952 So. 2d 129 - Guice v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A ... difference between the right to [a] speedy trial and the accused’s other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused’s advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s ability to defend himself.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Houser v. State

2. “[b]oth our federal and state constitutions provide that an accused enjoys the right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, inter alia, that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Our state constitution states, inter alia, "the accused shall have a right to ... a speedy and public trial." Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26 (1890). When one reads these federal and state constitutional provisions, there can be absolutely no question that the accused in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to a speedy trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 986 So. 2d 917 - Dora v. State

3. “a defendant may effectively waive his right to complain of not being tried within the 270-day period set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 , when the defendant does not request or assert his right to a speedy trial or object to a delay”). . See, e.g., Guice, 952 So.2d at 139-40 ; Jones v. State, 776 So.2d 643 (Miss.2000); Walton, 678 So.2d at 650 ; Jasso v. State, 655 So.2d 30, 35 (Miss.1995); State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66, 71 (Miss.1994). . Payne v. State, 363 So.2d 278 (Miss.1978). . Id. at 279 . . Id. (concluding that since delay in excess of 270 was not covered by a continuance,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. McBride v. State