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← 950 F.2d 469 - Bae v. Peters

Bae v. Peters’s Empirical Analysis

950 F.2d 469 · 1991

Citation profile

71
cited by 71 later decisions
2
states following
August 2014
most recently cited

47 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently August 2014 · most notably United States v. Montgomery (1994), United States v. Kamel (1992)

47 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

540199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Edwards v. Arizona · Colorado v. Connelly · Engle v. Isaac · Harris v. Reed

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It is certainly reasonable to state that an indictment must meet general Fourteenth Amendment standards. No matter how a state chooses to charge a criminal defendant, the due process clause requires that a criminal defendant receive “notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge.” Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 , 68 S.Ct. 514, 517 , 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 930 (6th Cir.1988). In other words, a criminal defendant must receive adequate notice of the charges against him so that he may defend himself against those charges. Koontz v. Glossa, 731 F.2d 365, 369 (6th Cir.1984). A vague indictment ... or a last-minute change in the charge could prejudice a defendant’s opportunity to defend himself; if that prejudice is severe enough, a due process violation could occur. See, e.g., id. at 369-70; Watson [v. Jago], 558 F.2d [330] at 337 [(6th Cir. 1977) ].”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “a criminal defendant must receive adequate notice of the charges against him so that he may defend himself against those charges. A vague indictment ... or a last-minute change in the charge could prejudice a defendant's opportunity to defend himself; if that prejudice is severe enough, a due process violation could occur.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Absent improper police coercion, a defendant’s mental state does not render a confession involuntary under the due process clause.”); Smith v. Duckworth, 910 F.2d 1492 , 1497 (7th Cir.1990) (”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.