Sykes v. State

¶1 Ambrose L. Sykes, appellant, appeals his Superior Court convictions of two counts of Murder First Degree, two counts of Rape First Degree, and various other felony and misdemeanor offenses. Sykes was sentenced to death by lethal injection. Sykes makes six arguments on appeal. First, Sykes argues that the trial judge infringed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he erroneously instructed the jury during the guilt phase that allocution would follow closing arguments. Second, Sykes asserts that the State improperly used its peremptory challenges based on race and thereby denied his right to an impartial jury. Third, he contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a change of venue. Fourth, Sykes argues that the trial judge erred when he failed to order a new trial after a witness improperly contacted two members of the jury after the guilt phase and before the penalty phase of his trial. Finally, Sykes argues that his death sentence should be set aside for two reasons: first, because death by lethal injection violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and, second, because his death sentence is disproportionately severe compared to other similar cases. Because the cruel and unusual punishment argument was not properly raised before the trial judge and because Sykes has alternate means of asserting this claim in Superior Court, we do not consider that argument here. Because we find no error on the remaining issues, we AFFIRM.

¶2 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 On November 8, 2004, sixty-eight year old Virginia Trimnell was scheduled to fly from Washington, D.C. to Detroit to visit her daughter. When Trimnell did not arrive as scheduled, her daughter contacted the Dover Police Department. Officer Jeffrey Gott went to check on Trimnell. Gott testified that when he arrived at Trimnell’s apartment, it was tidy and undisturbed and observed no signs of forced entry. He also testified that he saw two shopping bags sitting on the bed. However, he could not locate Trimnell’s car or purse.

¶4 At approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 10, 2004, Dover Police Sergeant Timothy Mutter saw Trimnell’s car traveling on Kings Highway in Dover. The driver, later identified as Sykes, got out of the vehicle, and Mutter asked him for his license and registration. Sykes initially complied but then fled after Mutter asked about Trimnell. The police could not apprehend Sykes that night.

¶5 Police found Sykes’s fingerprints on a shovel and a rubber glove inside Trimnell’s car. The police also found three gas cans and women’s clothing that matched what others saw Trimnell wearing on the day she disappeared. In the trunk of the vehi *265 cle, police found a large green suitcase with Trimnell’s name and Trimnell’s purse inside a green duffel bag. Police found Trimnell’s body stuffed into the large green suitcase.

¶6 An autopsy indicated that Trimnell died by strangulation. A sexual assault kit detected sperm in Trimnell’s vagina. The autopsy did not, however, reveal any defense wounds on Trimnell. DNA testing was conducted. Sykes’s saliva reference sample was ultimately determined to match all sixteen loci from Trimnell’s vaginal swab. Sykes’s DNA also matched the sperm located on a comforter found in Trimnell’s truck.

¶7 Police seized a computer during a search of Trimnell’s apartment. An examination of that computer revealed that it had been used to access pornographic websites on November 7, 2004. Trimnell’s credit cards had been used to access the website. That computer had not been previously used to visit similar websites. Police also seized two pornographic magazines and four computers from Sykes’s mobile home. Files on two of those computers contained “similar images of adult pornography” to those found on Trimnell’s computer. Additionally, police found a leather bag containing silver dollars in the home of Sykes’s girlfriend, Jenny St. Jean. Trimnell’s daughter later identified that bag as Trimnell’s.

¶8 Trimnell’s telephone records revealed that a cell phone registered to Sykes made three calls to her home on the morning of November 7, 2004. Sykes, a night shift restaurant custodian at Dover Downs, did not work on November 7, 2004. He quit this job on November 8, 2004 due to alleged transportation problems. After he quit his job, Dover Downs security cameras showed him leaving the parking lot on November 8, 2004 in Trimnell’s car.

¶9 Police arrested Sykes on November 29, 2004 and the State later indicted him on two counts of Murder First Degree and other felony and misdemeanor charges. The State later re-indicted him and added two counts of Rape First Degree.

¶10 The case proceeded to trial on May 80, 2006. During jury selection, the State used four of its eight challenges to remove members of minority groups from the jury. 1 After three of the first five, and again when four out of the first six, challenges had been exercised against minority venirepersons, Sykes raised a Batson challenge. The trial judge found that the prosecutor had offered a race-neutral reason for each of the peremptory challenges. Consequently, the trial judge determined that the State had discharged its burden of proof as required under Batson. The empaneled jury found Sykes guilty on all charges.

