actions — Suspension—Injunction — Execution— Sales. Since an injunction, while in force, suspends the statute of limitations, where an execution sale would have been made within the six-year period limited by law but for the issuance of an injunction, the time lost by reason of the injunction must be excluded from the computation of the time within which the judgment could have been enforced.</p> <p>Same — Interrupted Sale — Return. Where, after levy of a. writ of execution, the sale was enjoined, and later the injunction was dissolved, the officer may proceed to sell the property, after the return day and after the actual return.</p>

<p>Chattel Mortgages — Lien—Priority—Animals—Agister’s Lien. The lien of a chattel mortgage is superior to the subsequent lien of an agister, in view of Rem. Code, § 3660, which provides that a chattel mortgage shall be void as against all creditors of the mortgagor, both existing and subsequent, etc., unless it is acknowledged and accompanied by an. affidavit of good faith, the effect of the statute being to make such instruments valid as against any subsequently asserted liens.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered August 26, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court March 3, 1917, for a writ of mandate to compel the granting of a change of judges for the hearing of a motion to modify a decree of divorce.

, entered November 9, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action to recover damages by reason of enforced suspension of work under a city contract, tried on the merits to the court.

, entered December 2, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages sustained in a collision with a street car.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered April 10, 1916, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon stipulated facts, in an action in equity.</p>

<p>Pleading — Amendments. It is not a valid objection to an amended complaint that it contains statements inconsistent with the original complaint, where the object of the two complaints was the same.</p> <p>Pleading — Separate Statement of Causes. It is not prejudicial error to refuse to require a complaint to separately state causes of action for the setting aside of two instruments, where they were both made for a single and continuous purpose to defraud.</p> <p>Limitation of Actions — Quieting Title — Relief on Ground of Fraud. Where the gravamen of an action is to quiet title, even though fraud is practiced in creating the cloud, the action is not subject to the three-year limitation in actions for relief on the ground of fraud.</p> <p>Evidence — Parol Evidence to Vary Writing — Deed as Mortgage. Where a deed absolute on its face was not delivered to the grantee, and was intended as a mortgage, that fact can be proven by parol.</p> <p>Same — Parol Evidence — Alterations in Deed — Forgery. Alterations in a deed, and that it had been forged, can be shown by parol.</p> <p>Alteration of Instruments — Mortgages—Validity. A material' alteration in a deed intended as a mortgage annuls the instrument and prevents proceedings for its foreclosure, even by an innocent assignee.</p>

, entered January 22, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to vacate a judgment, after a hearing before the court.

, entered June 26, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in a jitney bus.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Smith, J., entered February 28, 1914, in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for rescission, tried to the court.</p>

, entered June 29, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in a jitney bus.

, entered October 17, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for a broker’s commission.

, entered April 13, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, reversing the revocation of a physician’s license, on appeal from an order of the medical board, after a hearing before the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered April 10, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to abate a nuisance.</p>