Gilmore v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The most commonly understood method of “waiving” a constitutional right is by an affirmative, verbal request. Typical of such waivers under the Sixth Amendment are the requests to proceed pro se and requests to plead guilty.... The High Court has emphasized the importance of an affirmative, on-the-record waiver, noting that it indulges every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. # ⅜ ⅝ # ⅝ At the other end of the spectrum is the concept of forfeiture.. Unlike waiver, Which requires a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant’s knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.... In United States v. McLeod, 53 F,3d 322 (11th Cir.1995), ... the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a defendant who is abusive toward his attorney may forfeit his right to counsel. ⅜* í¡í r}{ ⅜» «¡i Finally,' there is a hybrid situation, (“waiver by conduct”) that combines elements of waiver and forfeiture. Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.... Thus, instead of “waiver by conduct,” this situation more appropriately might be termed “forfeiture with knowledge.” ⅛ H* ⅜ # sfc [Forfeit”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gabriel Kowalskey v. State of Indiana

2. “In the present case, Gilmore engaged in behavior that led his court-appointed attorneys to withdraw from representation. Understandably, the trial court became dissatisfied with the delay seemingly caused by Gilmore in moving the case forward. This conduct was not of the kind often associated with a finding of forfeiture of the right to counsel. Nor does this conduct fit neatly into the category of cases in which waiver of the right to counsel is found, as Gilmore repeatedly requested representation by counsel. Instead, it appears to be more along the lines of a waiver by conduct or forfeiture with knowledge. As such, Gilmore ivas and is entitled to a hearing during which he should he warned that if his obstreperous behavior persists, the trial court will find that he has chosen self-representation by his own conduct. Then the inquiry turns to an analysis of whether Gilmore made a knoioing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, which includes a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation established in an on-the-record evidentiary hearing where specific findings are made. While not condoning Gilmore’s apparent obstreperous conduct, because those warnings were not given to Gilmore, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that Gilmore had waived his right to counsel. We, therefore, vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gabriel Kowalskey v. State of Indiana

3. “'confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Yusuf Hotep-El v. State of Indiana