¶11 Following announcement of the verdict on June 27, 2006, the trial judge instructed the jury to return on June 29. During the evening of June 27, two of the jurors came into contact with St. Jean, Sykes’s girlfriend, at a little league park. According to Juror No. 6, St. Jean approached him and asked if he could “donate to the Little League since you ruined my life today.” Juror No. 9 also encountered St. Jean, but told her that “I can’t talk to you” and walked away from her. No. 9 told the trial judge that St. Jean did not say anything to her. Both of the jurors notified the trial judge what had happened. St. Jean denied having any contact with the jurors. *266 After interviewing both jurors, the trial judge concluded that No. 6 could remain fair and impartial and allowed him to remain on the jury. The trial judge dismissed No. 9 after she expressed her fear of St. Jean. At the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a unanimous vote. The trial judge sentenced Sykes to death by lethal injection. Sykes’s automatic and direct appeals followed.

¶12 In our initial opinion, we found that the trial judge made an incomplete Batson analysis. 2 We remanded to the trial judge to make factual findings regarding the presence or absence of discriminatory intent, ie., to determine the totality of the circumstances regarding the challenges and to assess the credibility of the prosecutor’s race neutral explanations. 3 On remand, the trial judge concluded that the prosecutors had provided credible, plausible, and race-neutral reasons for each of the peremptory challenges that removed minority panelists from the jury and that the challenges were not a pretext for racial discrimination. 4

¶13 ANALYSIS

¶14 1. Eighth Amendment Argument

¶15 Sykes argues for the first time on appeal that his death sentence should be commuted because death by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Delaware Constitutions. 5 He seeks a remand to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the impact Delaware’s method of lethal injection may have on a defendant. This Court will not consider any question not fairly presented to the Superior Court unless the interests of justice so require. 6

¶16 Section 4209(f) of the Delaware Criminal Code prescribes the method of carrying out a death sentence in Delaware. 7 We have previously upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection as a form of execution. 8 Further, it is presumed that the Department of Correction will properly perform its duties in carrying out an execution procedure. 9

¶17 The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari and heard ar *267 gument to determine whether the combination three drug protocol used in executions by lethal injection violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment.” 10 However, Sykes did not present this issue to the trial judge. The United States Supreme Court has this issue under consideration. Their decision may control the issue irrespective of anything we might say about the Eighth Amendment today. Further, Sykes may seek post conviction relief after this mandate returns to the Superior Court on any claim under the Delaware Constitution about the propriety of the lethal injection procedure in Delaware. Accordingly, because Sykes still has several avenues available to protect his Eight Amendment and his Delaware constitutional rights, and because he did not properly raise Eight Amendment issues before the trial judge in the first instance, we decline to address those issues in this Opinion.

¶18 2. Fifth Amendment Violation

¶19 Sykes contends that the trial judge violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he informed the jury before closing arguments during the guilt phase that Sykes would have an opportunity to alloeute. The trial judge denied Sykes’s motion for a mistrial. We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion because the trial judge “is in the best position to assess the risk of any prejudice resulting from trial events,” 11 “A mistrial is appropriate only where there are no meaningful and practical alternatives to that remedy.” 12 To the extent that the claim alleges an infringement of a constitutionally protected right, we review de novo. 13

¶20 “The United States Supreme Court stated that the 5th and 14th Amendments forbid comment by the prosecutor on the accused’s silence or instructions by the Court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” 14 In evaluating claims of impermissible comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent, the comment “must be examined in context.” 15 These claims may be asserted if they arise from actions of a prosecutor or a trial judge. 16 We have *268 held that the comment “must be uninvited, must create an improper inference of guilt, and must be prejudicial” to constitute reversible error. 17

¶21 Before closing arguments during the guilt phase, the trial judge told the jury:

Members of the jury, at this time the State and defense have rested their cases. It is typically the time at which you will now hear closing arguments of counsel. We’ll first begin by hearing from the prosecution. Then you’ll hear from the defense. And as you know from earlier instructions that were given to you, the State has a further opportunity to respond to the defense’s statements. You also may be hearing from the defendant if he chooses to do what we call an allocution. It’s entirely up to the defendant, and you may hear about that as we proceed.

