¶1OPINION ON STATE’S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
¶2A jury convicted appellant of two counts of aggravated robbery. After appellant entered pleas of “true” to the enhancement allegations, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for life on both counts. The record reflects that after appellant’s trial began, the trial court granted appellant’s request to proceed with eleven jurors after it was learned that one of the jurors had communicated with a potential witness for the State. The eleven-member jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilt on both counts.
¶3On direct appeal, appellant claimed, among other things, that the jury had no power to render a verdict because it was composed of less than twelve jurors. The State claimed appellant waived the right to a jury composed of twelve jurors.
¶4Relying on this Court’s recent decision in Ex parte Hernandez, 906 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), the Court of Appeals held appellant could not waive the requirement of Article 36.29(a), V.A.C.C.P., that no less than twelve jurors render a verdict in a felony case. Roberts v. State, 933 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.]). The Court of *81Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the causes for a new trial. We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to reexamine our decision in Hernandez and to once again reexamine the question of whether a defendant can waive his statutory right under Article 36.29(a) to a jury of twelve members.
¶5In Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813, Tex.Cr.App.1997), this Court decided the issue adversely to appellant, and held a defendant may waive his statutory right to a jury of twelve members. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause there for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and our opinion in Hatchand to address appellant’s remaining points of error.
¶6dissenting.
¶7The majority opinion is yet another attempt to circumvent applicable law in furtherance of a result oriented agenda. The majority holds “... a defendant may waive his statutory right to a jury of twelve members. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause there for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and our opinion in Hatch. ...” Ante at 81.
¶8While I dissent to the majority’s holding in this case for the reasons I dissented in Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Cr.App.), I feel it necessary to comment on the majority’s disturbing and unprecedented mischaraeteri-zation in this case of defendant’s right of trial by a full jury as merely a “statutory right” subject to waiver. Until now, this Court has honored an accused felon’s right to a jury of twelve member's as a right protected by the Texas Constitution. See, Tex. Const, art. V, § 13 (jury in district court shall be composed of twelve members); and Tex. Const, art. I, § 15 (defendant’s right of trial by jury shall remain inviolable). Clark v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 278, 276 S.W.2d 819, 820 (1955) (holding judgment in felony case where there is plea of not guilty based only on a verdict of eleven jurors violates defendant’s constitutional right of trial by jury and is absolutely void); Dunn v. State, 92 Tex.Crim. 126, 242 S.W. 1049 (1922) (same). With this additional comment, I dissent to the majority’s failure to apply Texas law requiring twelve jurors in a felony prosecution, consistent with my dissenting opinion in Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Cr.App.).