Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 955 SO2D 81 - State v. Ruiz

State v. Ruiz’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
1
states following
April 2018
most recently cited

30 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Stovall v. Denno · Arizona v. Fulminante · Johnson v. United States · Neder v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he erroneous treatment of La.Rev. Stat. 40:982 as a substantive element of the offense, thus placing the defendant's prior offenses in the charging instrument and before the jury, does not necessarily render the criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. . . . The erroneous introduction of evidence of other crimes is a trial error, which may be qualitatively assessed in the context of the other evidence to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citation omitted.)”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “We further observe that although the State charged the defendant as a second offender pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 40:982, after trial the State filed an habitual offender bill under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. After finding the defendant a second offender subject to the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 A(l)(a), the court calculated the applicable sentencing range by doubling the maximum penalty provided for the underlying offenses pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 40:982, and then applying to those enhanced penalties the formula for sentencing a second offender under La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1A(l)(a), to find a sentencing range of 5 to 20 years for possession of cocaine and 30 to 120 years for distribution of cocaine. Under this formula, the trial court imposed sentences of 5 years at hard labor for possession of cocaine as a second and subsequent offender and 30 years at hard labor for distribution of cocaine as a second and subsequent offender. These sentences equate to the maximum penalties statutorily provided for the underlying offenses of possession and distribution and thus, the court imposed sentences which do not exceed the maximum un-enhanced terms of imprisonment provided by the underlying substantive crimes. However, we must caution the trial court that the double enhancement formula it used, ie., enhancing the penalties provided for the underlying offense as a matter of La.Rev.Stat. 40:982 and then enhancing those enhanced penalties under La. Rev stat 15:529.1, on the basis of the ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Structural errors infect the entire trial process and necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair; they deprive a defendant of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence. The United States Supreme Court has found structural errors in”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.