¶22 Counsel did not object at the time. After the State made its closing argument, the trial judge then ordered a recess and called counsel to chambers. He notified counsel of his misstatement and asked whether the parties wanted him to issue any type of clarification. At the conference, Sykes’s counsel moved for a mistrial, and the trial judge denied that motion with leave to renew the motion in writing. 18 After further discussion with the attorneys, the trial judge determined that he would provide a curative instruction. Upon returning to the courtroom, he instructed the jury as follows:

I want to clarify one thing because I misspoke. I want to make sure you understand where we are in these proceedings. I actually told you the State would make closing remarks, which [the Prosecutor] did on behalf of the State; that you next would hear from [Defense counsel], who would speak on behalf of the defendant; and then, of course, we’ll have another opportunity for the State, according to our rules, the State would have a right to add any rebuttal they wish to make. And then the matter will close at that point, and then I will give you the instructions that you will follow for this case at this stage of the proceedings. Anything else I said is not important for you to know other than the fact that you need to also understand that the defendant in this case has a right to testify or not testify as he chooses, and the defendant has chosen not to testify in the case-in-chief for the defense. And the fact that the defendant has elected not to testify must not be considered by you as indication that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. I gave you this instruction already. I’m going to give it to you, and you’ll hear it again when I do full-blown instructions which I’ll give you after the State has had an opportunity to do its rebuttal. And the fact that the defendant has chosen not to testify will not be considered by you as an indication that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged or any applicable related offense or for any other purpose, for that matter. And you must not discuss it or consider it during your deliberations. I specifically instruct you that you may not consider the defendant’s election not to testify in determining whether the State has established an element or offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Normally [sic], 19 you would spec *269 ulate as to what the defendant might have said had he exercised his right to testify during the trial. Like any other person charged with an offense, this defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶23 A defendant has no right of allocution during closing arguments in the guilt phase. Therefore, the trial judge erred when he informed the jury that the defendant would have a right to alloeute when no such right existed at that point in the proceedings. Recognizing his error, the trial judge issued a curative instruction informing the jury that it could not consider the defendant’s decision not to testify as evidence of guilt. According to the trial judge, before making that comment, the jury was previously aware that Sykes had the right to testify but had chosen not to do so. The trial judge instructed the jury not to draw any adverse inference from Sykes’s decision not to testify. The trial judge chose not to mention allocution again “so as not to draw to the jury additional attention to the word, since it is a word of ‘legal art,’ and the jury would most likely not be familiar with the term.” 20

¶24 The curative instruction was a “meaningful and practical alternative” to a mistrial. “Error can normally be cured by the use of a curative instruction to the jury, and jurors are presumed to follow those instructions.” 21 Although neither party invited the reference to allocution, the comment did reflect on the defendant’s failure to testify during the guilt phase. But, it was not prejudicial in light of the curative instruction that was given. The trial judge told the jury he misspoke and specifically instructed the jury to not consider Sykes’s silence as evidence of guilt. After examining all of the trial judge’s statements in context, we conclude that the trial judge properly denied the motion for mistrial.

¶25 3. Impartial Jury

¶26 Sykes next claims that the State denied his right to an impartial jury when the State improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race. Sykes notes that the State used four of its first six peremptory challenges to strike minority venirepersons. “We review de novo whether the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for the use of peremptory challenges.” 22 “If we are satisfied with the race-neutrality of the explanation, we apply a more deferential standard of review to the trial court’s ultimate conclusions regarding discriminatory intent. The record of the trial court’s credibility determinations ... and the trial court’s findings with respect to discriminatory intent will stand unless they are clearly erroneous.” 23

¶27 We initially found that the trial judge’s analysis was incomplete under Batson v. Kentucky 24 and remanded this case to the trial judge for further elaboration on this issue. Sykes had made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on the State’s challenge rate, which required the prosecutor to “articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be *270 tried,” 25 the second step of Batson. Although the trial judge found that the prosecutor had offered a race-neutral reason for each of his peremptory strikes, he did not any include findings about the credibility of these explanations in light of the “totality of the relevant facts.” 26 We remanded to the trial judge to make these factual findings.

¶28 On remand, the trial judge analyzed the relevant challenges and the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanations for the challenges. The trial judge engaged in the same analysis as recently explained in Jones v. State, 27 by considering “the credibility of the prosecutor’s representations regarding the challenges, the composition of the jury pool and the peremptory challenges by the State, and [the comparison of] the backgrounds of the challenged panelists against those of similarly empaneled veniremembers who were not challenged.” 28

¶29 Four prospective black jurors were challenged by the prosecutor during jury selection in Sykes’s trial, Mr. S., Ms. T., Ms. F., and Ms. D. 29 The prosecutor directed his second peremptory challenge to Mr. S., a black male. The prosecutor explained that he exercised this peremptory challenge because Mr. S. had been arrested and convicted of violent crimes, including one for domestic violence. 30 The defense argued that other empaneled jurors had been arrested, but the court found that the records of those jurors were not comparable because the charges had been dropped or involved nonviolent crimes. The trial judge found the prosecutor’s explanations reasonable, credible, and race-neutral.

