Burns v. Incorporated’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]f the plaintiff offers nothing to disprove the defendant’s nondiscriminatory explanations, the explanations’ weakness alone is insufficient to create an issue of pretext. Instead the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to present affirmative evidence of [discriminatory] animus____ A showing of pretext demands the same type of proof—affirmative evidence of discriminatory intent—required under traditional principles, but not necessarily the same quantum. Affirmative proof that alone does not suffice under the traditional scheme may, when combined with the weakness of the defendant’s asserted nondiscriminatory reasons, create a prima fa-cie case of pretext.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 18 F. Supp. 2d 596 - Malina v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. · 28 F. Supp. 2d 331 - Rankin v. Greater Media, Inc.

2. “(1) under ordinary principles of proof using any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue, or (2) under a judicially created proof scheme originally used in the Title VII context in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ... and subsequently adapted for use in ADEA eases. Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374-75 (4th Cir.1992) (citing, inter alia, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 , 113 S.Ct. 1276 , 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993))[ ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Brennan v. Deluxe Corp. · Papa v. Union Carbide Corp.

3. “The plaintiff, Frances D. Burns, was employed by the defendant, AAF-McQuay, Inc., for approximately sixteen years at the defendant’s facility in Staunton, Virginia. The plaintiff was the secretary to the human resources manager until her reassignment to the position of switchboard operator. Approximately one month after her reassignment, the plaintiff resigned her employment with the defendant. From 1978 to 1991, the plaintiff was supervised by Chuck Welsh (Welsh). From 1991 to 1992, the plaintiff was supervised by Gary Aderson (Aderson). In 1992, Stephen B. Horney (Horney) became the human resources manager and the plaintiffs super visor. Horney was the plaintiffs supervisor at all times relevant to this matter. The plaintiff claims that supervisors Welsh and Alderson consistently evaluated the plaintiffs performance as “commendable” or “excellent.” The plaintiff claims that she maintained good working relationships with both Welsh and Alderson and that neither supervisor criticized her work performance. Alderson testified that the plaintiff was an excellent employee and that her job was definitely not in jeopardy because of her work performance. The defendant claims, however, that Horney became dissatisfied with the plaintiffs performance. In February 1994, Horney transferred the plaintiff to the position of switchboard operator and replaced the plaintiff with Donna Brown, then thirty-nine years of age. On March 4, 1994, the plaintiff resigned from the company. At the time ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 980 F. Supp. 175 - Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc.