Visger v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Strickland teaches us that: The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . The Court thus expressly rejected a “more likely than not” standard for evaluating whether counsel’s deficient performance altered the outcome of the case. Instead, as noted by the Fourth Circuit: With respect to the prejudice requirement, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The level of certainty is something less than a preponderance; it need not be proved that counsel’s performance more likely than not affected the outcome. Instead, the petitioner need only demonstrate “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 759 (4th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 126 So. 3d 1195 - Nelson v. State

2. “To establish the first prong under Strickland , the defendant must demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . To establish the second prong under Strickland , the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . When reviewing a trial court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s factual findings to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the trial court’s determinations of deficiency and prejudice, which are mixed questions of fact and law. See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 32 (Fla.2005).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 126 So. 3d 1195 - Nelson v. State