¶30 The prosecutor exercised the fourth peremptory challenge against Ms. T., a black female. The prosecutor explained that he challenged Ms. T. because she indicated that she “leaned against imposing the death penalty and that her demeanor prompted [him] to believe that she did not hold the maturity level that [he] desired for a Capital murder case.” 31 For example, Ms. T. answered “Four” when asked “Have you formed or expressed any opinion regarding whether or not the defendant in this case should be given the death penalty?” 32 The trial judge found the prosecutor’s reasons for dismissing her *271 were based on credible, race-neutral reasons that were not pretextual and not race-related. 33

¶31 The State used its fifth peremptory challenge against Ms. F., a black female. During voir dire, Ms. F. responded to the question of whether she was involved in working with or treating or supporting victims of violent crimes. Because Ms. F. was a youth rehabilitation counsel- or, the prosecutor challenged her. He explained that he was “not interested in a juror whose livelihood involves rehabilitation and who does not judge individuals who have committed wrongs.” The defense argued that the prosecutor had accepted Alternate Juror No. 2, a white male, who worked as a counselor at a family camp for abused children. The trial judge accepted the prosecutor’s assertion that the full-time job of rehabilitating juvenile delinquents differed from counseling abused children for one week per year.

¶32 The State used its sixth peremptory challenge against Ms. D., a black female. In response to the question of whether she could vote for the death penalty, Ms. D. answered no. The prosecutor also noted that one of the deputy attorney generals on Sykes’s case had also prosecuted several of Ms. D.’s relatives. The court accepted the prosecutor’s explanations as non-pretextual.

¶33 The trial judge concluded that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were for credible, plausible, and race-neutral reasons, and not pretexts shadowing racial discrimination. The trial judge also noted that the final jury consisted of three black jurors, a hispanic juror, an Asian juror, and an “other,” none of which the State attempted to challenge for cause. The State also had four peremptory challenges that remained unused. The defense conceded that there was no evidence of a policy or practice on the part of the Department of Justice or the individual prosecutors to exclude minorities from juries.

¶34 Although Sykes made a prima facie showing under Batson, 34 the complete Bat-son analysis shows no constitutional violation. The expanded record shows that the prosecutor articulated credible race-neutral explanations for each of the State’s peremptory challenges. The record supports the trial judge’s fact findings that no discriminatory intent motivated the State’s peremptory challenges. Accordingly, Sykes’s Batson claim is without merit. 35

¶35 *272 4. Change of Venue

¶36 Next, Sykes argues that the trial judge erred when he denied Sykes motion for a change of venue. Sykes contends that highly inflammatory and sensationalized media coverage prevented him from receiving a fair trial in Kent County. We review the trial judge’s denial of a pre-trial motion for a change of venue for abuse of discretion. 36 “A change of venue will be granted only upon a showing of reasonable probability of prejudice.” 37 The showing can be made when the defendant presents “evidence of highly inflammatory or sensationalized pre-trial publicity sufficient for the court to presume prejudice if it finds the publicity to be inherently prejudicial. Short of such a showing, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice through voir dire.” 38

¶37 The trial judge analyzed the pretrial publicity concerning Sykes’s case and concluded that the articles were “informational” and that Sykes had failed to demonstrate actual prejudice through voir dire. “[D]ue process does not entitle a defendant to a trial by jurors ignorant of all facts surrounding the case.” 39 The articles were insufficient for the trial judge to presume prejudice, and actual prejudice was not demonstrated through voir dire. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sykes’s motion for a change in venue.

¶38 5. Improper Contact with Jurors

¶39 Sykes argues that the trial judge erred when he did not order a new trial when a witness improperly contacted members of the jury after the guilt phase but before the penalty phase. We generally review denials of motions for a new trial for abuse of discretion. 40

¶40 To succeed on a claim of improper jury influence, a defendant must prove that he was “identifiably prejudiced” by the juror misconduct unless he “can establish the existence of ‘egregious circumstances,’ — i.e., circumstances that, if *273 true, would be deemed inherently prejudicial so as to raise a presumption of prejudice in favor of defendant.” 41 In the voir dire context, “[djeterminations of juror impartiality are the responsibility of the trial judge who has the opportunity to question the juror, observe his or her demeanor, and evaluate the ability of the juror to render a fair verdict.” 42 Consequently, the trial judge’s findings are extended great deference. 43

¶41 During the evening after the jury delivered the verdict, Sykes’s girlfriend, Jenny St. Jean, approached two of the jurors at a little league game. Juror No. 6 notified the trial judge that St. Jean had approached him and asked him if he could “donate to the Little League since you ruined my life today.” Juror No. 9 also notified the trial judge that St. Jean had approached her, that St. Jean did not say anything, and that Juror No. 9 told St. Jean, “I can’t talk to you” and walked away from her. The trial judge interviewed both jurors regarding the incident.

