952 So. 2d 393 - Barber v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"First, the appellant contends that the scheme is unconstitutional because the jury does not make all of the findings of fact that are necessary to support the imposition of the death penalty. With regard to his case, he specifically asserts that the trial court, rather than the jury, made findings of fact as to which aggravating and mitigating circumstances existed; that the trial court, rather than the jury, determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; that the jury did not agree unanimously on the existence of the two aggravating circumstances; and that the jury did not unanimously find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. "In Ex parte Waldrop , 859 So. 2d 1181 , 1187-88 (Ala. 2002), the Alabama Supreme Court explained: "`It is true that under Alabama law at least one statutory aggravating circumstance under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-49 , must exist in order for a defendant convicted of a capital offense to be sentenced to death. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-45 (f) ("Unless at least one aggravating circumstance as defined in Section 13A-5-49 exists, the sentence shall *Page 21 be life imprisonment without parole."); Johnson v. State , 823 So. 2d 1 , 52 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that in order to sentence a capital defendant to death, the sentencer "`must determine the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in [Ala. Code 1975,] § 13A-5-49 '" (quoting Ex parte Woodar”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 78 So. 3d 458 - Craig Newton v. State of Alabama. · 86 So. 3d 1032 - Billups v. State

2. “'Gates has made no attempt to show that he suffered actual prejudice because the jury saw him in handcuffs. Our independent examination of the record also persuades us that he did not suffer any prejudice. Although defense counsel strenuously objected to the admission of the videotape, he did not object to the handcuffing in particular. He did not ask for a cautionary instruction or a poll of the jury. Furthermore, the videotape at issue here was taken at the scene of the crime, not at the police station. Thus, jurors likely would infer that handcuffing was simply standard procedure when a defendant is taken outside the jail. The viewing of the defendant in handcuffs on television rather than in person further reduces the potential for prejudice. In light of the foregoing facts, and the fact that Gates sat before the jury without handcuffs for several days during his trial, we conclude that the relatively brief appearance of the defendant in handcuffs on the videotape did not tend to negate the presumption of innocence or portray the defendant as a dangerous or bad person. We therefore conclude on the particular facts of this case that the handcuffing of Gates during the videotaped confession does not require a new trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State

3. “"Third, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly refused to read to the jury a list of proposed nonstatutory mitigating factors he submitted. Because he did not present this argument to the trial court, we review it for plain error. See Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P. "The appellant filed a list of proposed examples of nonstatutory mitigating evidence that he wanted the trial court to read to the jury during its penalty phase instructions. In addressing this request, the trial court stated: "`My feeling is still the same that to list those as mitigating factors would be to comment on the evidence. But I do not have a problem with the Defendant or counsel listing those and telling the jury that you contend that those are mitigating factors, then my charge to the jury will be anything you find to be a mitigating factor can be used by you in this deliberative process that you will go through, assuming that the State has not disproved it. So that's the way I'm going to handle that. I don't think I can do it otherwise than to be commenting on the evidence and putting a `stamp of approval' on this as a mitigating circumstance you must consider. I mean, the list . . . could go on ad infinitum.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 78 So. 3d 458 - Craig Newton v. State of Alabama.