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← 96 Cal. 467 - Verdier v. Roach

Verdier v. Roach’s Empirical Analysis

1892

Citation profile

53
cited by 53 later decisions
12
states following
October 1992
most recently cited

53 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently October 1992 · most notably Newman v. Burwell (1932), 141 Cal. App. 2d 801 - Hurlimann v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n (1956)

53 state decisions — followed in 12 states

15018921900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Fallon v. Butler · In re Estate of Swain · Kenyon v. . See · Ellis v. Polhemus · Stuttmeister v. Superior Court

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Where the limited jurisdiction of a distinct probate court has proved to be inadequate, the original jurisdiction of courts of equity over the administration of estates has been invoked. Our superior courts have both probate and equity jurisdiction, so that whenever, in the course of the administration and settlement of estates, our probate statutes are found to be inadequate to authorize and accomplish all that a court of equity is authorized to do in such cases, our superior-courts may exercise their equity powers in connection with, and as incidental to, their powers in probate matters, to the extent necessary to a complete administration and distribution of estates; provided, of course, that nothing be done in contravention of any statutory provision.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““It is further contended for appellants that they had no existing claim against Blythe’s estate which could have been presented during the period of ten months after publication of notice to creditors, since Blythe’s liability to indemnify them did not become absolute or due until the contingency happened, two years after that period had expired. “ It is true that their claim was neither absolute nor due during that period, but it was, nevertheless, an existing valuable claim against the estate of Blythe, assignable, devisable, and descendible (Kenyon v. See, 94 N. Y. 563 ), and also detrimental to Blythe’s estate. It consisted of a then existing obligation arising from an express covenant of the decedent to indemnify the appellants for one half of all damages they might suffer from water, etc., during the term of the lease. It was substantially a covenant of insurance. “ Counsel ask, What would have been the effect of an allowance of this claim by the administrator? A sufficient answer to this is, that an allowance of the claim would have admitted and established the validity of the obligation, and would have entitled it To be filed in court and ranked among the acknowledged debts of the estate, to be paid in due course of administration’ (Sec. 1497), 'as the circumstances of the estate required.’ (Sec. 1647.) If still contingent at the time of the settlement of accounts, 'the amount thereof, or such part of the same as the holder would be entitled to if the claim Avere due,”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““Literally understood, perhaps, this would exclude from the meaning of the word 'claims’ all demands of every kind which did not fall due until after the death of .the decedent, even though a money judgment might be rendered upon them after they should become due; and it would follow that claims upon promissory notes and other contracts for the direct payment of money not due until after the death of the testator need not be presented to the executor for allowance. It will hardly be contended that this was the intention of the learned! justice who wrote the opinion in that case. Near the close of the opinion, however, the intention of the court is expressed more precisely as follows: ‘In the use of the term “claims” it (the Legislature) intended to embrace only such demands or liabilities as might by action be reduced to simple money judgments, and to leave the enforcement of specific liens and equitable rights to the ordinary proceedings in the district courts.’ This expresses all that could have been intended as to the meaning of the word ‘claims.’ Whether the claims were due, not due, or contingent must have been considered immaterial to the decision.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.