¶42 Juror No. 6 told the trial judge that he was not in fear of St. Jean and that he could remain impartial. Juror No. 9 admitted that she was fearful for herself and her daughter after the encounter. The trial judge excused No. 9, but not No. 6. Sykes contends that the contact between St. Jean and the two jurors is an egregious circumstance warranting a presumption of prejudice. We disagree.

¶43 Only the impartiality of Juror No. 6 is at issue because the trial judge excused No. 9. Juror No. 6 told the trial judge that he was not worried that St. Jean would do any harm to him and that he could remain impartial. Sykes failed to demonstrate or articulate how he was “identifiably prejudiced” by juror misconduct or that he could establish the existence of “egregious circumstances” warranting a new penalty hearing. Thus, because Sykes failed to meet his burden demonstrating prejudice, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in evaluating this juror and determining that the juror could remain impartial and complete his duty during the penalty phase.

¶44 6. Proportionality of the Death Penalty

¶45 The final issue we must address is whether the Superior Court judge’s imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases arising under the Delaware death penalty statute. 44 Review by this Court is statutorily mandated following the imposition of a death sentence. 45 Under 11 Del. C. § 4209(g), this Court must independently review a sentence of death to determine whether: (1) the evidence supports, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury’s finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; (2) the sentence was arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended; and (3) the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 46 In this appeal, Sykes argues that his sentence of death is disproportionate. He does not contest the jury’s findings on the statutory aggrava *274 ting circumstances. 47

¶46 In Sykes’s case, the State alleged, as an applicable statutory aggravating circumstance, that Sykes murdered Virginia Trimnell while committing or fleeing from second degree burglary. 48 The State established this statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, by virtue of Sykes’s conviction at trial. 49 The jury unanimously found that the State proved the statutory aggravating circumstance by their verdict on the felony murder count.

¶47 The trial judge did not arbitrarily or capriciously impose the death penalty. A judge’s decision is not arbitrary and capricious if the decision is “the product of a deliberate, rational and logical deductive process.” 50 The trial judge set out his rationale for the sentencing decision in a nineteen page written opinion. 51 In reaching his decision, the trial judge considered the statutory and non-statutory aggrava-tors presented by the State and carefully considered the mitigating evidence presented by Sykes.

¶48 The trial judge considered the following aggravating circumstances: the preplan-ning and viciousness of the rape and murder of the victim in her home; the fact that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain; the evidence that Sykes targeted the victim and planned the murder in advance; the evidence that Sykes terrorized and abused the victim before murdering her and that he murdered the victim in an effort to destroy or conceal evidence that he had burglarized her apartment and raped her; the defendant’s potential to be dangerous in the future; the impact on the victim’s family and friends; and the fact that the victim was random, innocent, and elderly (68 years old). He balanced those aggravating factors against several mitigating factors, including the lack of guidance as a youth, his lack of a father figure, his relationship with his wife, son, and extended family. The evidence supports the trial judge’s determination, consistent with the jury’s unanimous recommendation, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The decision resulted from a deliberate, rational, and logical deductive process.

¶49 Finally, we must determine if Sykes’s sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. In answering this inquiry, we review the “universe” of cases. 52 The “universe” of cases is comprised of those First Degree Murder cases which have included a penalty hearing and in which a sentence of either life or death has become final, without or following a review by this Court. 53

¶50 We have upheld the imposition of the death penalty in several cases involving cruel and outrageous deaths of de *275 fenseless, helpless persons. 54 Where the victim was elderly and was raped and murdered by strangulation, we have found the death sentence proportionate. 55 We have also upheld death sentences where the murder occurred in the victim’s home where the object was to commit another criminal offense such as burglary or robbery, 56 and where the murder has been committed for pecuniary gain. 57 Although Sykes tries to distinguish his case from others where the pecuniary gains were larger, “[t]he presence of pecuniary gain is not necessary ... for a death sentence to be affirmed.” 58 This case fits the pattern of cases where the death penalty has been upheld as proportionate. Accordingly, the trial judge’s imposition of a sentence of death for the murder conviction was not disproportionate.

