Fruge v. Doe’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The “clear and convincing” standard falls somewhere between the “preponderance of the evidence” in civil cases and the “beyond a reasonable .doubt” standard in criminal proceedings. To be “clear and convincing,” the1 evidence must “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.” Hobson v. Eaton, 19 Ohio Misc. 29 , 399 F.2d 781 , 784 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 , 89 S.Ct. 1189 , 22 L.Ed.2d 459 (1969). “Clear and convincing eVidence means evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the. conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 , 901 n. 3 (Tenn. 1992). See. e.g. In re Estate of Armstrong, 859 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. App. 1993).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re: Samuel D. · Estate of Walton v. Young

2. “"(e) If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, the insured shall have no right to recover under the uninsured motorist provision unless: "(1)(A) Actual physical contact shall have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by such unknown person and the person or property of the insured; or "(B) The existence of such unknown motorist is established by clear and convincing evidence, other than any evidence provided by occupants in the insured's vehicle. . . . "”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lipscomb v. Doe · 975 So. 2d 287 - Cherokee Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sanches

3. “... Prior to the 1989 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201 , there could be no recovery unless there was actual physical contact between the uninsured motorist’s vehicle and the insured’s vehicle. See e.g., Hoyle v. Carroll, 646 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.1983). The requirement of physical contact with the vehicle operated by the unknown motorist prohibited recovery in eases where the unknown motorist caused the accident but there was no physical contact between the vehicles. Subsection (e)(1)(B), enacted in 1989, allows recovery in cases where, for example, the insured is forced off the road by an unknown motorist without physically striking the insured’s vehicle. The high standard of proof required by the amendment, clear and convincing evidence produced by witnesses other than the occupants, obviously was intended by the legislature as a safeguard against bogus claims arising from one-vehicle accidents. Cf. id. at 162 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Beal v. Sloan