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← 955 SO2D 864 - Edmonds v. State

Edmonds v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2006

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
June 2017
most recently cited

4 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · Delaware v. Van Arsdall · Kumho Tire Company, Ltd., et al. v. Patrick Carmichael, Etc., et al. · Gault · Chambers v. Mississippi

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Daubert court described the analysis that judges must apply when determining admissibility as a two-step inquiry: "the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge [reliability] that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue [relevance]." Id. In answering this inquiry, Daubert urged courts to use a non-exhaustive list of factors to help determine the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) whether the theory can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the theory has been published or subjected to peer review; (3) any known rate of error; and (4) the general acceptance that the theory has garnered in the relevant expert community. Id. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . In further describing the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court emphasized that "the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one." Id. at 594 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . The Court also stated that "an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation." Id. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . Although Daubert was decided in 1993, Mississippi did not adopt the Daubert standard until 2003, in Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31 (Miss.2003). Prior to adopting the Daubert standard, Mississippi utilized the "general acceptance" standard as articulated in Frye. In McLemore , the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted Daubert because Rule ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Tyler, — BY OFFICER WILLIAMS: Do — do you want him to stop talking to us? Do y'all want to — BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: I want to be here with him. This is my child. You have to understand. BY OFFICER WILLIAMS: And he — he said prior that he — he wants to talk to you after he talks to us. BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Tyler, do you know what you're — I mean you're telling them the truth. Right? BY THE DEFENDANT: (Head nodding yes) BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Huh? BY OFFICER WILLIAMS: And he wants — and he wants to talk to you after he talks to us. BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: They're not making you say stuff that you don't want to say? BY THE DEFENDANT: (Head nodding no) BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Look at me. Look at me. Are you having problems? BY THE DEFENDANT: (Head nodding no) BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Well what's wrong? BY OFFICER WILLIAMS: Do you want to go ahead and talk to her now, Tyler? BY THE DEFENDANT: (Head nodding no) BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Do you? Son, just — Look, baby, tell me. Look. What's wrong? What's wrong, baby, Huh? BY THE DEFENDANT: I'm telling the truth. BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Okay. What is the truth? BY THE DEFENDANT: That me and Christy did it. BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Tyler, y'all killed him. (DEFENDANT CRYING) BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: Tyler! Tyler Wayne! Son look at me. Did you for real do that or are you just telling them that. BY THE DEFENDANT: We done this. BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER: What did y'all do? Oh, God . . . Tyler Wayne, are you sure you did this? BY”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “As can be seen from the quoted passages, the State did not ask Dr. Hayne whether his autopsical findings were consistent with two people pulling the trigger. Moreover, Dr. Hayne did not testify to such a finding. The precise question asked by the State that drew the objection was this: Based on the path of the projectile and everything that you viewed, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the defendant's version of the events is consistent with what you found in Mr. Fulgham? Because of the intervening objection, this question was not answered. After the objection was overruled, the State then asked this question: Doctor, I had asked you regarding your examination of the victim, Joseph Fulgham, your examination of the photographs, the crime scene video, the location that Mr. Fulgham was found, and this defendant's version of what happened and how he was killed, based on a medical degree of certainty or within a medical degree of certainty, do you have an opinion one way or another whether or not that is consistent? Obviously, Dr. Hayne was competent to testify regarding the path of the projectile from the point it entered Joey's body. Because the autopsy provided Dr. Hayne with knowledge of the angle that the projectile traveled after entering Joey's body, Dr. Hayne also was competent to testify regarding the angle of the projectile prior to entering Joey's body, for it would have continued to travel at that angle unless it was deflected by striking a bone or some other”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.