Waite v. Waite’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses, Rule 8(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C. , 851 So.2d 507 , 516 (Ala. 2002), and do not affect a court's jurisdiction to consider an action. Affirmative defenses may be waived if they are not pleaded by a party against whom a claim is asserted. Rule 8(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bechtel v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. , 451 So.2d 793 (Ala. 1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice § 8.27[3] AT 8-251 (2d ed. 1948)). By its actions in the present case, the trial court, in essence, asserted the affirmative defenses of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel on behalf of the defendants and dismissed the matter based on those affirmative defenses. "`After careful consideration, we find most persuasive the reasoning of the courts that have held that, although a trial court may dismiss an action on its own motion on a jurisdictional basis, affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations or the doctrine of res judicata are not jurisdictional bases upon which a court may base a sua sponte dismissal. See Lease Partners Corp. v. R J Pharmacies, Inc. , [ 329 Ill.App.3d 69 , 768 N.E.2d 54 , 263 Ill.Dec. 294 (2002)]; Adams v. Inman , [ 892 S.W.2d 651 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994)]. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the action, on its own motion, based upon affirmative defenses not asserted by the defendants.'"”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Beck · Wausau Development Corp. v. Natural Gas & Oil, Inc.

2. “"`"The standard of review of the grant of a motion to dismiss . . . was set out in Nance v. Matthews , 622 So.2d 297 , 299 (Ala. 1993): "`"`On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. The appropriate standard of review . . . is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note that a . . . dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.'" " `Jacks v. Madison County , 741 So.2d 429 , 430 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (citations omitted). In addition, "[m]otions to dismiss are rarely appropriate in declaratory judgment proceedings. Such a motion does, however, serve one purpose, that of determining whether the [complaint] states the substance of a bonafide justiciable controversy which should be settled." Wallace v. Burleson , 361 So.2d 554 , 555 (Ala. 1978) (citation omitted).'"”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 994 So. 2d 250 - Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. TUSCALOOSA CTY.

3. “[m]otions to dismiss are rarely appropriate in declaratory judgment proceedings. Such a motion does, however, serve one purpose, that of determining whether the [complaint] states the substance of a bonafide justiciable controversy which should be settled.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 994 So. 2d 250 - Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. TUSCALOOSA CTY.