¶51 CONCLUSION

¶52 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superi- or Court is AFFIRMED.

¶53 APPENDIX A *

¶54 Name: Robert Ashley

¶55 Criminal ID: 9605003410

¶56 County: New Castle

¶57 Sentence: Life

¶58 Decision on appeal: 2006 WL 797894 (Del. Mar. 27, 2006)

¶59 Meri-Ya C. Baker Name:

¶60 90011925DI Criminal ID:

¶61 New Castle County:

¶62 Life imprisonment Sentence:

¶63 1993 WL 557951 (Del. Dec. 30,1993) Decision on appeal:

¶64 Name: Jermaine Barnett

¶65 Criminal ID: 9506017682

¶66 *276 County: New Castle

¶67 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶68 Decision on appeal: 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000)

¶69 Name: Hector S. Barrow

¶70 Criminal ID: 9506017661

¶71 County: New Castle

¶72 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶73 Decision on appeal: 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.2000)

¶74 Name: Tyreek D. Brown

¶75 Criminal ID: 9705011492

¶76 County: New Castle

¶77 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶78 Decision on appeal: 1999 WL 485174 (Del. Mar. 1,1999)

¶79 Name: Justin L. Burrell

¶80 Criminal ID: 9805012046

¶81 County: Kent

¶82 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶83 Decision on appeal: 766 A.2d 19 (Del.2000)

¶84 Name: Luis G. Cabrera

¶85 Criminal ID: 9703012700

¶86 County: New Castle

¶87 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶88 Decision on appeal: 747 A.2d 543 (Del.2000)

¶89 Name: Luis G. Cabrera

¶90 Criminal ID: 9904019326

¶91 County: New Castle

¶92 Sentence: Death

¶93 Decision on appeal: 840 A.2d 1256 (Del.2004)

¶94 Name: Thomas J. Capano

¶95 Criminal ID: 9711006198

¶96 County: New Castle

¶97 Sentence: Life

¶98 Decision on appeal: 889 A.2d 2006 (Del.2006)

¶99 Name: James B. Clark, Jr.

¶100 Criminal ID: 9406003237

¶101 County: New Castle

¶102 Sentence: Death

¶103 Decision on appeal: 672 A.2d 1004 (Del.1996)

¶104 Name: Charles M. Cohen

¶105 Criminal ID: 90001577DI

¶106 County: New Castle

¶107 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶108 Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken

¶109 Name: Donald Cole

¶110 Criminal ID: 0309013358

¶111 County: New Castle

¶112 Sentence: Life

¶113 Decision on appeal: 922 A.2d 364 (Del.2007)

¶114 Name: James T. Crowe, Jr.

¶115 *277 Criminal ID: 9508008979

¶116 County: New Catle

¶117 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶118 Decision on appeal: 1998 WL 736389 (Del. Oct. 8,1998)

¶119 Name: David F. Dawson

¶120 Criminal ID: 88K00413DI

¶121 County: New Castle (venue changed)

¶122 Sentence: Death

¶123 Decision on appeal: 637 A.2d 57 (Del.1994)

¶124 Name: Byron S. Dickerson

¶125 Criminal ID: 90011926DI

¶126 County: New Castle

¶127 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶128 Decision on appeal: 1993 WL 541913 (Del. Dee. 21,1993)

¶129 Name: Cornelius E. Ferguson

¶130 Criminal ID: 91009926DI

¶131 County: New Castle

¶132 Sentence: Death

¶133 Decision on appeal: 642 A.2d 772 (Del.1994)

¶134 Name: Donald Flagg

¶135 Criminal ID: 9804019233

¶136 County: New Castle

¶137 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶138 Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken

¶139 Name: Freddy Flonnory

¶140 Criminal ID: 9707012190

¶141 County: New Castle

¶142 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶143 Decision on appeal: 893 A.2d 507 (Del.2006)

¶144 Name: SadiM J. Garden

¶145 Criminal ID: 9912015068

¶146 County: New Castle

¶147 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶148 Decision on appeal: 844 A.2d 311 (Del.2004)

¶149 Name: Robert J. Garvey

¶150 Criminal ID: 0107010230

¶151 County: New Castle

¶152 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶153 Appeal: 873 A.2d 291 (Del.2005)

¶154 Name: Robert A. Gattis

¶155 Criminal ID: 90004576DI

¶156 County: New Castle

¶157 Sentence: Death

¶158 Decision on appeal: 637 A.2d 808 (Del.1994)

¶159 Name: Arthur Govan

¶160 Criminal ID: 92010166DI

¶161 County: New Castle

¶162 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶163 Decision on appeal: 1995 WL 48359 (Del. Jan. 30,1995)

