950 So. 2d 583 - State v. Draughn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 177 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 178 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Additionally, where circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove." La. R.S. 15:438; see State v. Neal, XXXX-XXXX p. 9 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 , cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940 , 122 S.Ct. 1323 , 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002). The statutory requirement of La. R.S. 15:438 "works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury." Neal , XXXX-XXXX p. 9, 796 So.2d at 657 .”

   18 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lee · 123 So. 3d 360 - State v. Thompson

2. “The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.”

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 49 So. 3d 488 - State v. Marinello · 28 So. 3d 442 - State v. Page

3. “A defendant's Batson challenge to a peremptory strike requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. 476 U.S., at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 . Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Id., at 97-98 , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 . Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, "[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible"; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, at 98 , 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 , 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-2332 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). This final step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, but "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett, supra, at 768 , 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 .”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Horn · State v. Johnson