¶164 *278 Name: Tyrone N. Guy

¶165 Criminal ID: 0107017041

¶166 County: New Castle

¶167 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶168 Decision on appeal: 913 A.2d 558 (Del.2006)

¶169 Name: Jason Anthony Hainey

¶170 Criminal ID: 0306015699

¶171 County: New Castle

¶172 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶173 Appeal: 878 A.2d 430 (Del.2005)

¶174 Name: Akbar Hassan-El

¶175 Criminal ID: 010701704

¶176 County: New Castle

¶177 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶178 Decision on appeal: 911 A.2d 385 (Del.2006)

¶179 Name: Robert W. Jackson, III

¶180 Criminal ID: 92003717

¶181 County: New Castle

¶182 Sentence: Death

¶183 Decision on appeal: 684 A.2d 745 (Del.1996)

¶184 Name: Larry Johnson

¶185 Criminal ID: 0309013375

¶186 County: New Castle

¶187 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶188 Decision on appeal: 878 A.2d 422 (Del.2005)

¶189 Name: David Jones

¶190 Criminal ID: 9807016504

¶191 County: New Castle

¶192 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶193 Decision on appeal: 798 A.2d 1013 (Del.2002)

¶194 Name: Michael Jones

¶195 Criminal ID: 9911016309

¶196 County: New Castle

¶197 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶198 Decision on appeal: -A.2d-(Del. Dec. 12,2007)

¶199 Name: Michael Keyser

¶200 Criminal ID: 0310021647

¶201 County: Kent

¶202 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶203 Decision on appeal: 893 A.2d 956 (Del.2006)

¶204 Name: David J. Lawrie

¶205 Criminal ID: 92K03617DI

¶206 County: Kent

¶207 Sentence: Death

¶208 Decision on appeal: 643 A.2d 1336 (Del.1994)

¶209 Name: Thomas M. Magner

¶210 Criminal ID: 9509007746

¶211 County: New Castle

¶212 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶213 Decision on appeal: 1998 WL 666726 (Del. July 29,1998)

¶214 *279 Name: Michael R. Manley

¶215 Criminal ID: 9511007022

¶216 County: New Castle

¶217 Sentence: Death

¶218 Decision on appeal: 918 A.2d 321 (Del.2007)

¶219 Name: Frank W. Moore, Jr.

¶220 Criminal ID: 92S03679DI

¶221 County: Sussex

¶222 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶223 Decision on appeal: 1994 WL 202289 (Del. May 9,1994)

¶224 Name: Adam Norcross

¶225 Criminal ID: 0002006278A

¶226 County: Kent

¶227 Sentence: Death

¶228 Decision on appeal: 816 A.2d 757 (Del.2003)

¶229 Name: Juan Ortiz

¶230 Criminal ID: 0104013797

¶231 County: Kent

¶232 Sentence: Death

¶233 Decision on appeal: 869 A.2d 285 (Del.2005)

¶234 Name: Jack F. Outten

¶235 Criminal ID: 92000786DI

¶236 County: New Castle

¶237 Sentence: Death

¶238 Decision on appeal: 650 A.2d 1291 (Del.1994)

¶239 Name: Darrel Page

¶240 Criminal ID: 9911016961

¶241 County: New Castle

¶242 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶243 Decision on appeal: 934 A.2d 891 (Del.2007)

¶244 Name: James W. Perez

¶245 Criminal ID: 93001659

¶246 County: New Castle

¶247 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶248 Decision on appeal: No. 207,1993, Moore, J. (Del. Feb. 3,1994)

¶249 Name: Gary W. Ploof

¶250 Criminal ID: 0111003002

¶251 County: Kent

¶252 Sentence: Death

¶253 Decision on appeal: 856 A.2d 539 (Del.2004)

¶254 Name: James Allen Red Dog

¶255 Criminal ID: 91001754DI

¶256 County: New Castle

¶257 Sentence: Death (judge only)

¶258 Decision on appeal: 616 A.2d 298 (Del.1992)

¶259 Name: Luis Reyes

¶260 Criminal ID: 9904019329

¶261 County: New Castle

¶262 Sentence: Death

¶263 *280 Decision on appeal: 819 A.2d 305 (Del.2003)

¶264 Name: James W. Riley

¶265 Criminal ID: 0004014504

¶266 County: Kent

¶267 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶268 Decision on appeal: 2004 WL 2085525 (Del. Oct. 20, 2004)

¶269 Name: Jose Rodriguez

¶270 Criminal ID: 93001668DI

¶271 County: New Castle

¶272 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶273 Decision on appeal: 1994 WL 679731 (Del. Nov. 29,1994)

¶274 Name: Richard Roth, Jr.

¶275 Criminal ID: 9901000330

¶276 County: New Castle

¶277 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶278 Decision on appeal: 788 A.2d 101 (Del.2001)

¶279 Name: Reginald N. Sanders

¶280 Criminal ID: 91010161DI

¶281 County: New Castle

¶282 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶283 Decision on appeal: 585 A.2d 117 (Del.1990)

¶284 Name: Nelson W. Shelton

¶285 Criminal ID: 92000788DI

¶286 County: New Castle

¶287 Sentence: Death

¶288 Decision on appeal: 652 A.2d 1 (Del.1995)

¶289 Name: Steven W. Shelton

¶290 Criminal ID: 92000787DI

¶291 County: New Castle

¶292 Sentence: Death

¶293 Decision on appeal: 650 A.2d 1291 (Del.1994)

¶294 Name: Donald J. Simmons

¶295 Criminal ID: 92000305DI

¶296 County: New Castle

¶297 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶298 Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken

¶299 Name: Chauncey Starling

¶300 Criminal ID: 0104015882

¶301 County: New Castle

¶302 Sentence: Death

¶303 Decision on appeal: 903 A.2d 758 (Del.2006)

¶304 Name: Brian David Steckel

¶305 Criminal ID: 9409002147

¶306 County: New Castle

¶307 Sentence: Death

¶308 Decision on appeal: 711 A.2d 5 (Del.1998)

¶309 Name: David D. Stevenson

¶310 Criminal ID: 9511006992

¶311 County: New Castle

¶312 *281 Sentence: Death

¶313 Decision on appeal: 918 A.2d 321 (Del.2007)

¶314 Name: Willie G. Sullivan

¶315 Criminal ID: 92K00055

¶316 County: Kent

¶317 Sentence: Death

¶318 Decision on appeal: 636 A.2d 931 (Del.1994)

¶319 Name: Ralph Swan

¶320 Criminal ID: 0002004767A

¶321 County: Kent

¶322 Sentence: Death

¶323 Decision on appeal: 820 A.2d 342 (Del.2003)

¶324 Name: Antonio L. Taylor

¶325 Criminal ID: 9404018838

¶326 County: Kent

¶327 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶328 Decision on appeal: 685 A.2d 349 (Del.1996)

¶329 Name: Milton Taylor

¶330 Criminal ID: 0003016874

¶331 County: New Castle

¶332 Sentence: Death

¶333 Decision on appeal: 822 A.2d 1052 (Del.2003)

¶334 Name: Desmond Torrence

¶335 Criminal ID: 0205014445

¶336 County: New Castle

¶337 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶338 Decision on appeal: 2005 WL 2923501 (Del. Nov. 2, 2005)

¶339 Name: Charles H. Trowbridge

¶340 Criminal ID: 91K03044DI

¶341 County: Kent

¶342 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶343 Decision on appeal: 1996 WL 145788 (Del. Mar. 4,1996)

¶344 Name: James W. Virdin

¶345 Criminal ID: 9809015552

¶346 County: Kent

¶347 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶348 Decision on appeal: 780 A.2d 1024 (Del.2001)

¶349 Name: John E. Watson

¶350 Criminal ID: 91008490DI

¶351 County: New Castle

¶352 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶353 Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken

¶354 Name: Dwayne Weeks

¶355 Criminal ID: 92010167

¶356 County: New Castle

¶357 Sentence: Death

¶358 Decision on appeal: 653 A.2d 266 (Del.1995)

¶359 Name: Joseph Williams

¶360 Criminal ID: 9809018249

¶361 *282 County: New Castle

¶362 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶363 Decision on appeal: 2003 WL 1740469 (Del. Apr. 1, 2008)

¶364 Name: Roy R. Williamson

¶365 Criminal ID: 93S02210DI

¶366 County: Sussex

¶367 Sentence: Life imprisonment

¶368 Decision on appeal: 669 A2d 95 (Del.1995)

¶369 Name: Jermaine M. Wright

¶370 Criminal ID: 91004136

¶371 County: New Castle

¶372 Sentence: Death

¶373 Decision on appeal: 671 A.2d 1353 (Del.1996)

¶374 Name: Craig A. Zebroski

¶375 Criminal ID: 9604017809

¶376 County: New Castle

¶377 Sentence: Death

¶378 Decision on appeal: 715 A.2d 75 (Del.1998)